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This study follows the progress of an academic 
controversy, on the consequences of unemployment for 
physical health, which took place in Great Britain 
between 1975 and 1987, treating it as a case study in 
the relationship between research and policy debate. 
There are three aims to the study: (1) to document its 
progress in detail in order to clarify the interactions 
between its "academic" and its "political" aspects (2) 
to investigate the extent to which "quality" as defined 
by the academic community influences the impact of 
research on policy debate (3) to propose the outline of 
a model of policy-related academic debate which can be 
applied to other cases and therefore contribute to the 
study of the relationship between research and policy. 
The study uses a combination of interviewing, 
documentary research and participant observation, and 
sets published papers within their context of the 
formal and informal relationships between researchers, 
professionals, policy makers, pressure groups and the 
media. It is guided by a combination of two theoretical 
perspectives: the models of the construction of social 
problems proposed by Spector and Kitsuse and Downs, and 
the "translation" model in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge drawn from recent work by French scholars 
such as Latour and Callon. It is concluded that the 
application of this combination of perspectives leads 
to a reformulation of questions about the relationship 
between research and policy. The acceptance of 
scientific findings appears to depend upon actor-
networks which are at least partly constructed as a 
result of policy-decisions, so that "truth" and 




1.1 The Debate: A Brief Chronological Account 
In mid 1975, an article appeared in The Financial Times, written by Lombard 
columnist C. Gordon Tether, which dealt with the possibility that unemployment 
might be damaging to health. Eighteen months later, the first conference on 
the topic took place in Britain, organised by an independent policy unit, the 
Unit for the Study of Health Policy, and attended by people with a wide range 
of interests, including social medicine, economics, planning and ecology. Two 
years later, in January 1979, a World in Action programme "The Reckoning", 
caused considerable public stir. It, like the Tether article, concerned the work of 
one particular expert, M. Harvey Brenner of Johns Hopkins University. In the 
programme, lavishly illustrated by human interest stories from 
recession-stricken areas, Brenner made claims about the numbers of deaths, 
mental hospital admissions and prison sentences that would arise as a result of 
given levels of unemployment. 
Even before it was screened, The Reckoning had resulted in questions in 
Parliament. There were more afterwards, and the party in power (Labour, under 
pressure to adopt deflationary measures by the International Monetary Fund) 
had to reassure many of its backbench members that it had the situation under 
consideration. In September 1979, the prestigious British medical journal The 
Lancet, published a paper by Brenner (Brenner 1979) which made an 
econometric analysis of trends in employment levels and mortality levels in 
England and Wales, showing that these were significantly correlated in the 
period 1926-1976. 
In the spring of 1981, now with a Conservative government in power, a 
major conference on unemployment and health was held in Wales, sponsored 
by the Welsh National party amongst other groups. Brenner was the main 
speaker, and camera teams had followed him from the USA.ln the summer, a 
report was published by the Department of Health and Social Security on the 
health of families of unemployed breadwinners (Fagin 1981). The research had 
been carried out by a psychiatrist, Dr Leonard Fagin. Although only a small 
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sample, the report detailed many painful effects of unemployment on these 
families, and received wide press coverage. More Parliamentary questions were 
asked. More MPs were reassured that the government had the problem in 
hand, and that Dr Fagin's work had indeed been a "pilot study" to a larger 
research effort to investigate the effect of unemployment on health. 
In September 1981, the fruits of this effort appeared in the academic 
journals. One paper from the same study as Fagin's, but reporting results for 
the whole sample rather than a tiny subsample, appeared in The Employment 
Gazette (Ramsden and Smee 1981). Another, a re-analysis of Brenner's 
macro-economic study of employment and mortality trends in England and 
Wales, appeared in The Lancet (Gravelle, Hutchinson and Stern 1981). Both 
papers concluded that if there were some effect of unemployment on morbidity 
and mortality, it could not be demonstrated in either of these data sets, and 
the hypothesis that unemployment was bad for health could not be regarded as 
having received any supporting evidence. So that another "Celtic Fringe" 
conference on unemployment and health, organized and sponsored by the 
Scottish National Party, held in Glasgow in November, had rather less impact, 
despite the presence of Brenner once again as main speaker, and enthusiastic 
promotion by leading political, academic and medical figures in Scotland. 
In June of 1982 two further reports of research on unemployment and 
health emerged. One was from a large-scale study of the health of middle aged 
men (Cook et al 1982). The other was from a one percent sample of the 1971 
Census of England and Wales, followed forward to subsequent vital events and 
censuses (Fox and Goldblatt 1982). Both in their different ways showed some 
evidence of poorer health or higher mortality risk amongst people who had 
reported themselves as unemployed. This time, however, there was little press 
attention and no questions in parliament. 
Questions were, however, asked about the risk of suicide and attempted 
suicide amongst the unemployed, as a result of the dramatic act of two young 
boys who, in the autumn of 1982, killed themselves by running a hose from the 
exhaust of their parents car, leaving a note to say they had been driven to it by 
the hopelessness of unemployment. This was perhaps the most striking of 
such incidents, but frequent similar reports in appeared in the media 
throughout 1982. When research from a prestigous unit in Edinburgh dealing 
with unemployment and suicide (both "completed" and "attempted") began to 
3 
be publicized in 1982, it reached a ready audience (see Platt 1982, 1983), as did 
further work on attempted suicide and other aspects of the mental health of 
the unemployed which followed in subsequent years (for example, Banks and 
Jackson 1982, Gillies et. al. 1985, Warr and Payne 1983, Platt and Kreitman 
1984, 1985). 
By the summer of 1984, Conservative Health Minister Kenneth Clark had 
admitted to the annual conference of MIND, the National Association for Mental 
Health, that undoubtedly unemployment was harmful to health. When further 
results of the one percent sample study (Moser et. al. 1984) were leaked to the 
press in September 1984, it aroused (relatively) rather less media interest. 
Between 1984 and 1987, studies continued to be published which added to 
the evidence that there was (Beale and Nethercott 1985, 1986a-d, 1987), or was 
not (Forbes and Macgregor 1984, Alderson 1985) a cause for concern. And yet 
there was little further attempt to use this evidence in debates on government 
economic policies. Nor was debate between the different sides of the academic 
argument explicitly re-joined, despite the continued appearance of papers 
critical of Brenner and presenting material which showed no relationship 
between "unemployment" and various measures of "health" (Wagstaff 1986, 
Forbes and Macgregor 1987 , Charlton et. al. 1987). 
The issue never became (during the period 1984-87) as "hot" as it had been 
in 1979-81. It made far fewer appearances in the media. There were no more 
large conferences with television teams from the USA, as there had been in 
early 1981. Headlines of "Death on the Dole" were now confined to local 
newspapers rather than the nationals. The Labour Party made sporadic use of 
the idea that unemployment was harmful to health. But when, in January 1987, 
the very latest (and highest) estimate drawn from a large and academically 
respectable study using official statistics appeared in the BMJ (Moser et al 
1987), it received only a single mention in the media. The issue seemed to 
have lost its characteristic of being, or being seen as, one which was of major 
concern to politicians or to the public at large. 
This may seem rather paradoxical -- that as the evidence of the existence 
of a social problem seemed to grow, and as its existence tended to be 
accepted in certain academic circles and amongst some opinion leaders and 
policy makers, the salience of the problem, both as a "scientific" and as a 
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public issue seemed to decrease. Furthermore, although at one point, the media 
did treat the health of the unemployed as if it should be of concern to the 
reading and viewing public, at no time did trade unions or groups of the 
unemployed or those working to advance their interests take it up 1. The 
question was treated in academic journals and conferences in contradictory 
ways: some papers and speeches seeming to accept unquestioningly that 
unemployment was bad for health, others continuing to treat it as an open 
question. 
Research on the effect of unemployment on psychological health was also 
carried out and reported during 1977-1987. It will not be discussed in any 
detail in the present study for two reasons 
1. it was not given any priority by the media (with the exception of Fagin 
and Little's study, which was on the borderline between mental and 
"physical" health) 
2. and possibly the reason for (1), psychological ill-health is not the same 
sort of phenomenon for political purposes as "physical" ill-health. 
The major reason for (2) above is that the question of "physical deterioration" 
has a long history in British social policy debate (Pfautz 1967, Hennock 1976). 
It has formed the centre of many political storms over the adequacy of both 
wages and levels of benefit. The question of whether the notion of giving to 
someone whose labour is not "in demand", sufficient money to allow "physical 
subsistence", can be justified within a strict market economy, is an "essentially 
contested" one in western industrial societies. This problem is compounded by 
repeated findings of studies since the early twentieth century that the lower 
levels of WAGES tended to be lower than the amount needed to pay for a diet 
defined in "expert" studies as sufficient to sustain physical health. In the 
1970's and 1980' this problem surfaced in the form of debates over the 
"replacement ratio" (of benefits to wages, see Micklewright 1986, Cooke 1988), 
and in the form of "scrounger scares" (Golding and Middleton 1982, Deacon 
1976, 1978, Deacon and Sinfield 1977, Popay 1977). purporting to show that 
benefits were too high, and were used to support deviant or luxurious 
lifestyles. There was one study, the DHSS Cohort Study, whose results figured 
importantly in the debate on health, whose major purpose was to deal with the 
1 The Unemployment Unit carried two articles and one short piece on unemployment and health 
during the period 1982-1985. The first of these (Platt 1982), attributed high rates of suicidal 
behaviour amongst the unemployed to pre-existing psychological vulnerability. 
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question of the "replacement ratio", not primarily in relation to health, but 
rather in relation to public concern about what some saw as an excessively 
high level of benefits (see Moylan, Millar and Davies 1984 for a full report of 
the study's findings). 
Suicide and attempted suicide (seen as possible "effects" of unemployment) 
provided a half-way phenomenon. Insofar as unemployment was being claimed 
to cause suicidal behaviour via individual "depression", research claims that 
"unemployment causes mortality" were not fiercely contested. The "alleviation" 
of psychological consequences was something which officials offered to 
academics as a "suitable" topic (see section 7.4 below). There were, however, 
other claims made in the media, to the effect that suicide was a decision taken 
"while of sound mind" by, for example, young people facing the reality of life 
without work. These claims drew considerable attention, from the media and in 
parliament, and also from officials and researchers (see section 8.1.2). The 
following account will therefore concentrate on the fate of claims that the 
"unemployed" are subject to risks to their "physical" health, and/or at greater 
risk. of death than the "employed". 
1.2 A social-problems approach to the relationship between 
research and policy debate 
F M Martin (1977) has remarked that 
There may be a doctoral thesis to be won by sieving through the 
products of academic social medicine in order to capture a few 
specimens of policy-oriented research, and by painfully 
reconstructing the relevant policy processes ... 
There have been many attempts to discover how research "influences policy" 
(for example, Caplan 1976, Rein 1980 and 1983, Weiss 1979, Bulmer 1983, and 
the various papers collected in Kallen et. al 1982., to give but a few recent 
examples) how researchers might increase the influence of their work, and 
what kind of research is taken most seriously by policy-makers. The present 
study treats the debate on unemployment and "physical" health as a case study 
in "the relationship between research and policy". It attempts to "reconstruct" 
and make sense of the progress of the debate in order to address some of the 
questions posed by previous work on the relationship between scientific and 
policy debates, and to throw light on the apparent paradoxes to which arose as 
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the debate unfolded. In pursuit of these aims, the study will document the 
interactions between the "public" and the "scientific" aspects of work on the 
question between 1975 and 1987. Tracing these interactions seems to produce 
an alternative set of questions about the "influence of research on policy", 
which begins to appear mutual rather than unidirectional. 
The theoretical approach adopted will combine two elements. Firstly, the 
"social problems perspective" as described by Spector and Kitsuse (1977), and 
as developed by Manning (1985). Secondly, the approach to scientific 
controversy adopted by the "strong programme" of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SSK).This chapter will outline these two perspectives. The second 
chapter will go into more detail of how researchers in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge have applied certain "principles" amd "rules of method" to 
the study of scientific controversies. Chapter 3 will give a brief account of the 
formation of the social groups which played major parts in the unemployment 
and health debate, and the background of institutional change against which it 
took place. Chapters 4 to 9 are arranged in the form of the "stages" of a 
social-problem process. Within each chapter, sections and subsections both 
give an account of the major events in the debate, and offer examples which 
illustrate the social processes involved at the level of the smaller groups of 
professionals, resarchers, activists, journalists and officials, in interaction with 
each other. Chapter 10 looks back over this account, asseses the extent to 
which the theoretical approaches adopted have enabled the debate to be 
understood, and suggests an alternative way of examining future cases in 
which "the relationship between research and policy" is at issue. 
Spector and Kitsuse (1977) have described their formulation of the 
"social-problems perspective" as placing "the interaction between 
claims-making groups and others regarding the definition of social conditions 
and what should be done about them" at the centre of interest. A primary task 
of the researcher is to examine how some situation or condition is asserted to 
be morally objectionable, and how collective activity is organised around these 
definitions and assertions, Social problems are not in themselves CONDITIONS, 
but rather the OUTCOME of activities, which Spector and Kitsuse term 
"claims-making" (p. 72-73). 
The central problem of a theory of social problems is to account 
for the emergence, nature, and maintenance of claims-making 
and responding activities" (p. 76) 
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The social problem analyst is not concerned with whether or not condition "x" 
even exists, let alone with whether it is in some final sense "truly" morally 
objectionable. Rather, s/he must analyze the discourse on the existence of the 
problem as "factual claims-making" and the moral discourse as "value 
claims-making". Factual and value claims are interwoven throughout the career 
of the problem, and Spector and Kitsuse propose four "phases" in which this 
career can be divided: 
Stage One is that in which a group or groups point to the 
existence of some condition (a factual claim), indicate that it is 
undesirable in some way (a value claim), and attempt to promote 
it to a higher position on the agenda of public and political 
debate. 
In Stage Two, some official organisation or institution recognises 
the "truth" of the knowledge-claim, or at least begins an official 
investigation to clarify these claims, and begins to formulate an 
official "policy response". 
In Stage Three the original groups declare themselves unsatisfied 
with official response, and the "policy failure" or "cover-up" 
becomes a new problem claim. 
In Stage Four, claims-making groups abandon their attempt to 
satisfy their grievances and/or to resolve the asserted problem 
through official channels and begin to develop "alternative, 
parallel, or counter-institutions". 
This "stages model" is not put forward by Spector and Kitsuse as anything 
more than a working hypothesis. They do not assume that social problems 
have a "natural history", let alone the specific one which they have outlined. 
They hope, however, that eventually: 
The original counsel of the natural history concept to examine 
sequences of events and to document unfolding lines of 
activities will have produced a rich literature ... a hypothetical 
natural history may serve as a temporary procedural manual, a 
checklist of things to attend to, and a first order of business" (p. 
158) 
The procedure advocated by Spector and Kitsuse is to investigate the 
claims-making strategies of all the groups engaged in a social problem 
process, which may include a wide variety of professions, pressure groups, 
"moral crusaders", official agencies and members of the media. An essential 
part of this investigation is to "ascertain how PARTICIPANTS in an activity 
define that activity" (p. 79). 
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A critical elaboration of this approach as it can be applied to the British 
policy process is offered by Manning (1985). Like Spector and Kitsuse, he takes 
a "developmental" approach, and focuses on the process of claims-making 
rather than on the questions of "whether the problem really exists". This is not 
a "natural" but rather a "social history". To Spector and Kitsuse's stages he 
adds a possible "loop" back from III to II (an example is the setting up of a 
Royal Commission) and observes that "Group claims can get stuck in this loop 
and disappear" (p. 9-10). He also adds the concepts of "individualisation" of 
social problems (which I will call "moral fragmentation") and of defining certain 
problem areas as exclusively the domain of "experts" (which I will call 
"technical fragmentation"), as processes which accompany the progress of 
problem-claims through these stages. 
His criticism is that the model does not go into sufficient detail about the 
ways in which claims are put forward by some groups and accepted by others, 
nor about what determines the way "official" and government agencies react. 
One reason for this failing is that Spector and Kitsuse have no analysis of the 
role of the media in the social problem process. 
In order to fill this gap, I have followed Oscar Gandy's (1982) analysis of the 
relationship between experts and the media, and, more specifically, I have made 
extensive use of his concept of "information subsidy". 
Gandy's work applies only secondarily to professional or scientific groups, 
but forms an extremely useful model for the more public phases of the 
unemployment and health debate. He points out: 
Politicians, bureaucrats, producers and consumers will each 
attempt to influence the identification of social problems, the 
formulation of policy options in response to those problems ... 
They will attempt to produce that influence ... most frequently 
through the provision of information subsidy to other policy 
actors ... (p.55) 
Work on pressure groups and the media, such as that of Oscar Gandy, Field 
(1982) and Banting (1979) demonstrates that pressure group activity often 
involves the making of "knowledge-claims" as a central concern. These 
authors point out that "scientists" and "policy actors" (both those who wish to 
change the status quo and those who wish to preserve it) all make use of 
public controversy, often "creating" such debate through that form of skilful use 
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of the media, which Gandy describes as "information subsidy". As he puts it, 
The information is characterised as a SUBSIDY because the 
source of that information causes it to be made available at 
something less than the cost a user would face in the absence 
of a subsidy .... That is, the delivery of an information subsidy 
through the news media may involve an effort that reduces the 
cost of producing news faced by a reporter, journalist or editor 
(p. 61-62). 
Carole Weiss, who has written extensively on the question of how 
information is used to influence policy-makers (for example, Weiss 1982), notes 
that: 
generalisations and ideas from numbers of studies come into 
currency... through articles in academic journals, journals of 
opinion, stories in the media ... lobbying by special interest 
groups, conversations of colleagues, attendance at conferences ... 
and other uncatalogued sources. (p.290) 
Adopting the phrase originated by Shils (1961), she describes this as the 
"enlightenment model" (a phrase first coined by Shils, 1961) of the relationship 
between research and policy. Due to the important role played by the media in 
the "networks of enlightenment" described by Weiss, certain important 
agenda-setting decisions are taken by the journalists who control 
claims-making groups' access to newspaper space and airtime. These decisions 
take the form of concepts of "newsworthiness" which are well described by 
various writers on the media (such as Goldenberg 1975, Altheide and Johnson 
1980). 
Gandy explains that: 
Much of the hegemonic process is automatic, unconscious, and 
part of the "normal" practice of professional journalists.(p.57) 
Faced with time constraints, and the need to produce stories that 
will win publication, journalists will attend to, and make use of, 
subsidised information ... By reducing the costs faced by 
journalists in satisfying organisational requirements, the subsidy 
giver increases the probability that the subsidised information 
will be used. (p.62) 
How can interest-groups thus "reduce the costs" to a journalist of using 
their information? This question was itself a recurring topic for participants in 
the unemployment and health debate. Activists and (a few) researchers learned 
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how to write a press release so as to hit the right balance between 
presentation of qualified "factual" information and "sensationalism". They strove 
to guess what would carry "authority" (one of the first things some journalists 
wanted to know of the provider of a subsidy was "Is s/he a DOCTOR?"). They 
discovered the value of making something appear to be a "leak". Some even 
learned the journalists' stylistic rule of writing a press release as an inverted 
pyramid, with the bits you didn't mind being cut left to the end. All these 
considerations are enumerated by Gandy, although in his case studies 
"authority" of the source seems to have been more important than in the 
present study, and "leak" status less important. 
Gandy points out that pressure groups and entrepreneurial subprofessions 
often act as "expert" providers of "subsidised information" to the media in 
order to put pressure on political administrators ("the State"), and bring about 
or prevent policy change. Manning devotes more attention than Spector and 
Kitsuse to the nature of "the State". He sees the state as a "site of conflicts 
and struggle" over the allocation of goods and services. Claims upon the state 
for goods and services are made by pressure groups of various kinds, and here 
the analysis of J.J. Richardson and A.G. Jordan (1979) is a useful addition to the 
social problem model. Richardson and Jordan go so far as to argue that, in the 
course of social-problem processes, 
There is a breaking-down of conceptual distinctions between 
government, agencies and pressure groups; an interpenetration of 
departmental and client groups. (p. 44) 
They contend, and it is borne out by the present case study, that officials and 
pressure groups are to some extent symbiotic. They give examples such as the 
Third London Airport and the Channel Tunnel in which proposals were 
developed jointly by Ministry personnel and members of their "client" groups. 
Ham (1986) also finds this model useful in analysing the policy process within 
the Departments of Health and Health Authorities. One reason for this 
"symbiotic" relationship between officials and pressure groups, which is not 
spelt out explicitly by Richardson and Jordan, but which was spoken of in some 
of my interviews, is the need for an official wishing to carve out a "career", to 
be seen to initiate and/or promote a successful programme or innovation. 
Contact with pressure groups and "dissident" academics can be a good source 
of "bright ideas" which, when used with skill and discretion, benefit officials' 
"cycles of credibility" (see section 1.4). 
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Richardson and Jordan offer their own version of the "stages model" of a 
social problem process, based on that of Downs. In this model, more 
prominence is given (than that accorded in Spector and Kitsuse's version) to 
two additional "stages": 
1) the "dramatic event" which alerts the public to the issue 
2) the "decline of public interest" which sets in once the high 
cost of "solving" the problem has been realised (p. 90) 
They pOint out that process (2) may be "helped along" by the promotion of new 
issues onto the agenda of public debate, pushing out the old (from Downs, 
1973). They dismiss the idea that the policy agenda is set by pressure groups 
and interest groups openly lobbying the legislature: 
Campaigns are the currency of unsuccessful groups; permanent 
relationships are the mode of the successful (p. 123). 
The reason these "permanent relationships" are given little prominence in the 
literature on policy making is that their confidentiality is one of their essential 
characteristics. Richardson and Jordan admit that if the presence of a strong 
pressure group is combined with Parliamentary interest and good media 
coverage, policy actions CAN be brought about by "outsiders", but they feel 
that this is the exception rather than the rule. 
Relating his discussion of pressure groups to that of the media, Manning 
points out that pressure groups have usually 
developed an intimate relationship with the mass media [and 
that] ... Out of this relationship, particularly the exercise of 
journalistic routines ... comes an image amongst 'informed' 
opinion as to how grievances should be perceived and whether 
the resulting claims are legitimate (p. 19) 
The media alone, however, cannot create major social problems. In order for 
this to happen, larger "power blocs" must become involved, such as the 
business community, the Women's Movement, the Labour or Ecology 
movements, or alliances of professional groups. Pressure groups on single 
issues must, therefore, gain the support of these wider constituencies --
McCarthy (1986), using Downs' model, has provided a detailed account of the 
attempts by the Child Poverty Action Group to enrol more powerful groups in 
its cause. Other recent examples include the patient lobbying of the trade 
unions by the Low Pay Unit in their campaign for a minimum wage, and the 
12 
activities of the London Food Commission around the questions of food 
additives and irradiation. A social-problem analysis therefore needs to describe 
the ways in which small pressure groups seek to have their claims taken up by 
more powerful bodies. 
1.3 Government, science and the professions in Victorian Britain -
some insights from social history 
Manning's analysis of pressure groups and "the state" however, rather tends 
to sketch over the internal complexity of government. He observes that the 
fate of an issue, even one which has gained wide support, depends on 
"prevailing political priorities" and "departmental politics". The outcome of this 
is, he feels, to convert social problems into "technical problems related to 
individuals" (i.e., moral and technical fragmentation). There are several authors 
who have investigated the internal processes of political administration in more 
detail. Heclo and Wildavsky's (1974) work on ministers and hig her civil servants 
in Whitehall, and the fate of the Central Policy Review Staff, was pioneering, 
but deals with a level of government above that at which most of the activity 
in the unemployment and health debate took place. 
Another useful analysis, which deals with a different historical period, is 
that of Macdonagh (1958, 1961), McLeod (1967) Novak (1972) on the process of 
government growth and the role which science played in it in the early 
nineteenth century. Macdonagh (1958) proposes another variant of the "stages 
model". Like Spector and Kitsuse's, Macdonagh's first stage is "exposure of a 
social evil", but this model then jumps to the stage of "legislation" rather than 
dwelling further on the claiming and counter-claiming process involving 
pressure groups and political parties. Macdonagh's third stage is the discovery 
that the first legislation is insufficient, and the implementation of stronger 
measures. Up to this point, the two versions of the stages in the social 
problem process are quite different, and seem to be applicable to case studies 
of altogether different types. In Macdonagh's fourth stage, however, he deals 
with the effect of successful SOCial-problem claims-making upon the 
organisation of occupational groups, and their relationship to the state. At this 
stage, a corps of "officers" or "inspectors" of one kind or another are appointed 
to see that the legislation is implemented. In stage Five, the officers or 
inspectors develop their own entrepreneurial aims and interests as an 
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emergent professional group, which helps the process along to Stage Six in 
which yet more legislation is passed and a central authority is established. 
Novak's contribution is to point out that the "expertise" of the corps of 
inspectors or officers is not something which should be accepted or taken for 
granted by the social historian. Rather, entrepreneurial groups enter this 
process as makers of knowledge-CLAIMS, deliberately targetted towards 
attaining a role in what was at the time under study (middle and late 
nineteenth century) a growing state sector of the economy. Novak provides a 
succinct formulation of "public health as a social problem" to which a medical 
profession in a state of change and uncertainty could offer itself as "the 
solution": 
like any professional body or trade union, the medical profession 
had to provide sufficient employment for its members. 
entrance into the civil service [through the post of Medical 
Officer of Health] through the public health bureaucracy meant 
much more to doctors than an opportunity to improve England's 
health For the doctors, the Medical Officership was a 
state-subsidized research grant which symbolized the state's 
need for medical expertise. 
Here Novak provides a theoretical interpretation of the relationship between 
sections of a profession and departments of state which can be applied directly 
to present day policy processes in health and welfare. His intention was to 
criticise Macdonagh's acceptance of "government growth" as an INEVITABLE 
outcome (a "natural history") of increasing knowledge. On the contrary, 
Sanitary science was still in a rudimentary state. Hence, when 
doctors monopolized public health, it was not due to ... their 
deeper comprehension of disease; it was due to their success in 
'selling' medicine to the government. .,. this differentiation of 
knowledge and function was not the natural result of scientific 
advances but rather an artificial means of ensuring the continued 
recognition of doctors in the civil service. 
As Novak sees it, "professional zeal" is "a dynamic element in the course of 
bureaucratic growth" AND in the "growth of knowledge". He does, however, 
cling to a concept of "real" knowledge as something which is in some way 
"other than" the sort of knowledge claims put forward by entrepreneurial 
professional groups. This opens him (as it does sociological analysts using a 
social-problem perspective) to the charge of "ontological gerrymandering" 
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(Woolgar and Pawluch 1985a and b)2. In order to overcome this problem. we 
will need to follow the development of a more consistent theoretical approach 
to science as a socially organised activity. in a later section of this chapter. But 
the contribution of this work by social historians on the relationship between 
professions and the state forms an essential link in the understanding of 
present-day social-problem processes and the way in which they result in both 
"policy" and "knowledge". 
Reader (1966) adds to this general account an observation more specific to 
the case-study taken by Macdonagh (1961). that of the Passenger Acts. The 
first "inspectors" of sanitary conditions on passenger ships were "naval officers 
on half pay". Reader points out that at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. there 
was a large number of servicemen semi-employed (see Reader 1966. chapter 
5). Some of these now found a new market for their energies and skills in the 
inspectorial role under the Passenger Acts. which they fought with great vigour 
and some sacrifice to improve and implement. A major contribution of these 
social historians to developing a SOCial-problems perspective is that they 
remind us to investigate the ways in which social and economic change can 
affect the circumstances of occupational groups. Such change may give rise to 
a dynamic (one example of which is the "occupational survival" discussed in 
chapter 3. below) in which groups must seek redefined roles for some or all of 
their members. As a writer in the tradition of the "strong programme" of SSK 
was later to express it: 
... professional . vested interests may form the middle link which 
connects. on the one hand. controversies about the nature of 
phenomena and. on the other. conflict over the availability of 
resources or the securing of credibility for scientist's work 
(Shapin 1982b). 
This dynamic can. in turn. have far-reaching influence upon what come to 
be seen as significant social problems at a specific period. 
2 Briefly. this phrase refers to the practice of Writing accounts of phenomena as "socially 
constructed" only when the author basically does not believe in them. rather than allowing for the 
socially organised character of perception and understanding in both those cases which we do 
and do not currently regard as "real". 
15 
1.4 From "interests U to uLaboratory Studies ll 
Manning has included some discussion of science as the socially organised 
production of knowledge claims in his model of the social problem process. In 
this discussion he refers to the "strong programme" in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge (SSK)3, which regards ALL forms of scientific 
knowledge-claims, not just the ones which contemporaries regard as 
"mistaken", to require explanation in terms of the social activities which 
produce them. However, he does not deal at any great length with this 
perspective or the contribution it might make to the study of social problem 
processes. As the present study lays more emphasis on the "academic" than 
on the "public" or "policy" debates concerning the health of the unemployed, I 
will spend rather more time than Manning on the description of recent 
developments in SSK, and on an attempt to outline a way of combining the two 
perspectives in a method which may be applicable to the analysis of other 
policy-related academic controversies. Work in the "strong programme" of SSK 
has shown that closure of a scientific debate can never be regarded as the 
result of discoveries about a world "out there". Specifically, the Duhem-Quine 
thesis demonstrates that there is no such thing as a universally acceptable 
"replication" of any scientific experiment (Collins 1983, 1985). Therefore, closure 
of debate, and the outcome of closure known as "fact" must be studied as 
social processes. An important contribution to understanding these social 
processes is provided by the "interest model" developed by (amongst others) 
Barnes (1977), Bloor (1976) and Mackenzie (1981 a). 
At the outset of the present stUdy, a guide to theory and method when 
considering the role played by the researchers (to whom I will also refer as 
"scientists") was taken from Mackenzie's (1981 a) account of the development of 
statistics in Britain in the early twentieth century. There were obvious reasons 
for this choice: Mackenzie dealt with an occupational group similar to some of 
the scientists in the unemployment and health issue community; a similar 
topic: the application of statistical methods to a politically controversial 
subject; and used a theoretical perspective which I thought would offer a 
3 An explanation of the principles and methods of the version of the "strong programme" used 
here is given in chapter 2. 
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fruitful way of organising some of my material. Mackenzie was concerned with 
the ways in which the "interests" derived from the social origins and class 
membership of the participants influenced not only the answers they gave to 
specific questions, but also the very methods which they used to formulate 
these answers, down to fine points of mathematical detail. As a result, one of 
the guiding ideas with which I began the present study was an expectation that 
the social position and political allegiances of participants in the unemployment 
and health debate -- in this case not only statisticians but also doctors, 
economists, and other kinds of academic and professional and paraprofessional 
workers -- would be found to influence the stances which they took and the 
ways in which they went about investigating the question "does unemployment 
cause ill-health?". It seemed that there should have turned out to be a group of 
participants drawn from non-elite social groups and owing their allegiance to 
liberal or progressive political currents who took up, defended, and technically 
elaborated one position ("it does"), and another group, with elite social position 
or origins and conservative political allegiance, who took up and defended the 
opposite view. 
Mackenzie's thesis to the effect that the development of a new discipline 
should be regarded as similar to that of a political party (p. 94-95), and that 
scientific developments must be understood in the context of the occupational 
roles open to scientific workers (see his analysis of the career of Major 
Greenwood, p. 110-112) held up very strongly when used as a guide to 
understanding the relationship between research and policy in the 
unemployment debate. However, perhaps because of the different historical 
periods at which the two debates took place, from the beginning of the present 
study there were difficulties in the use of the concept of "social interests". 
Paramount amongst these was that the social origins and broad political 
allegiances of ALL participants were so very similar. There was, therefore, a 
need to search more widely for a theoretical insight which would encompass 
the complexity which was beginning to emerge from interview material. To give 
one example of these problems, the first few "scientists" I interviewed seemed 
to have great difficulty in remembering what they had actually said in papers 
and talks about unemployment and health. Interviewed approximately eighteen 
months after the major Scottish conference on the subject, speakers seemed 
vague, almost uninterested, and told me that I must understand they had 
"moved on to other things". This topic, of such consuming interest to me at 
17 
the time, was, to the first scientists I interviewed, clearly some kind of a 
sideline. It obviously would not do to assume that they had carried out some 
work in this area either out of intellectual fascination or for (covert or explicit) 
"political" reasons. 
This is not to suggest that the political CONTEXT had no influence upon the 
progress and/or the outcome of the debate as a whole. It is altogether 
possible, and consistent with the analysis offered here, that there could have 
been a different outcome if either a social democratic or "liberal" conservative 
administration had come to power at some time during 1979-87. In section 7.3 
it is suggested that a temporary shift in opinion within the political party in 
power may have influenced the reception of one study. However, as there is no 
case study such as Mackenzie's with which to compare the present one in 
respect of political context, as opposed to the social and political origins and 
allegiances of participants, it must be left to future researchers to explore in 
detail the influence of political context on policy-related scientific controversy. 
One way of addressing the questions which arose from the attempt to 
apply a concept of "social interests" is to outline the difficulties which other 
researchers in the sociology of scientific knowledge have encountered. There 
have now been many case studies using some variation of an "interest model" 
to investigate scientific debates, and the empirical study of scientists at work 
(whether or not they were engaged in "controversy") has led to a rich 
elaboration of this model which increases its usefulness to the study of 
policy-related scientific controversies. 
Critics of the "interest" model developed by Barnes and Bloor and applied 
by their Edinburgh colleague Donald Mackenzie to the development of medical 
statistics have asked what would actually COUNT as an instance of "interests 
determining knowledge" (see for example Woolgar 1981). Woolgar accuses 
interest-theorists of a 
general strategy .. to reveal interests as a kind of backcloth of 
attendant circumstances, and to imply that this revelation throws 
into better perspective the knowledge claims or event which is at 
issue. 
In these studies, "interests" are not seen as themselves socially 
constructed, or as resources actively used by actors. At the same time, they 
18 
are seen as "unproblematically available to the sociologist". Woolgar criticizes 
these assumptions, and, indeed, these were some of the problems with which 
my data faced me in the early and middle stages of my fieldwork -- I was 
precisely UNABLE to understand what the "interests" of participants whom I had 
interviewed were. 
Pursuing the problem of how to make sense of the things "my" scientists 
said in their interviews, and of my own experience as a member of a scientific 
team, I turned from macro-level studies of science and social interests to 
micro- level studies of scientists at work in the "laboratory" situation (the term 
"laboratory" will be used here, as it is in the work quoted, to mean any working 
situation in which scientists are found, whether or not it contains the 
accoutrements we would normally think of). Foremost among these both in its 
relevance to my material and perhaps also in the general estimation, is Latour 
and Woolgar's (1979, 1986) "Laboratory Life". 
In their close observation of scientists at work, Latour and Woolgar 
developed the concept of the "cycle of credibility". They give this name to what 
might be regarded as the typical or "normal" career-pattern of a scientist, 
whereby he or she "invests" his or her time and skills according to a 
calculation of the best achievable outcome. Such calculation is regarded by 
scientists at a necessary part of the exercise of their profeSSion, and success 
in certain individuals is attributed to an inspired ability to make correct 
investment decisions. The outcome of these decisions, in the form of published 
papers, invitations to address conferences, and other signs of approval and 
acceptance, in turn attract resources such as new grants, valued colleagues, 
additional equipment. This enables the scientist to increase her NEXT 
investment, with a correspondingly expected increase in returns, and so on. 
The value of the concept of the cycle of credibility emerged as my 
fieldwork progressed. It became clear that, in a policy-related scientific debate, 
(or at least in the one presently being considered), it can be used to 
understand the activities, not only of the researchers, but also of government 
officials, journalists, and members of other groups involved in the issue 
community (including the voluntary sector's "profeSSional" segment, and those 
working for political parties) Latour and Woolgar's account not only made sense 
of scientists' remarks about "time", "moving on", and "getting something out of 
... " projects, and of the way in which they lost interest in unpromising areas, 
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but also of the images projected to me by people in (seemingly) very different 
occupations who spoke of "having a bright idea and fighting for it", "knowing 
when to move on", or "getting mileage out of ... " an issue. 
One of the most important insights offered by the application of Latour and 
Woolgar's analysis to the material provided by my interviews with and 
observations of researchers concerned the use of the concept of "time" by 
scientific workers. Clarification of the importance of "time" as an investment by 
researchers is a valuable contribution of the "laboratory studies" to the 
investigation of the relationship between science and policy making. The 
allocation of "time" was a concern frequently expressed in my interviews. 
Concern about the investment of time was not confined to scientists, but was 
most emphasised by this group, and was the feature which distinguished 
scientists' accounts of their participation in the debate4 . The different 
orientations to "time" and "moving on" of a young academic economist and a 
civil servant was expressed thus in one interview: 
Well, you see, {'x'} is a civil servant, an economic adviser. So 
perhaps he goes on longer on the same subjects, because of 
their policy aspects. But for people like me [an academic], you 
take up a topic and then you drop it, either other people take it 
up or it fades away. 
There seemed to be conflicting pressures at work. The academic 
researcher's time is a part of her means of production, in the Marxist sense: 
the scientist is unlike some other workers in that she is not totally "alienated" 
from the means of producing knowledge, because time is a resource over 
which the scientific worker may retain some degree of "ownership" and control. 
So, on the one hand, there is pressure for the scientist to ensure that her 
"time" is as fully "invested" as possible (hence the negotiation of "busy-ness" 
so commonplace in academic life.) To give a concrete example from my own 
field observations, statisticians working in medical settings set great store by 
being "very busy". Of course, they are. But also, it was a signalling of 
disciplinary and professional autonomy to make doctors, especially, wait in a 
queue for the statistician's attention. The other side of this social negotiation 
of "busy-ness" (i.e. the full investment of "time") is, however, that some 
4 In contrast, "intellectual fascination" and being "hooked" was expressed by non-academic 
participants, see sections 3.3 and 8.1.4. 
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(especially less experienced) scientists exhibited, in the present study, a 
tendency to over-commit themselves at certain stages of their careers. The 
investment of "time" must not only be made but must be SEEN to be made. 
This gives rise to a tight and delicately balanced agenda of work priorities for 
the scientist, in which individual items are highly susceptible to being 
rescheduled to the bottom of a lengthy list, regardless of the personal interest 
or commitment of the scientist. In other words, the micro-level negotiation of 
"time" may, at certain points, leave little space for considerations of "interests", 
whether these be overtly pOlitical or more personal commitments, perhaps 
derived from the scientist's social and cultural background. To be abandoned by 
scientists, therefore, it is not necessary that some area of investigation be 
"suppressed" or "censored". Considerations of time management are a powerful 
source of control over the setting of the scientific agenda. The successful 
scientist will know when to terminate a poor investment, when to "move on to 
other things". The junior scientist learns this skill as part of her socialisation. 
Although decisions taken according to these criteria may be, at certain pOints, 
experienced as a form of "censorship", they will normally be justifiable in terms 
of setting sensible work priorities, for the good of the laboratory and that of 
the novice's own career. 
In interviews, academic scientists who had made this kind of decision in 
relation to "unemployment and health" often had notable difficulties in 
remembering their own previous work. However, far from being a "problem" for 
them (although it sometimes caused embarrassment in the interview situation), 
this ability to "move on" decisively was regarded as a product of experience in 
the proper doing of science in the real world. Knorr-Cetina (1982) has 
commented on the phenomenon: 
Scientists talk about their 'investments' in an area of research, or 
an experiment. They are aware of the 'risks', 'costs', and 'returns' 
connected with their efforts, and talk of 'selling' their results to 
particular journals or foundations. (Knorr-Cetina 1982) 
I would like to argue here that Latour and Woolgar's account of the cycle of 
credibility and the resulting concept of academic "time" as an investment which 
the experienced scientist learns to deploy artfully allows us to perceive one of 
the major, if latent and unexplicated, methods of "agenda-setting" within 
science itself. What this model of scientifiC deCision-making means is that we 
often have no need to look for more obvious external influences to account for 
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the appearance or disappearance of certain questions as "scientifically 
interesting" and "worthwhile". Because the skilful scientist will pick up far more 
subtle signals about "what is hot and what is out", and follow their indications, 
as part of the normally competent pursuit of an academic career. This is 
emphatically NOT to say that politically controversial topics are written-out of 
science, but "in a subtle way". On the contrary, a topic may prove a good 
investment by being at a point of balance within a controversy, or may be 
MADE INTO a good investment by being strategically linked to an "external 
controversy". The entrepreneurialism involved here is also a part of successful 
science. One statistician peripherally involved in the unemployment and health 
debate, for example, was reputed to have deliberately chosen to devote 
(untypically for him) some "time" to an environmental controversy well outside 
his area of greatest expertise because it was "the point in his career" to tackle 
a "political" subject, which step was considered a necessary one in the process 
of acquiring a Chair. What is significant here is not whether this story is a true 
account of the statisticians motives, but that is was repeated as an example by 
his juniors. 
1.5 From Laboratory Studies to the Iltrans-scientific field ll 
However, allocation of "time" takes place as between activities which are by 
no means all defined by the scientific community itself. This analysis of the 
ways in which individual academic scientists' and research groups' agendas are 
formed points us even more firmly in the direction of the wider social-problem 
processes which constitute the trans-scientific field. One author who has been 
concerned to re-introduce consideration of these processes into the conduct of 
"laboratory studies" is Karin Knorr-Cetina. 
In her essay "Scientific communities or transepistemic arenas of research? 
A critique of quasi-economic models of science" she demurs from the 
"quasi-economic" concept of investment and return on the grounds that when 
limited to the interior of "science", these concepts have unsufficient explanatory 
power. The decisions made in the laboratory 
appear to be simultaneously situated in a field of social relations 
(Knorr-Cetina 1982 p. 102) 
This is the "trans-scientific field", which is "organised in terms of 
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resource-relationships ... the transepistemic connections of research are BUILT 
INTO scientific inquiry". Knorr-Cetina criticizes Latour and Woolgar for not 
taking account of the relations between scientific producers and their clients in 
the creation of "true accounts" of phenomena. She warns against equating the 
sort of conditionally accepted "information" (knowledge claims) which scientists 
strive to produce in order to gain recognition by their peers WITHIN the 
scientific community with a wider concept of "truth". In order for a "truth" to be 
established, a further step is required, and this she sees as the intervention of 
ENTREPRENEURS. And it is not only the final step in the fact-creating process 
(from "information" to "truth") which requires entrepreneurship. Knorr-Cetina 
also reminds us that science is 
a system in which a scientist's ability to work, including the 
ability to raise money, may depend on decisions made at the top 
organisational and other administrative levels (p. 112) 
And at THESE levels, the scientific cycle of credibility plays no part in the 
making of decisions, she argues. At this level, questions of allocating resources 
are paramount. The present study will not exactly follow Knorr-Cetina here, in 
that what seems to happen at the level at which resource decisions are taken, 
as far as this can be ascertained, is that certain individuals or subgroups MAY 
take up a research team's case and push it as a part of their OWN cycle of 
credibility. The impression given by Knorr-Cetina that somehow there are "big 
decisions" about resources taken in a different manner from those about "facts" 
is at least partly an artefact of difficulties of research access to 
decision-making sites. It is important that this practical question of fieldwork 
method and strategy not be allowed to construct a monolith at the level of 
"the state". 
Knorr-Cetina does warn of the dangers of merely ASSUMING the 
relationship between "credibility" and resources. Should we take it for granted 
that a scientist who is accorded much credibility (through the reception of his 
or her published work as "true", "excellent" etc) by peers will be more likely to 
receive further resources to invest in the next phase of the cycle? Knorr-Cetina 
thinks not, and this forms another of her criticisms of Latour and Woolgar's 
concentration on the inside of the laboratory. Other laboratory studies have 
shown the scientists deemed "successful" in this sense have been deprived of 
their funds and equipment in what seems to them a completely arbitrary 
manner, or, conversely, find that previously rejected proposals suddenly find 
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favour in the eyes of those who control access to resources. Although 
scientists retain partial control of their own time, they are nevertheless still 
primarily WORKERS in 
a market of positions where the commodity is scientists 
(Knorr-Cetina 1982, p. 112) 
who must "sell their labour power" like any other worker. Here we can see that 
Knorr-Cetina is not really objecting to an "economic model" of SCIENCE, but to 
an inconsistent or incomplete model which fails to distinguish the role of 
"worker" from that of "entrepreneur" and "employer". An individual scientist 
may, at various times, behave as if s/he were anyone of these (giving rise to 
such descriptions of academic activity as "time-serving", "getting on a 
bandwagon", and "empire-building", respectively). But Knorr-Cetina aims at 
greater conceptual clarity when analyzing the process of scientific investigation, 
and holds that such clarity will take us outside the laboratory. 
Indeed, the concept of a community of knowledge-producers as one 
composed solely or even mainly of SCIENTISTS is greatly oversimplified. 
Although I have made use of a concept of "the core group" (Collins 1981) of 
those who remained longest involved in the centre of the unemployment and 
health debate, this group included non-researchers. Nor is this concept 
supported by a naturalistic ethnographic description of what scientists do 
(Pinch and Bijker 1984). In Knorr-Cetina's's fieldwork, as in the present study, 
the scientists THEMSELVES do not orient solely or even mainly towards each 
other, depending on the stage at which the process of debate is observed. 
Much of Knorr-Cetina's criticism of laboratory studies implies the importance of 
a missing TEMPORAL dimension, and it was the longitudinal character of the 
present study which demanded the addition of a social-problem perspective to 
concepts drawn purely from the laboratory micro-studies, useful as these were 
in understanding much interview material. 
In the course of close ethnographic observation: 
We see scientists writing letters and sending out papers and 
grant proposals. We hear them talking to people all over the 
country on the phone ... We read the correspondence filed away 
in a folder and learn about contracts realised for industry ... we 
learn that they FRAME their scientific work in terms of their ex 
situ involvements (Knorr-Cetina 1982, p. 117) 
Furthermore, these negotiations are woven tightly into what will ultimately 
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result as a knowledge claim. The network of relationships in which the 
scientist is involved thus enters fully into the resulting IJfacts lJ . Knorr-Cetina 
does not regard this network as IJdirectly observablelJ. In the present case 
study, an attempt has been made to observe a large part of such a network, 
tracing those connections perceived as significant by scientific (and other) 
participants by means of reading the documents and correspondence produced 
and referred to, and by interviewing members of the groups making up the 
"trans-scientific lJ field for the academic debate. 
We are left, still, with the problem of finding an alternative to the mere 
assumption that IJcredibility" is automatically translated into resources. When 
scientists reach out along their networks seeking for resources, what do they 
offer in return, what are they IJseliinglJ? Knorr-Cetina suggests that it is 
the convertibility of ... a scientist's work ... into the locally 
relevant IJcurrencies" (p. 121) 
That is, we cannot even assume anything about what may COUNT AS a 
resource, either sought for or offered in return by the scientists in their wider 
relationships. It MAY be money or equipment or space or time. It may be 
legitimation. The fragility of the definition of a IJresource" is reflected in the 
amount of effort put into writing research proposals, she argues. Furthermore, 
and here again the social-problems perspective is a good guide, scientists may 
seek to convert what they already have (a new statistical measure, for example, 
or a medical procedure, or a lJunique" set of data) into a resource relevant to 
some other group's own aims. What this means is that the analyst cannot be 
too quick to make simple assumptions about what will be sought for or offered 
as a resource. Rather, it is necessary to listen to what subjects say. As it was 
observed in the unemployment and health debate, so also in Knorr-Cetina's 
study 
Oscillations between conflict and co-operation, between the 
fission and fusion of interests that are reciprocally defined, are 
routine correlates of the process of negotiation which 
characterizes resource-relationships (1982, p.122) 
Accordingly, the analyst must not assume that somehow "society" provides an 
input into science in the form of setting social problems for science to solve 
(see section 3.1). Scientists are not passive recipients of either resources or 
"questions", but rather active participants in the social-problem process 
through which "problems" are defined. Social and political issues may reach 
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deeply into the design and analysis of research. But equally, available and/or 
well-marketed scientific skills and techniques will influence what comes to be 
solidified as a "researchable issue". Furthermore, scientists (and policy makers, 
and research funders and managers) must always be to some extent engaged 
in a process of striving for or approximating a desired relationship between 
concerns deriving from the trans-scientific field (the social, medical, etc. 
"problems" at stake) and the design of measures, tests, samples, and other 
"Iaboratory" procedures. Even when there appears to be complete agreement 
between customers and contractors: 
Scientists "figure", "gather", "think" and "hope" that a particular 
problem translation ... will match the interest of those to whom 
they are committed, but they often do not KNOW EXACTLY what 
is expected from them. So they re-direct their guesswork 
according to the responses they get, and they may end up 
convincing those who are "interested" in the work about what 
exactly they should be interested in. (Knorr-Cetina 1982, p. 124) 
Out of this negotiating, guessing and figuring not only about the natural 
world but also about the characteristics of the research team's SOCIAL world 
which need to be correctly managed in order to advance the (individual and 
collective) aims of team members, emerge "facts" and "knowledge". 
1.6 The IItranslationll model and the social-problem process 
The most recent and sophisticated work on the process of "translation" 
between scientists' concerns and those of significant groups in the 
"trans-scientific" field comes from France (Calion 1986, Calion 1981, Calion Law 
and Rip 1986, Latour 1984a and b, Coutouzis and Latour 1986, Latour 1987). An 
account of the theoretical and methodological bases upon which this research 
is constructed will show the close relationship between a consistent 
constructivist programme for the sociology of scientific knowledge and the 
social problems perspective. 
Calion and Law (1982) see the "networking" activities of scientists as "an 
attempt to determine the relative 'marketability' of different fields of work", for 
example, in choosing what questions to pursue, selecting the journals to which 
they will send papers, the funding bodies to whom they will appeal, and so on. 
All these activities involve attempts to first "interest" (this term now being used 
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with the specific meaning of "actively attract the interest of') and then "enrol" 
others in the scientists' own projects: 
Analytically, [the scientists'] position is little different from a 
politician who uses argument and persuasion to insist that it is 
in the 'interests' of this or that social group to vote in this or 
that way (Calion and Law 1982) 
Calion and Law do not reject the concept of "interest". But they use it in a 
somewhat different way to that of, for example, Barnes and Mackenzie (1981 b). 
Inter-esting, or "interessement" is an ACTIVITY in which scientists engage, for 
example, when they target a paper at a specific journal or a grant application at 
a particular funding body (Law 1983). Furthermore, their concept of enrolment 
is not unidirectional. If a researcher "sells" a paper to a journal, s/he has 
enrolled the journal in his or her scheme of things. If the editors ask for major 
changes and get them, however, then it is the SCIENTIST who has been 
"enrolled". The question of "interests", for Calion and Law, is therefore 
to discover how it is that actors enrol one another, and why it is 
that some succeed whereas others do not. 
One strategy of enrolment is to guess what the interests of other ARE, and 
adapt one's work accordingly. Scientists do this, it is proposed, by constructing 
"interest maps". That is, they attempt to construct a picture of the temporarily 
stabilised outcome of previous processes of enrolment which will enable them 
to steer towards their own goals. Calion and Law distinguish themselves from 
Barnes and Mackenzie in two ways, The first is that they regard "others' 
interests" as shifting and temporary rather than as a "backcloth" which can be 
taken for granted in the analysis of the work of a specific scientist or research 
team. The second is that they regard the appeal to interests as only ONE way 
in which enrolment can be attempted. In this, they do seem to approach close 
to Woolgar's (1981) formulation: that is, that scientists actively engage in 
explicit "interest-WORK" and that this should be a topic for the sociological 
analyst. There is a considerable contrast between this position and the way in 
which Barnes and Mackenzie treat "interests" as properties of social GROUPS, 
which individual members may not consciously hold. (Mackenzie 1981 b). For 
Calion and Law, interpreting other actors' "interests" as indicators of THEIR 
location in a social structure is an activity by which members "do 
structure-work", that is, construct the social world as a stable enough place in 
which to plan and pursue goals. 
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On this view, interests ... are attempts to define (and most 
importantly, to enforce) the institutions, groups, or organisations 
that exist from time to time in the social world (Calion and Law 
1982) 
The debate on the status of "interests" has moved from a position where 
some critics of the Edinburgh school have feared that scientists were being 
constructed as "cultural dopes", through to a position where everyone is 
artfully negotiating their own and each others' concepts of what is "really in 
their interest". Lynch, for example, condemns studies of scientists which treat 
them 
as if [they] were deprived of adequate access to their own 
socio-historical circumstances (Lynch 1982) 
He argues that scientific and technical workers have all sorts of ideas about 
the outside world, and consciously decide what about this world is relevant to 
their present work and how to deal with it. He calls this "critical inquiry", and 
recommends the sociological analyst of science to study it. Such study must 
be done ethnographically, at close range, and preferably following a debate in 
"hot blood", (see section 2.2) because publicly, scientists deploy a rhetoric 
which "hides its drama in the form of a response to necessity", that is, 
scientists construct their public talk as an inevitable response to a solid world 
of facts "out there" (Latour 1981). Inside the laboratory or the office, 
researchers are constantly dealing with this "drama" -- the "troublesome 
questions" about the relationship between the outcome of technical exercises 
(experiments, computer runs) and the real world. Factual claims by other 
competing researchers are translated back into social artefacts or psychological 
aberrations. Scientists, in other words, Lynch shows, are apt to construct EACH 
OTHER as cultural dopes, as a part of the very process of competing claims to 
"truth". All these types of reasoning and rhetoric were clearly visible in the 
ways participants (not only scientists) spoke of each other's work in the 
unemployment and health debate. 
This working-through of the consequences of regarding science as a 
thoroughgoingly social activity leads back towards the SOCial-problems model 
described in section 1.2., and to the ways in which an integration of the two 
approaches can enable steps forward to be taken in the understanding of 
policy-related scientific debates. A "SSK" which locates scientists so firmly as 
active subjects within a social world in which they participate as 
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knowledgeable, artful and striving to attain certain personal and group 
objectives seems to fit well with a programme to treat social problems as 
organised phenomena with their own variable "social histories". As Latour 
(1981, 1987) insists, there is nothing sacred or special about "science. It is a 
social activity amongst others. So it should not come as a surprise that 
concepts found useful in the analysis of scientists' activities, in the present 
study, proved applicable, with some modification, to understanding the 
activities of members of other groups in the "issue community". Latour (1987, 
p. 168) advocates that in studying the fate of scientific ideas 
we should not consider only those who called themselves 
scientists -- the tip of the iceberg -- but those who, although 
they stay outside, are nevertheless shaping the science, and form 
the bulk of the iceberg. 
This is necessary because 
scientists ... link their fate to that of other and much more 
powerful groups ... that have learned how to interest everyone in 
some issues ... groups that are constantly on the lock-out for 
new unsuspected allies ... (p. 169) 
The scientists entered the social-problem process in the same way as other 
groups, indeed, the conduct of the academic debate only began to become 
comprehensible when scientists' activities WERE theoretically approached in 
this way. 
The strong programme, by opening up all forms of scientific and technical 
activity to sociological analysis, allows us to see that scientists are like any 
other participants in organised activity who compete for material and cultural 
resources. They make claims in relation to other scientists, and also in relation 
to the wider society. Just as social problems arise from the ongoing and 
related activities of social movements, professions, officials and journalists, so 
do "scientific facts" arise from the ongoing activity of scientists IN RELATION to 
these other groups. At certain times, scientists of one sort or another are 
"mobilised" by other actors in social-problem processes, to produce factual 
claims consistent with these actors' value orientations (see Harwood 1979, 
1980, 1982; Gillespie, Eva and Johnston 1979; Nowotny and Hirsch 1980). At 
other times, scientists themselves will enter a SOCial-problem process, or even 
create one, in order to advance the claims to status and resources of the 
research team, laboratory, or other group or institution to which they belong 
(as in Aronson 1982a and b). Scientists enter the fields of social problem 
29 
debate "spontaneously" when a group of them can see that the debate offers 
opportunities for new and desirable alliances, that is, for "mobilising" others in 
pursuit of the scientists' own objectives. If these objectives can be attained by 
alternative means, then participation in any given debate or social-problem 
process will come to be seen as of only passing relevance. In the present case 
study, one major feature of the social history of the issue is the way in which 
various researchers made sallies into the field ("unemployment and health") and 
then WITHDREW, a course of action which they themselves regarded as typical 
of "scientific work". Another feature, however, was that OTHER groups 
(activists, officials, journalists), treated the issue similarly: as a means to their 
various ends, so that at anyone time, groups could find themselves left "high 
and dry", without allies to support either their moral or their factual claims. 
In Latour's formulation, chains of reasoning which scientists construct forge 
the links of social alliances. Logic and social strategy are one and the same. A 
"fact" will be established when one group establishes their argument (or 
artefact) as a common element which links together (perhaps provisionally and 
fleetingly) the majority of the groups involved in a given social-problem 
process. This he terms an "obligatory point of passage". For example, the 
success of germ theory in nineteenth century France was that its protagonists 
eventually established the "microbe" as the common element to all the varied 
mass of phenomena (both "biological" and "political") with which a far greater 
and older social movement ("Public Health") was concerned, thus mobilising a 
strong ally (Latour 1984a, p. 25-35). 
From this account of the translation model of scientific controversy, we can 
clearly see its close similarities to a social-problems model of policy debate. In 
effect, Latour, Calion and their colleagues have demonstrated that the 
construction of fact and artefact and debates over questions of "policy" are 
inextricable. If the researcher adopts the ethnographic method advocated by 
the "Iaboratory studies", and persistently follows or "shadows" (in Latour's 
terms) the scientists in their daily work, it can be seen that an essential part of 
the activity of senior scientists entails discussions and negotiations with a wide 
variety of decision-makers outside of the "scientific community". Similarly, in 
the study of policy debate, activists and officials will be found to engage 
routinely in activities to "enrol" support on the basis of factual claims. Latour 
and Woolgar (1986) quote Gusfield's work on auto accident prevention policies 
in the USA as "exemplary" of their own approach. Other examples of work 
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which has started from the "policy" end and converged towards the 
conclusions of those who begin by studying "science" include Petersen and 
Markle and their colleagues on cancer therapies (see Petersen and Markle 1981, 
Markle and Petersen 1981, McCrea and Markle 1984), Johnson and Hufbauer 
(1982) on sudden infant death syndrome, and Troyer and Markle (1984) on 
coffee drinking as a social problem. 
A recent example of an approach combining insights from social-problems 
theory and the sociology of scientific knowledge is Aronson's account of 
nutrition policy in early twentieth century United States. Aronson (1982a) shows 
how a long drawn-out effort by Atwater, the leading entrepreneurial figure in 
the new subdiscipline of nutrition, produced "dietary ignorance" as an 
obligatory point of passage which mediated the concerns of a new science, the 
US government, and American labour reformers who wished to improve the lot 
of the industrial worker and quell civil unrest without changing basic economic 
structures. Labour movement agitation around the inadequacy of wages 
provided the occasion for the scientists to raise the problem of nutritional 
sufficiency onto the political agenda. Atwater and his colleagues then 
technically and morally fragmented the question into a problem of 
measurement (technical) and one of education (moral), and in so doing 
established their knowledge claims as important "facts" for use in the policy 
making process. 
An even more recent example is provided by the work of Christine Crowe 
on the in-vitro fertilisation debate (Crowe 1987). Crowe gives an account of 
the construction of the concept of the "pre-embryo" as the obligatory point of 
passage which mediated the concerns of the subprofessions of obstetrics and 
gynaecology, the State, and pressure groups representing conflicting attitudes 
towards women's rights and abortion. The fragility of these alliances, and 
therefore of the "reality" of the pre-embryo as a biological entity, is clearly 
seen in this sensitive account which documents research done "in hot blood" 
during the course of an unresolved debate. 
To complete the argument of this chapter, I would like to suggest that 
there is a reading of the work of the French "translation" school which can to 
some extent "domesticate" their own propOSitions. Rather than regarding the 
recommendation to "shadow the scientists everywhere" (and, if my argument is 
accepted, the activists, the officials, etc) as open ended and therefore 
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methodologically very demanding, it may be that we can see a pattern in the 
participation of scientists, and other groups, in social problem processes. In all 
of the case studies discussed by Latour, Calion and their colleagues as well as 
the other English and American studies cited here, it seems that the important 
groups were of three types: a scientific subdiscipline, a subprofession, and one 
or more interest-groups within the administrative agencies ("the State,,)5. 
Activity in pressure-groups and "intermediate bodies" outside the "State", 
including the provision of "information subsidy" to the media acted as the 
vectors between theseS. This is very close to what is proposed by Manning as 
the procedure for investigating social-problem processes. It is the model which 
will be used in the present case study. 
5 see, for example, the discussion of military, public-health, and general physicians in Latour 
(1984a, chapter 3)' also Latour (1987) chapter 4 and pages 255-256. 
61n other types of social-problem processes, perhaps the majority, groups engaged in private 
industry will constitute a fourth party, for example, brewers and distillers, auto manufacturers, 




Chapter 1 has outlined the different theoretical perspectives which have 
been adopted and combined in this study, and described the ways in which 
"gaps" and problems arising from the use of each one separately led to a 
search for elaborations and refinements which would allow field data to be 
more satisfactorily organised and understood. 
This chapter has 3 purposes: 
1. to specify in more details the "principles" and "rules of method" which 
have been adopted from the "translation" approach to the sociology of 
scientific knowledge 
2. to describe and discuss the types of fieldwork undertaken in this study, 
and describe some of the problems which arose during the collection of 
material 
3. to consider the problems involved in making general statements, whether 
these purport to be "explanatory" OR "descriptive, on the basis of a single 
case study 
Workers in the social-problems perspective and in the "strong programme" 
of the sociology of scientific knowledge have not been greatly concerned with 
the problems of method which arise during fieldwork and documentary 
research. Some time must therefore be devoted here to a consideration of the 
methodological issues involved in any case study, and in doing the sort of 
interpretative work demanded by sociology, social history and ethnography. 
Although a social-historical account of a policy-related academic debate has 
been most helpfully provided by Aronson's (1982a and b) work on nutrition 
science in the early 20th century, neither she nor others working in the "social 
problems perspective" seem to have given a great deal of attention to 
discussion of the problems involved in assessing the validity of accounts. 
Hugh Heclo has constructively criticised some of the assumptions which 
have underpinned past case study work. The case study is intended to illustrate 
wider points, Heclo reminds us, and, ideally, should be (as any other scientific 
enterprise) "Planned under the impetus of theory" (Heclo 1972, p. 88). This he 
calls the "deductive" use. The "inductive" use of the case study is to build up 
a number of cases, as done in clinical medicine, which eventually elucidate the 
course of a disease. Heclo feels that behind the common inductive use of case 
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studies, lies the idea that at some point a "critical mass" will be arrived at, 
which will somehow of itself produce a theoretical breakthrough. Unfortunately, 
at the time of writing, he saw little sign of this object being achieved. We 
should, not, however, abandon the method: 
There appears to be nothing about the case study technique 
which is inherently nontheoretical or unscientific: the problem 
lies in assuming that theoretical contributions will emerge 
automatically from narrative. (p.93) 
The advantages of the method are that case studies provide a way of 
emphasising changes through time, and of concentrating on dynamic factors, 
on "how things work'" (p.93). The fact that case studies can make use of a 
variety of fieldwork methods is also seen as a strength. However, Heclo 
demands that every researcher presenting a case study be required 
immediately to answer the question "Case of what?". At this point, the 
methodological problems of policy studies elide with those of the sociology 
and social history of science. (Shapin 1980 p. 134, D Smith 1982, Collins 1983) I 
will begin to address these problems by describing the "rules of method" used 
in the studies of scientific and technological knowledge which have guided 
those aspects of the present study concerned with understanding the actions 
of the researchers involved in the unemployment and health debate. 
2.1 "Rules of method" In social studies of science 
Because the ideas involved in the present work are contemporary, it has 
been possible to investigate their development using an ethnographic method 
similar to that used in the "laboratory studies" (Latour and Woolgar 1979, 
Knorr-Cetina 1981, 1982, Gilbert and Mulkay 1984), extended into an attempt 
similarly to observe parts of the "transepistemic field". It is more difficult to 
find examples of observational studies of other groups involved in 
policy-related academic debates such as policy-makers, and funding bodies, 
but we might take Heclo and Wildavsky (1972) on British higher civil servants 
as one example, and Kogan and Henkel (1983) on the functioning of the 
Rothschild research structure within the Department of Health and Social 
Security as another. In such an approach, a case study may be seen as an 
attempt to provide both a social-historical and an ethnographic account of a 
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policy debate. As has been argued in Chapter I, this is the direction in which 
recent work appears to lead. 
Latour and colleagues (Latour 1984a, 1987, Coutouzis and Latour 1986), 
Callan (1986), and Law (1986b) have provided a series of methodological rules 
and principles for the conduct of ethnographic studies of scientific work. This 
is referred to as the "translation model". For the present purposes, "scientific" 
work will not be differentiated from other kinds (professional, communicative, 
didactic, etc) carried out by members of groups in a policy community, and 
therefore the "translation" perspective will be regarded as applicable outside of 
what is conventionally defined as "science". So the study of the work of 
officials, activists, and journalists will also be approached using the same 
methods. 
The first "principle" of the translation model is that the analyst should avoid 
"drawing up a double entry ledger" (Latour 1984a) with science on one side and 
society on the other. Instead, the investigator should "follow the course of the 
action wherever it leads" (Coutouzis and Latour 1986). The first principle thus 
recommends a similar procedure to Spector and Kitsuse's's method for the 
study of social-problem processes. And what has been discovered by the use 
of this method is a process of "stages", in scientific and technological debates7. 
They add that scientists and technologists themselves do not divide society 
from science, but artfully negotiate the stages of claims-making process in 
which they are engaged (Latour 1981). 
The second principle is to "begin with controversy" (coutouzis and Latour 
1986), that is 
cases where the experts themselves disagree and are themselves 
(to the advantage of the observer) engaged in discussion of each 
others positions, presuppositions and prejudices 
If one starts from controversy and makes no presuppositions about what is 
fact, or even who is expert, it is found that a discussion will often "mix experts, 
7 Latour, Calion and their collaborators extend their perspective to embrace the study of 
technology, by regarding the acceptance of new ARTEFACTS as the outcome of strategic social 
action in the same way as the establisment of new '"facts'" , see Bijker, Hughes and Pinch 1987, p 
83-106. 
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politicans, and the rank and file", all of whose roles must be equally attended 
to if the process of a debate is to be understood (Coutouzis and Latour 1986) 
The third principle is that of "maintaining symmetry" (as in Bloor 1 973, 1976, 
Mulkay and Gilbert 1982) .This is an important precaution given the necessity 
to study controversies, as the observer risks becoming "victim of the actors' 
own partiality". We must seek to explain both "succesful" and "unsuccessful" 
claims ("true" and "false" hypotheses) in the SAME TERMS. There can be no 
appeal to unexplicated notions of "rationality" or "the outside world" to explain 
the success of some theories only. Nor should consideration of social or 
political factors be absent from the explanation of "truth" and confined to the 
explanation of "error". Those claims which become accepted as fact, as well as 
those which do not, are regarded as produced by political, economic, social, 
psychological and material factors, without privileging one or the other. It 
should be emphasised here that in the present study the "outside" world, or 
"nature" is not taken to be either absent or dominant in the explanation of 
scientific controversy. Rather, the material world is regarded by the sociologist 
(as by scientists themselves) as a potential ally or opponent in claims-making 
strategies of the same importance as institutions, businesses, funding bodies, 
other scientists, etc. Nor is it to preclude observing that scientists (and others) 
judge and comment on the "quality" of each other's work, judging some to be 
"good science ll and some to be "bad science". The principle of symmetry does 
demand, however, that the sociological observer be sensitive to the contextual 
and temporally specific nature of such judgements. 
This leads us the the fourth principle of "explanation by association and 
situation". The sociologist 
cannot give an account of victory or defeat except by means of 
the presence or absence of allies and powers at the right time 
and in the right place (Coutouzis and Latour 1986) 
In the application of these principles to a case-study of the transfer of a 
technology (solar power) to a developing region, Coutouzis and Latour found 
that they offered great advantages, foremost amongst which was that 
one can follow controversies in hot blood, even the most bitter 
ones, whether they be about electric cars, gravity waves, 
neutrinos ... Instead of arriving at the end to distribute prizes to 
the heroes and brickbats to the villains, this method does not 
hesitate to enter the situation where there is everything to play 
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for (Coutouzis and Latour 1986) 
This makes the perspective proposed in the "translation model" well suited 
to the understanding the unemployment and health debate and, I would argue, 
other cases of policy-relevant scientific and technological controversy. 
What emerges is a series of "stages" in a debate. Once groups do enter the 
process, they engage in: 
1) attempts to "interest" other groups -- whether these be 
conceptualised as "social" (funding bodies, other professional 
groups, political parties) or as "natural" (microbes, as in Latour 
(1984a), shellfish, as in Calion (1986), tides, as in Law (1986). 
Here "inter-esting" ("coming between") is taken to mean persuading a 
group's members to take a different course, to take a diversion down the road 
which the scientists (or other would-be "inter-estors") propose. It is achieved 
by a form of bargaining or compromise between the ongoing activities and 
obectives of the scientists and those of the potential allies. The process of 
"inter-esting" entails 
2) "translation", that is, mutual adjustment of the groups' 
ongoing activities so that they become "resources" for each 
other (see Knorr-Cetina's discussion of the ways in which items 
may be constructed as "resource" in section 1.5. above) 
If translation is successful, groups have succeeded in 
3) "enrolment" -- the creation of a (relatively) stable set of 
alliances. Out of this "lash-up" (Latour 1987) of forces emerges 
an OBLIGATORY POINT OF PASSAGE. That is the statement or 
instrument which all groups accept as essential to their several 
purposes, the expression of the point where their "interests" 
meet. 
If the alliances hold, the Obligatory Point of Passage (OPP) will be 
transformed into an unquestioned BLACK BOX (a phrase first used in the 
sociology of science by Whitley, 1972), whose solidity and reality is accepted 
far beyond the boundaries of the alliance which created it (Latour 1987, pp. 
138-139). Latour and Calion are at pains to point out, however, that there is 
nothing inherent in the fact or artefact which makes it solid. Rather, it is the 
extension of the networks along which the blackbox can be passed without 
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being "broken apart" which CONSTITUTES its solidity. The example given in 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) of this process is the referencing of statements in 
scientific papers. A statement which is a true "blackbox" will not be considered 
to need any reference at all. One which is considered fairly solid will need, 
perhaps, one standard or "classic" reference. A highly doubtful statement needs 
to be sustained by a host of tactically chosen references which attempt to 
"lash-in" the reader within the network of the statement's producers. This is 
the point at which the concept of entrepreneurial ism emphasised both by 
social-problem theorists and by Knorr-Cetina (1982) can usefully be integrated 
into the analysis. 
Calion (1986) devotes considerable attention to "dissidence and betrayal". 
Allies can turn their coats, for a whole series of reasons. Experiments may fail, 
more powerful interests may beckon, an OPP may simply cease to be so 
because participants discover other ways to attain their objectives (p. 219-220). 
Furthermore, a claims-maker may overreach herself -- she may, in the attempt 
to recruit yet more allies and extend the network of those who accept the 
blackbox, stir up previously quiescent opponents (Collins 1985, p. 134) A new 
machine, which works well at sea level or in a developed economy, may fail in 
other environments and cause its very principles of construction to be 
questioned and its inventors' statement to be discredited. A fact or theory may 
begin to be questioned BECAUSE it has attracted new allies who attempt to 
extend its applicability into jealously guarded new territory. This hazard formed 
a concern for participants in the unemployment and health debate. To be 
"seen to be doing something policy-relevant" attracted powerful new allies to 
the scientists. But at the same time it placed scientists' work under a new and 
threatening form of scrutiny. In some ways, the concepts of "interesting", 
"translation" and "enrolment" resemble that of "partisan mutual adjustment" as 
described by Lindblom (1979). Such mutual adjustment would tend to be 
required in precisely the kind of "policy communities" which Haywood (1983), 
Richardson and Jordan (1979) and Ham (1985) describe as the location of 
decision-making in modern Britain. This similarity in concepts used by 
sociologists of knowledge and social policy analysts seems to point to an 
opportunity to develop a more integrated perspective for the examination of 
policy-related academic debates. 
Following the stricture of Heclo, I will specify: "A case of what?" The 
present study is taken to be a "Policy-related scientific debate", and will be 
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approached with the aid of the models of social-problem processes developed 
by Kitsuse and Spector, Downs, and Manning; and approaches to analysing 
scientific controversy developed within the tradition of the sociology of 
scientific knowledge. These theoretical perspectives allowed me to understand 
the role of entrepreneurial subprofessional and subdisciplinary groups in 
creating unemployment and health as the kind of social problem which required 
the application of inspectorial, scientific and practical/clinical expertise of 
various different kinds. It will be argued that a "crisis" in a subprofession 
created by a combination of administrative and wider social changes (outlined 
below in chapter 3), was the essential driving force in the social-problem 
process. 
Plummer (1983) writes that "in the case study the theory is there at the 
outset to weave together the document ... " He contrasts this to Glaser and 
Strauss' (1967) concept of the case HISTORY in which the fullest possible story 
is obtained for its own sake, in the hope that theory can somehow be "based 
on" it. The latter concept obviously runs up against the objections stated by 
Heclo discussed above. The present study is therefore not an attempt at a 
detailed "history". However, neither were theoretical concepts established at the 
outset and maintained unchanged to the end. In this respect the procedure 
here does more closely resemble Glaser and Strauss' methods, in that it 
involved an "intimate acquaintance" with the world of participants, and also a 
flexible attitude to "ad hoc conceptualisation" which took place at various 
stages of the research. A description of this process can best be integrated 
with an account of the fieldwork methods used. 
2.2 Fieldwork methods 
A combination of fieldwork methods have been used, very much as 
envisaged by Heclo (1972) and by Spector and Kitsuse (1977), that is, a 
combination of participant-observation documentary research an interviewing. I 
carried out 59 interviews with participants in the debate, over the period May 
1983-June 1985. Interviewees included the first authors of all British papers on 
unemployment and health which gained the attention of the media and of 
politicians and were considered "central" by participants throughout the debate. 
A number of civil servants who had had responsibility for this issue were also 
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interviewed, as were leading "activists" in the pressure groups, including the 
organisers of the two Scottish conferences. Interviewees were distributed 

















































*includes charities, independent research and/or policy 
units and "quangoes". 
Two people declined to be interviewed when asked, one 
because he felt his work had not been central or important 
enough, the other was a "key informant" whom I had known 
very well for some time, and felt that a "formal" 
interview would be incongruous and embarrassing. 
However, we had regular conversations throughout 
the fieldwork period, from which emerged essentially 
the same type of information as that derived from 
interviews. 
No attempt was made to pre-determine the numbers of people in each 
"category" who should be interviewed. The definitions of the categories 
changed over the course of the study, and the above list is based on the 
respondent's source of income, so that, for example, several 
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intermediate-body workers were sociologists or economists. In fact the 
difficulty involved in separating "activists" from "academics" or "professionals" 
was one of the most important stages of the case study. This difficulty led to 
the observation that professional and disciplinary subgroups could use 
pressure group activity as a part of their efforts to increase the strength of 
their claims to "expert" status. Greater emphasis was placed on establishing 
ongoing relationships with a number of "key informants". For example, a small 
number of journalists gave me fairly detailed accounts of the processes by 
which certain items "made the papers" (see section 6.2.2, 8.2.1), and these 
accounts, rather than a large number of one-off interviews, were used to 
construct typifications of "information subsidy". It was also fortunate that my 
own personal and professional history made it possible to establish a "key 
informant" relationship with most members of the "core group" of researchers 
who remained at the centre of the debate during the period 1981-1987. 
Interviews were semi-structured attempts to elicit participants' own 
accounts of how they came to be involved in the debate, and how they 
envisaged its future development. The approach adopted, and many of the 
problems encountered in "elite interviewing" are discussed in Dexter (1970), and 
Seldon and Papworth (1983). 
The interviews had several aims: 
1. to elicit the "discovery stories" of participants 
2. to discover how researchers' work came to be taken up by journalists, 
officials and pressure groups, 
3. to discover as much as possible about how decisions as to the 
policy-relevance of the research were taken 
As often happens, those who were interviewed contributed to and changed 
the very objectives of the study itself. Seldon and Papworth have pointed out 
that an important outcome of "elite" interviews is that they enable the 
researcher to begin to fill-in the assumptions that lie behind documentary 
evidence. Another role played by some interviewees, was to instruct the 
fieldworker where to look for the important documentary evidence (Seldon and 
Papworth p 43). Seldon and Papworth quote de Weart and Vorkin (1982), who 
found that 
"An interview is not the end of a topic, but the beginning, a 
conduit from the black and white world of published papers to 
the colourful and chaotic real world of science" 
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It should also be pointed out that, as Payne et. al (1981) warn the field 
researcher, the interviewing and the participatory phases of the research "got 
to me", became a "key part" of my life, which "drained" me intellectually and 
changed me emotionally (Payne, Dingwall, Payne and Carter 1981, P 207-208). 
Nor was this a one-way process. By the closing stages of writing up this 
research, I was involved in collaborative work with two of "my subjects", and 
was obliged to acknowledge the possibility that my "participant" fieldwork 
method may have fallen short of "Ieaving the situation untouched,,8. 
The institutional context within which the debate took place was 
investigated by documentary research on the history and functioning of the 
various institutions involved (research institutes and funding bodies, 
professional associations, departments of state, pressure groups). Participants' 
perceptions of the way the institutions function were gleaned from participant 
observation and interviews. Much that happened in the debate before my own 
period of participant observation had also to be gathered from documents and 
interviews. The ongoing processes at the micro-level in both one of the 
research departments and one of the pressure groups were investigated by 
participant observation. Some of this was undertaken before the present 
project, when I worked as a member of a research team which became 
involved in unemployment and health. It is therefore undocumented by field 
notes, and relies on my own growing awareness of the sociological 
significance of the process of integration which resulted in a form of somewhat 
marginal "membership" of the research community. Throughout my interviewing 
of "scientists" involved in the unemployment and health debate, I made notes 
on the ways in which my own socialisation allowed me to employ shared 
assumptions as a way of facilitating the interviews. At a later stage, it also 
became clear that the particular TYPE of membership (junior) I had attained 
limited my ability to "understand" some of what the scientists were "really 
talking about". In a rather disturbing process, my increasing sociological 
understanding of the debate caused me to re-write a great deal of my own 
previous experience as a member of the scientific community. This analYSis of 
8 However, Latour (1988) has criticised the notion that the social study of science should set itself 
up as yet another disciplined with the same characteristics (need for status, preservation of rigid 
boundaries, etc) as those it studies. He goes so far as to recommend "blurring the distinction 
between science and the production of other sciences" and to favour co-authorship with 
scientists who have been the "subjects" of one's work (p. 175). 
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my own store of members' knowledge constituted the major input from the 
first period of "participation". 
The period of "native participation" in the research team may be thought of 
as the first phase in the process (it would not be accurate to describe this 
phase as "fieldwork") which produced the present case study. The second 
phase was a series of interviews carried out in Scotland with participants in 
the specifically "Scottish" period of the debate. I looked upon this part of the 
research as a pilot study, and material from this phase of my study has only 
been made limited use of. The Scottish interviews did not sufficiently clarify 
my ideas to allow me to proceed investigating the wider British debate with a 
polished "model", but established at least the outlines of a theory about the 
nature of the debate. In the course of the Scottish "pilot", I decided whom to 
interview on the basis of two criteria. Firstly, all (at least) first-authors of 
published academic papers were interviewed. Other interviews were decided on 
the basis of a "reputational method". As well as the published authors, there 
were people around who knew other people who had been involved in the 
unemployment and health issue. Just finding out who these were and how they 
knew each other provided valuable data on the actor-network which created, 
and was created by, emerging definitions of what the "social" and "scientific" 
issues were. I decided to begin by unstructured interviews, using a tape 
recorder, to simply elicit peoples "stories" of how they had become involved. 
The theoretical working model I was using at that time was tWo-fold. I thought 
I would find that scientists' interpretations of the debate would be influenced 
by their social origins and allegiances as in Mackenzie's work on biometry. My 
second hypothesis (rather vague) was that pressure groups and the media were 
influential in the effect of research on policy decisions, and that insofar as 
pressure group members and journalists were unable to grasp the complexities 
of scientific reports, their role could well be to "distort the relationship 
between research and policy,,9. 
No sooner had I carried out my first few interviews than I discovered that 
people who were kind enough to talk to me often felt that they did so at some 
9 For a statement of the "distortion" theory of the effect of pressure groups and the media on 
policy-related scientific debates. see Elwood and Gallagher 1984. The fact that this comes so 
close to my own early view in itself shows the extent to which I had absorbed the "natural 
attitude" of one of the customer-disciplines to community medicine (epidemiology). 
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risk, that much of what they told me was regarded as extremely confidential, 
and that access to further participants in the debate seemed to depend on 
ones who had met me "putting in a good word". I also found it easiest to allow 
myself to be cast in the role of seeker after knowledge in the substantive area 
(the "trainee" role which many other fieldworkers such as Schlesinger (1980) 
and Finch (1984) have also found themselves occupying). This appeared to me 
to rule out the use of tape. For that reason, I relied on a developing ability to 
write quickly, and to remember afterwards a lot of what had been said which I 
had not managed to write down during the interview. Of course, this method of 
recording is open to bias in recall, and being affected by what seems most 
important to record at the time of the interview. I did try to write down things 
which seemed to "make no sense" in the terms of my working hypothesis 
(these were harder to remember afterwards), and to include notes on when the 
interviewee, for example, had difficulty in remembering certain events. Much of 
this puzzling material, for example references to "time", and memory lapses 
(see section 1.4) later came to seem very significant, which may be a criticism 
of not having used tape. However, I felt at the time, and still feel (perhaps with 
rather less certainty) that the use of tape would have made some interviews 
impossible and produced an unhelpfully guarded response in many others. 
During the course of the "pilot" it became clear that at a certain point the 
issue community became "saturated", that is, the last person you interviewed 
advised you to talk to someone you already had. I termed this "network 
closure", and it seemed a good way of knowing what constituted the effective 
issue community and when one could stop looking for more views, opinions 
and "discovery accounts". Later on I discovered that as one's theoretical 
understanding of the debate changed, the network opened out again and 
aroused the horrifying spectre of an endless number of people one ought to 
interview. These new, theoretically defined networks, however, led far beyond 
the bounds of the thesis topic, although into interestingly related areas. So that 
the requirement of "sticking to one's topic" (which was "the unemployment and 
health debate", and not "the role of economic advisers in government", or "the 
customer-contractor relationship in health services research", or "the social 
construction of epidemiological knowledge") provided the final boundaries of 
the network of people to be interviewed. 
One other problem connected with deciding who to interview was balancing 
the value of the material possibly gained against the degree of suspicion and 
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embarrassment involved in talking to prominent people about a politically 
sensitive topic. In particular there were known to be four leading academics 
who had for a brief period played a role in discussions with civil servants on 
what research was needed. No-one would tell me who these persons were. I 
was able to gather a fairly good idea of three identities, but when I approached 
two of them, they made it clear that they were not willing to talk to me about 
"the debate". By this time I was finding it increasingly irksome to be put in the 
"novice" role and lectured on the inadequacies of "my study" as a Ph. D. in 
community medicine or epidemiology, which was the format taken by several 
interviews with very senior (and not so senior) "experts". As a result, I did not 
pursue the "four professors" further, which may also be a criticism of my study. 
My formal justification for this decision was that none of the "four professors" 
were published authors on the topic of unemployment and health, as far as I 
knew. 
Interviewing shaded into participant observation at many pOints in my 
fieldwork. I met members of the pressure groups (the Unemployment and 
Health Study Group and the Social Costs of Unemployment Forum) by 
interviewing them, and continuing to take some part in the group's activities (to 
an extent limited by distance and certain other considerations) seemed to 
follow on in a "natural" way. Participation in the pressure group's activities 
continued for over three years, and resulted in the usual degree of "going 
native". I was always kept informed of the background to any activity, such as 
the production and release of the group's major report, the writing of press 
releases on other research to which the group wished to draw public attention, 
and so on. 
The close association of the pressure group with one subset of the 
"entrepreneurial sub-profession" resulted in a further involvement with the 
related journal (Radical Community Medicine), on whose editorial group I spent 
a period of one year. In the winter of 1 984-5 the journal, which, like the 
pressure group, had been based in the North-East, moved to London. At the 
same time, I also returned to London from Edinburgh, and was asked to join 
the editorial group. It is an indication of the degree to which I had been 
absorbed into the wider issue community, and also of the degree to which my 
intellectual detachment and sense of priorities had become confused that I 
accepted, and not only because of the opportunities for "fieldwork". However, in 
the event, the experience was very helpful in understanding the complexities of 
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the relationships and boundary disputes between the disciplines which 
participated in both the unemployment and health debate and in the journal. 
During the whole period of time Summer 1983-Summer 1985 when the 
majority of the interviewing was carried out, I attended 9 meetings, seminars or 
conferences of half a day or more in length where "unemployment and health" 
was either the sole topic or a major one, making detailed notes. Apart from 
"what happened" at these gatherings, it was interesting to observe the extent 
to which there tended to be at least some members of the "core set" (Collins 
1974, 1981) in the debate present, so that by mid-1985 this group had taken on 
somewhat the appearance of a travelling circus. New faces appeared to give 
papers on, say, the historical aspects of the debate, but the question of the 
effect of unemployment on PHYSICAL health was nearly always dealt with by a 
small group of "authorities", and if they could not be obtained, members of 
another small group of "accredited" spokespersons. This, then, became another 
process to be explained, and, in turn, against which to test the model I was 
developing, that is, the persistence over time of certain individuals (and only 
these) in the debate. 
I also continued to visit the research unit where I had originally worked, and 
to have informal discussions with members of the unit about the stage at 
which their own work on unemployment and health was to be found. The fruits 
of all this, (as will be familiar to all ethnographically inclined field workers) was 
a mass of papers, field notes, interview notes, newspaper cuttings and other 
"documents" such as pressure group minutes, correspondence between 
participants, and working drafts of research papers. This "mass" then had to be 
distilled into categories through which the progress of the debate and the 
participation of "core" members of the issue community could be understood. 
2.3 Between description and analysis 
Silverman (1983) uses the concept (drawn from cognitive anthropology) of 
the "formal ethnographic description", by which is meant an "adequate and 
replicable account" of a routine social practice within a given cultural context. 
This is what I hope to establish for the categories used in this study. Material 
was selected for inclusion in the substantive chapters according to how well it 
seemed to illustrate the ways in which different theoretical approaches led to 
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the establishment of these categories of action within the various groups 
involved in the debate. In the course of exploring the case-study from these 
different perspectives, an attempt will be made to establish the usefulness of 
several equivalence categories, such as: 
- "professional entrepreneurialism" as defined by Aronson 
- "cycles of credibility" as applied by Latour and Woolgar to scientists, but 
extended in the present study to members of all the occupational groups 
involved 
- "information subsidy" as defined by Gandy 
- the "technical" and "moral fragmentation" of an issue 
- "interesting (interessement)", "translation", "enrolment" and the attempts to 
establish "obligatory points of passage" as defined by Calion (1985). Law 
(1986) and Latour (1987) 
The overall aim of this exercise (which might be characterised as an 
"analytically inductive case study" (Katz 1983. p. 133-134)) is to construct a 
"model" of the form and conduct of policy-relevant scientific (or technological) 
debates which other investigators may attempt to apply "deductively" (in 
Heclo's terms) to future cases. The search for categories by which to classify 
patterns of activity within the unemployment and health debate was carried out 
in pursuit of this overall goal. It is of course more than likely that future case 
studies will not find the "model" proposed here to be a useful guide. When 
this happens, not only the "model" itself. but also the methods used in its 
composition, and the "accuracy" of account, will be questioned. This close 
relationship between "reliability" (descriptive accuracy) and "validity" (theoretical 
adequacy) is a normal and desirable aspect of the process of inquiry. 
Plummer has observed that: "the move from data to theory" is perhaps "the 
most difficult task in aU social science research .. the moment of intellectual 
imagination when data turns itself into generalisation, concepts and theoretical 
hunches." (p. 127). Plummer offers no exemplary case to follow. It is for this 
reason that the present study is presented as a "model-building exercise". 
That is, the reader will be invited to judge the accuracy of the empirical work 
and the validity of the general concepts derived from the material by applying 
them, in a necessarily preliminary way, to other cases. Can I explain to a reader 
what an information subsidy is well enough for it to be recognised in other 
debates? Or an example of technical fragmentation? If so, then I may be 
granted to have provided a "formal ethnographic description" in the sense used 
by Silverman, i.e. a replicable account of a routine social practice. The 
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patterned collection of such practices may be seen as the "model" of (in this 
case) pOlicy-related debate. 
Within the present study, categories were arrived at by means of tentative 
formulation which emerged out of the interaction of "working hypotheses" with 
the data gathering process. This was followed by "testing" during the next 
phase of fieldwork. Concepts and categories were retained as long as they 
appeared to make sense of subsequent events and subsequently gathered 
accounts. Those which remain and are used in the analytic account of the 
debate presented here have withstood these tests. Of course it is always 
possible that if I had followed the debate for a longer period, or spoken to 
other people, some or all of the categories would have had to be discarded. 
I will offer two such "tests" as examples, as they were, almost in the full 
positivistiC sense, "crucial experiments" in relation to my latest semi-formulated 
hypothesis about what was "really going on". One (the first) took place in the 
autumn of 1984. I asked someone I had just interviewed (we were in a long 
lunch queue in his college canteen) "What are people like yourself [economists] 
doing in this debate? You seem to have defeated the opposition and yet you 
continue researching the topic?" "Oh" he replied, smiling, "because we can do 
it better than they can." I asked what he meant. "You don't need a medical 
degree to do health planning" he elaborated. His remark confirmed what had 
been a vague, but growing suspicion, that the debate was not about what it 
seemed to be about at all, and that I must explore it in terms of professional 
boundary disputes. 
The second crucial experiment took a great deal longer. For three and a half 
years I kept books of newspaper cuttings which I thought would be relevant to 
the debate. At first all of these were about factory closures, mass 
redundancies, parliamentary debates on unemployment, unemployment figures, 
and the like. Not once did any of these provoke a high-profile media discussion 
on the health of the unemployed. Subsequent to its very early appearances, 
almost all the media attention given to the unemployment and health debate 
followed revelations about "cover-ups" or "misuse of government statistics", 
and was usually the result of some form of "Ieak" by a scientist working in or 
close to government who was infuriated, not by the unemployment level, but 
by the threats to professional position and integrity posed by government 
policies towards the production and use of official information. To me, this 
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once again demonstrated the importance of the strategies of various subgroups 
within the different professions and disciplines involved in health policy and 
planning in the process by which "the health of the unemployed" was produced 
and sustained as a "social problem". 
Having reformulated my own expectations in this way, a return to field 
notes and interview material seemed to reveal entirely new things, which I 
simply had not perceived when looking for a purely "political" or 
"administrative" or even "scientific" phenomenon. I had been totally unable to 
understand why the participants in the debate did the OTHER things that they 
did, although I had tried to read as much as possible of their previous and 
subsequent work. I had been unable to understand the lack of any consistency 
in their political allegiances, or any correlation between these and their 
positions in the debate. 
So, in answer to Heclo's points on the importance of a theoretical approach 
to case studies, the present one began with an approach which proved 
unsatisfactory, passed through a series of others which were partial 
improvements, and came eventually to one which seemed to allow me to 
understand more of my material than any of the others taken singly. This came 
about by almost a laboratory-bench "tinkering" (as described by Latour and 
Woolgar.) Each attempt at an explanation left anomalies. The anomalies lead to 
a further search for alternative or additional forms of explanation, until at last 
most of them had been satisfactorily incorporated. What results is by no means 
presented as "final", but merely as a fruitful starting point for future work, 
which has perhaps cleared some undergrowth and suggested some pathways. 
2.4 Action and context 
Having attempted to deal with Heclo's question "A case of What?", and to 
offer an account of how categories and organising concepts have been arrived 
at in this study, I must now turn to the problems involved in making claims 
about "causation". Silverman (1983) has criticised the tendency of micro-level 
research, for example, in health care, to ignore the wider context, in this case, 
of changes in political ideology, economic climate, and administrative priorities. 
And yet, Hammersley and Atkinson warn against merely setting an ethnographic 
study against some wider background, leaving unexplicated what the author 
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thinks are the connections between the two. Similarly, Latour and Calion and 
Law have criticised the use of "background" concepts such as "interests" in an 
unexplicated fashion, as "factors" available to the sociologist and not to actors 
themselves (see Ch. 1). However, Whitley (1980) states: 
In making sense of scientific development in the contemporary 
sciences, the context of research is obviously a crucial aspect 
and variation in its structure can be related to variation in 
research practices ... 
As far as possible, I will treat "causes" and "wider influences" to be just 
what participants say they are. This procedure is also "true to" my own moral 
career as a participant observer, as I found myself drawn more and more into 
the wider concerns of other participants in the debate in order to make 
adequate sense of their own activities. For example, what had unemployment 
and health to do with resource allocation in health planning? Or energy 
expenditure in overweight women? Or the outcome of pregnancy in working 
mothers? By the very effort to understand the ways in which my participants 
DID participate in the debate, I (like them) came up against the wider context in 
which they operated and learned to account for what we were all doing there. I 
learned about the "causes" of actions by learning how participants made sense 
of what they were doing. This type of causality, cause-as-reason or motivation, 
can perhaps be left for the moment, at the level of members' accounting 
procedures. 
However, I am also going to make statements about the unacknowledged 
background and unintended consequences (to borrow Giddens' use of the 
phrases, for example, in Giddens, 1984) which gave the unemployment and 
health debate its shape during the period I observed it. In this, I will depart 
from the strict letter of the ethnographic method explained in section 2.2. in 
making use (at least by implication) of "causal" language. It will not therefore 
be possible to avoid discussion of the problem of "causality". 
Many authors have tackled the problem of the difference between historical 
and sociological accounts, and of the ways in which the concept of "cause" is 
used in non-experimental research situations. By their nature, case studies are 
post hoc, and the researcher is open to the accusation that she has 
constructed an explanation back.-to-front, when the outcome was already 
k.nown, and failed to meet the requirement that the account be subjected to the 
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test of prediction. One is also vulnerable to the accusation of practicing 
"Whiggish" history, which sees the whole process as somehow teleologically 
oriented towards a certain outcome. Is it legitimate to use concepts such as 
"cause" and "effect" when one is not in a position to carry out replications, 
comparative case studies, or to make testable predictions? 
In his discussion of the use of notions of causality in historical studies, 
Quentin Skinner (1966) concentrates on the sort of explanation that takes the 
form "idea "x' influenced or caused event(s) Y, Z, ... ". What is the nature of 
(even potentially falsifiable) claim of this type? Is it a claim by the historian to 
have discovered some unknown linkage? In which case the positivistic 
requirement that we demonstrate "constant conjunction" (a practical 
impossibility in most historical work) seems inescapable. Or is it a claim to 
have discovered some "inner relationship" already testified to by personages in 
the story themselves? The latter interpretation raises the question (familiar to 
sociologists) of whether informants' reports are "topic' or 'resource'. Skinner 
prefers to regard informants' reports of "influence" mainly as topic, and not as 
conclusive evidence. "It provides at most a clue to the intellectual biography." 
There are, however, certain thoroughly mundane tasks which must be seen 
to have been carried out by the researcher who makes even such a cautious 
use of the concept of "influence". He or she must know, for example, whether 
the 'influenced' person (call him or her P2) actually had contact with the source 
of possible influence (P1) or with P1's writings. Was this contact temporally 
prior to the actions we seek of explain? In the present study, comparison of 
documentary evidence and interview material had to be carefully carried out in 
order to deal with these questions. But even so, as ethnographers of science 
have shown, claims of influence can serve as a form of 'persuasion', as do 
references in scientific papers (see Gilbert 1977, Law and Williams 1982), or a 
way of signalling allegiance or membership of a valued group (as 
acknowledgements in academic papers often seem to be). 
A more common use of the concept of 'influence', Skinner feels, is as part 
of a claim by the historian to have "discovered" and established by her own 
investigation an "inner connection between P1 and P2"(p. 206). However, he is 
also sceptical of the possibility of establishing such a statement on a firm 
basis, and feels that this is a particularly acute problem in the history of 
science. 
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The evidence about intellectual relationships arlsmg out of 
attempts to solve puzzles is usually impossible for the historian 
to recover, and tends in any case to be of [a] systematically 
misleading kind.(Skinner 1966, p. 207) 
The history of an idea or event, Skinner continues, can never be adequately 
written in terms of its leading actors. 
The appropriate strategy must then be not to begin by 
abstracting leading ideas or events, but rather by describing as 
fully as possible the complex and probably contradictory matrix 
within which the idea or event to be explained can be most 
meaningfully located. 
I have found it most important to be clear that the unemployment and 
health debate was neither an account of the ideas of "great men and women", 
nor one of "reality out there" being slowly "discovered". The whole point of 
treating a debate whose outcome was, at the beginning (and the end) of 
fieldwork, indecisive was in order to be forced to concentrate upon the social 
processes which shaped the debate and its interrelationship with the political 
process. In Dreyfus and Rabinow's words "far from being differentiated bV their 
objects, discursive formations [written or spoken discussion] produce the object 
about which they speak." (p. 61) The aim of the present account is to attempt 
to see the different ways in which "the health of the unemployed" was 
produced by the various discourses upon it: in different academic disciplines, in 
Parliament, in the DHSS, in pressure groups, in political party campaigns, and 
the ways in which these discourses interacted with attempts by policy-makers 
to take and to justify practical decisions. 
However, the historian, sociologist or ethnographer still faces the problem 
of characterizing the relationships between context and ideas. She can attempt 
to increase the density of the account, from a potentially inexhaustible store of 
"evidence". This at least deals with Skinner's criticism that the main themes of 
a writer's work may not even be unambiguously discernible by a later 
commentator not immersed in the same context of meaning. When relating the 
work of different writers, Skinner insists: "It must be at least equally plausible 
to suggest that a writer's influence could derive from a chance remark, or even 
a misunderstanding of a remark, being taken up and developed But, he 
adds, ''The evidence required to supply any single convincing explanatory 
account is thus impossible to recover ... " (p. 210) Some of these difficulties may 
be partly overcome when studying a contemporary situation by close 
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observation, but these are still very serious problems in case study research. 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) found in their participant observation of a scientific 
team, that "Formal communication is the exception" as a major source of new 
ideas, and that "most published papers are never read, ... and the [rest] are 
transformed and misrepresented by those who read them." (p. 252) Fortunately, 
the rules of method adopted here will prevent us from assuming anything 
about the relative importance of informal and formal communication and allow 
us to explore the ways in which both formal and informal networks both 
promote certain kinds of "influence", and affect the specific kinds of 
misreadings and transformations to which communications are subject. 
However, the decision as to what will count as a 'sufficient' amount of 
evidence is not a Simple one. It invokes unexplicated ideas about proper 
procedure in research, which is precisely what we are trying to clarify. Andrew, 
Pickering (1980) asks 
Having cast doubt on the accounts produced by scientists, what 
are we to make of our own data when we read scientists' 
writings and talk with them in interviews? 
he answers: 
I am well aware that I have not solved the problem 
Skinner appears to conclude from his deliberations of these problems, that 
the historian should pretend to no more than description. A very dense 
historical description he argues, has the same status as certain types of 
scientific explanations which consist of "the most precise correlation between 
all possible variables" (1966, p.214). He also justifies this emphasis on 
"complete description" in terms of intellectual humility: "historical explanations 
attempted in this model would be bound to look much more provisional than is 
usual in the history books" (p. 215).Such a commitment to the textured account 
comes close to the anthropological concept of 'thick description' (originally 
formulated by Ryle, see Geertz 1983 p. 51-53). Emerson (1983) quotes the 
anthropologist Edmund Leach's characterisation of "thick description" as 
the intricate interweaving of plot and counterplot (in Emerson 
1983, p. 28) 
Thick description' has also been recommended by sociologists of scientific 
knowledge (see Bijker Hughes and Pinch 1987). 
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However, this argument is problematic. Firstly, Skinner is calling for 
complex description on the one hand, and on the other acknowledging that 
historians' language is "commonsensical" and not even "sufficiently rigorous to 
establish agreement on descriptive categories" (1966, p. 214). Secondly, these 
"descriptive" methodological strategies, as applied to social history, have been 
criticised by Stearns (1985). who feels that: 
there is a serious weakness in this new narrative argument ... The 
new narrative.... does not provide a means of coherently 
describing or explaining social change. Social historians ... must 
not be trapped in stylistic choices that unduly weight the scales 
against the possibility of ... dynamically linking the present to the 
past. (p.324-5) 
or, one might add, action to social context. 
Stearns would deny to social historians "the luxury or simplicity of an 
event-based narrative". The narrative cannot stand on its density or texture 
alone, and should rather, he argues, be used for illustrative purposes and not 
as the basic structure of an account. Similarly, Joynt and Rescher (1961) insist 
that the historian must undertake, at the very least, such classifications as are 
involved in describing events as "wars", "budgets", etc., "which can only be 
attained by grasping the relationship of causal and conceptual interrelation 
among the chronological particulars." This neatly expresses the inescapability of 
concepts of "explanation" and therefore of "cause", even to ethnographic 
accounts. 
In the present study, categories are offered as "formal ethnographic 
descriptions", and "causal" statements are proposed as working towards a 
"model" which can be more widely applied (as advocated in Frake 1983 p. 
66-67). It is on the fruitfulness of these categories and generalisations for 
further work that claims to "validity" and "accuracy" in the substantive account 
will ultimately rest. In Latour and Woolgar's words: 
the degree of accuracy (or fiction) of an account depends on 
what is subsequently made of the story (Latour and Woolgar 
1986, p. 284) 
To further paraphrase these authors, like the fate of statements about the 
"effect of unemployment on health", the fate of the present account of the 
debate rests in the hands of its readers. My appeal that others "test" the 
applicability of the approach used here (to destruction if necessary) to further 
our understanding of policy-related academic debates is itself an "enrolment" 
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strategy, an attempt to establish a "point of passage". In chapters 4 to 9, the 
concepts established in chapter 1 will therefore be applied, with the aid of the 
methodological principles and procedures outlined in this chapter, in an 
attempt to construct a coherent and "plausible" social history of the 
unemployment and health debate, in such a way as to suggest an approach to 
examining other policy-related scientific debates. First, however, chapter 3 will 
outline the scientific and administrative changes that preceded the 
unemployment and health debate, as a way of showing what the potential was 
for "inter-esting", "translation" and "enrolment" by actively entrepreneurial 
groups and individuals. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EPIDEMIOLOGY, ECONOMICS, AND HEALTH 
POLICY DEBATE 
3.1 The rationalisation of health 
The "Unemployment and Health debate" unfolded against the background of 
two related sets of institutional changes which took place in the early 1970s: 
those which were intended rationalise public expenditure on health, and those 
which produced a form of knowledge appropriate to this rationalisation. There 
was also an increasing emphasis on the need for planning, evaluation, 
efficiency and cost effectiveness in all other areas of public administration, in 
an attempt to control what had come to be seen as runaway growth in 
government expenditure. The emphasis on planning, in turn, gave rise to 
perceived needs for different kinds of information about the health and welfare 
of the population and the provision of services, and for new kinds of experts to 
collect and analyse this information. At a later stage, following the election of 
a Conservative government in 1979, the Keynesian paradigm of economic 
management was swept away and replaced by a "Friedmanite" ideology of 
return to free market principles. This major policy shift resulted, amongst many 
other things, in the acceptance by a British government of over 3 million 
unemployed by 1984, as well as the increasing incursion of market forces 
("privatisation") into areas of welfare such as housing and health. 
Even during the period of expansion and "welfare consensus", many of the 
postwar welfare measures against the "five great evils" of want, squalor, 
idleness, disease and ignorance had given rise to concern about cost and 
effectivenes. The prinCiples of social insurance did not really work for many of 
the groups most vulnerable to spells of inability to earn. "Full employment" was 
never a reality for women and the disabled and swiftly became less of a reality 
for other groups such as older workers in heavy manual jobs (Reubens 1970, 
Walker et. al 1985, White 1983). Because of the persistence of un- and 
underemployment, and of low wages in some sectors of industry, poverty was 
far from abolished (Jordan 1987, p. 99-103). Squalid housing of a new kind 
was invented, which was to prove as great a threat to mental hygiene (and 
even to child health and life expectancy see Fox and Goldblatt 1982, Martin et. 
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al 1987) as the old back-to-backs had been to physical health. Elderly people, 
preserved from death by the advances in medical technique and chemotherapy, 
survived into materially and psychologically deprived extreme age. 
One result of these developments, it may be argued, was that a Health 
Service which had never been intended to do so (0 M Fox 1986, p. 45-49), 
inherited responsibility for social distress in general, both at the practical and 
at the ideological level. This phenomenon has been termed "medicalisation" by 
many writers, a term often used vaguely and polemically, but which can be 
given more concrete meaning here in relation to the history of post 1950 
British welfare provision. 
The acceptance by the new school of "biographical" medicine in General 
Practice (documented by Armstrong, 1983; Jefferys and Sachs 1983) that 
patients' fears, sadness and loneliness were not "trivia", but legitimate business 
for doctors to deal with, was both a part of this phenomenon and a factor 
which accelerated its growth. The entrepreneurial activities of the Royal College 
of General Practitioners after its formation in the early 1960s were extremely 
successful in restoring the status and command over resources which had 
been denied them by the hospital and consultant-orientation of Bevan's 1947 
reforms. A result of this, however, was that increasing numbers of "social 
problems" began to be dealt with by the "family doctor" as forms of individual 
pathology. 
It was, therefore, quite likely that at some point, some section of the 
medical profession would come to consider that the effects of social and 
economic policies upon whole communities were also legitimate medical 
business. As part of the 1970 re-organisation of social work (the Seebohm 
reforms), the Medical Officers of health lost control of local authority social 
workers, who sought greater professional recognition and autonomy. (The 
causes and effects of this are now beginning to be disputed by social 
historians, see Jefferys 1987, Lewis 1986a). The group whose status had been 
radically undermined by this change, and by the 1974 Health Service 
reorganisation, the Medical Officers of Health were then re-designated 
"Community Physicians", and an ongoing debate began as to their role and 
domain of expertise. A strategy pursued by some sections of this new 
speciality was to take an interest in the social health of communities 
(complementary to that of individuals).This, however, was not the only reason 
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why sections within Community Medicine took up the question of whether 
unemployment and other forms of social deprivation, affect health. The 
question was posed within a context where, increasingly, a debate was being 
conducted on the "determinants of health". This debate was part of a challenge 
to the hegemony of the high-technology, high-spending, curative branches of 
medicine, and thus brought social/community medicine into an alliance with 
interests within government. 
The history of the British NHS has been accompanied from its inception by 
debates on expenditure. In the early 1950s, R. Titmuss and B. Abel-Smith 
re-analysed figures from the Guillebaud Committee Report to show that the 
"crisis" of rising costs was largely an artefact of inflation (Ham 1985, p.19). A 
short period of growth in the Service which followed Guillebaud overlapped 
with the adoption by British government of American style operational research 
techniques, and these techniques, although not introduced for these reasons 
alone, continued to be used in the attempt to cope with the economic 
constraints which began to be more strongly felt in the mid-1970s (Butler and 
Vaile 1984, p. 78-79; Ham 1985 p. 93-94). In 1968, the Labour government, in 
the wake of devaluation, "took a serious look at controlling the size of the 
public sector and converted the small steps that had followed since the 1961 
Plowden Report into the powerful PESC (PubliC Expenditure Survey Committee) 
system" (Heclo and Wildavsky, p 274). During this period of administrative 
reform (Fry 1981), it was discovered that "Ministers lacked sophisticated 
information and analysis such as that used in US programme budgeting. The 
result was that resources were being allocated without much reasoned 
deliberation" (Heclo and Wildavsky p 268). 
Heclo and Wildavsky continue: 
By 1970 it was clear to many Treasury officials that PESC needed 
further development and that this should entail increased effort 
at evaluating individual programmes and their results. (p 274) 
The impact which this had on the Department of Health was stated by a DHSS 
official, H.C. Salter, at a seminar on health economics held at the University of 
York's new (DHSS funded) Health Economics Unit in 1970. 
One might expect during Public Expenditure Review that there 
should be some scientific judgement of priorities and of the 
merits of cutting one programme instead of another ... But at 
present there are no means of arriving at scientific assessments 
... We are very conscious that in this new approach, we [Health 
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and Welfare] may well lose in the struggle for a proper share of 
the national cake if we are not able to present our case more 
scientifically (in Hauser (ed.) 1972, p. 18-19). 
The participation of Abel-Smith, an economist, in the early efforts of the 
Guillebaud Committee to identify the causes of "cost inflation" in the NHS and 
impose "priorities" and criteria of "value for money" acts as a reminder that 
economists were involved from the beginning in these exercises. In 1970, the 
DHSS introduced 
an output budget for health and personal social services, which 
would routinely relate expenditure more closely to objectives 
(Banks 1979, p. 154) 
1970 may be also regarded as marking the establishment of "health 
economics" as a distinct subdiscipline in Britain, centered around the York unit. 
(Porter 1979, and for sociological observations on the work of this research 
group, see Mulkay et. al. 1987a and b). 
Questions of cost and efficiency had not, however, been ignored by the 
medical profession. In the 1960s, practitioners of "social medicine" turned their 
attention in this direction. The most well known results are to be found in the 
work of A L Cochrane and J N Morris, who combined skills in epidemiology 
with concern for health service organisation. The first edition of Morris' book 
"Uses of Epidemiology" was published in the mid-sixties. It laid emphasis on 
the importance of measures to promote health rather than merely to deal with 
illness once it had occurred (an approach which came to be known as "the 
upstream model"). "Prevention" was held to be of increasing importance, in a 
period where the pattern of disease was seen to be changing to one where 
most illness was caused by chronic conditions which had long (and expensive) 
natural histories and were, basically, incurable. In 1972, Cochrane's 1971 Rock 
Carling Lecture on "Effectiveness and Efficiency: Random Reflections on Health 
Services" was published as a book (Cochrane 1972). It is perhaps still the most 
influential book written by a doctor on the subject of health service 
organisation. 
Morris used the idea of "community diagnosis" to refer to the need to 
monitor the state of health of a population in order to build up a picture of 
"need" which would allow the adequacy of health care provision to be 
assessed. COChrane's notion of "effective" treatment was one which "altered 
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the natural history of disease" (for the better). BOTH concepts required the 
monitoring of health status outside hospitals (Acheson 1968). This was to have 
been part of the task of the new profession of Community Medicine (see, for 
example, Gill 1976, Holland 1982, Morris 1971). Epidemiology and social 
medicine were less in demand now for the control of infectious disease and 
other traditional functions of the Medical Officers of Health (Florey and Weddell 
1980, Parston 1980). However, they could seek a new role by developing links 
with the planning and administration of health services as part of the drive 
toward rationalisation of the state sector which took place in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. 
Up to the early 1970s, the health of persons outside the hospital or health 
system was the preserve of "social medicine". But by 1970, it appears that at 
least some people within the DHSS foresaw the need to be able to make their 
claims against other Departments in the annual battle with the Treasury 
"scientifically respectable". The disciplines to which officials looked for 
expertise appropriate to their claims were both "social medicine" and 
economics. Health economics had been flourishing for some time in the USA 
and one of the largest health-economic studies ever undertaken in the UK was 
Feldstein's in the 1960s (Feldstein 1967). However, to some extent, the DHSS 
can be said to have further promoted the discipline, by funding the York Unit 
specifically to train up new members (the M.Sc. course in Health Economics 
had its first intake of students in 1977). The exigencies of the struggle between 
a spending Ministry and the Treasury began to create an intellectual space into 
which entrepreneurial subdisciplines could move (for an explicit debate 
amongst economists on this point see Engelman 1980, Akehurst 1981). This is 
one example of the importance of the relationship between academic and 
administrative concerns in the development of an emerging discipline, and 
constitutes one side of the essential background to the unemployment and 
health debate. 
Another development which formed part of the early social history of the 
debate was the reorganisation of the funding of medical research which took 
place during the 1970s. In 1971, like all other departments funding research, the 
DHSS appointed a Chief Scientist. The first Chief Scientist, Sir Douglas Black, 
elected to play a part-time, advisory role, and worked with a "Chief Scientist's 
Advisory Committee" (CSRC) of experts, whose role was to assess priorities 
across the whole "research programme". 
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Within the DHSS at this time, broadly, four major areas of "R&D" may be 
distinguished: Health Service, Personal Social Services and Special Client 
Groups, NHS Equipment and Supplies etc, and Social Security. Additionally, 
large amounts of money went to fund studies carried out by the Medical 
Research Council (MRC). The balance sheet in the period under study looked 
something like this: 
TABLE 1 
DHSS R&D Expenditure 1976-1981 
(.kOOOs) 
1976/7 1977/8 1978/9 1979/80 1980/81 
Health services 3684 4134 4364 4865 5785 
PSS/Client Grps 2594 2887 3456 4246 5326 
NHS Equipmt. 2936 2614 3118 4196 5399 
Soc. Security 270 329 352 353 469 
MRC 8936 8920 10740 11436 13778 
Source: DHSS Research and Development Handbooks 
The tables were not published after 1981 
The MRC is an independent research council whose funds come directly 
from the Department of Education and Science's "science vote", and are not 
allocated on a "customer-contractor" basis. Its members, the key decision 
makers who allocate both its DES and its DHSS grants, are drawn from the 
"high-tech" clinical specialities, proud of their independence and high scientific 
standards. In the early 1970s, as part of the "Rothschild" re-organisations of 
government-funded research (Kogan and Henkel 1983), 25% of the MRC's 
allocation from the DES was transferred to the DHSS to be devoted (on a 
contracted basis) to "Health Services Research". By this was meant research 
directed at the "effectiveness and efficiency", appropriateness and acceptability 
of clinical services, especially services to the less glamorous client groups such 
as the mentally and physically handicapped. These services were a traditional 
area of concern to "social medicine", and the composition of the CSRC's 
medical membership reflected this -- the Chief Medical Officer, Sir Douglas 
Black later chaired the group which produced the Black Report on Inequalities 
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in Health (DHSS 1980). Black himself had been a leading clinical sCientist, and 
a member of one of the MRC Research Boards. But the committee included 
Cochrane, Morris and another prominent figure in social medicine: Prof Alwyn 
Smith (an early academic participant in the Unemployment and Health Study 
Group). Other members during the brief life of the CSRC included economist 
Alan Williams, and strong representation of social policy, including both David 
Donnison and Peter Townsend at various points in time. Only three "pure 
clinicians" (out of 18) were included in 1973, this rose to 4 (out of 19) by 1979, 
the last year of the CSRC's existence. 
Sir Douglas Black expressed enthusiasm at the composition of his Research 
Committee: 
We were lucky in the help we enlisted from outside scientists. It 
was a totally different set of disciplines from those [which] one 
thinks of in connection with clinical research; for example, 
sociologists, economists, statisticians and so on. It was an 
interesting experience, and not merely in the Chinese sense of 
the word (Black 1986). 
Thus the composition of the CSRC can be seen as influenced by the 
critique of the dominance of the clinical specialties in medicine, both in terms 
of intellectual hegemony and in terms of command over resources. "Clinical" 
dominance was regarded by many policy makers as acting to the detriment of 
other services, particularly under the new conditions of economic stringency. 
This critique united two separate interests: the concern to limit health 
expenditure without arousing public protest, by discrediting that section of the 
medical profession which pressed for more and more resources for advanced 
technology, and the "radical" rejection of mechanistic forms of medicine, which 
originated outside of government. During its short existence, the Chief 
Scientist's Research Committee of the DHSS expressed the claims of 
social/community medicine to set new priorities for health. 
In Black's view, it was the restrictions on resources and civil service staffing 
that resulted from organisational reviews which hindered the effectiveness of 
the Rothschild machinery in the DHSS. Additionally, however, as also discussed 
by Kogan and Henkel, there was the inherent conflict between politically 
determined priorities (in this case, services to the "priority client groups" of 
older people and people with disabilities) and what Black termed "the question 
of scientific opportunity". In other words, how to strike the balance between 
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unglamorous, service oriented research on the elderly, disability and problems 
of service delivery and those topics which "good" scientists wished to pursue 
in order to gain prestige in the eyes of peers? This was made even more 
difficult by the fact that even in the case of service-oriented research, it was 
not easy to "identify a customer". According to Black, the most likely candidate 
was 
An Under-Secretary in charge of 18 or 19 Divisions in the DHSS 
.. .They vary in their devotion to the furthering of research, and 
given that research is only about 1 % of their total budget, this is 
only natural. ... Bureaucracy arose from the necessity to identify a 
credible customer. 
In 1978, Sir Arthur Buller took over as full time chief scientist and the CSRC 
was dismantled 10. In 1979 all DHSS funded research units began to be 
reviewed with a view to cut-backs. At the same time, the MRC's role was once 
again recovering strength. In 1981, the funds transferred to the DHSS were 
handed back, on the condition that the MRC undertake to fund more research 
decided on the basis of "need" rather than judgements of scientific merit alone. 
In order to facilitate this, a Health Services Research Panel was set up within 
the MRC. This arrangement was termed the "Concordat". 
3.2 The bureaucratisation of "Public Health" 
By the late 1970s there were two sources of discontent within community 
medicine and the disciplines to which it acted as a "client" or customer 
profession. One was dissatisfaction with the waning of the role which social 
medicine had begun to play in determining priorities for health research 
funding at the height of its influence on the CSRC. The other was the 
increasing bureaucratisation of Community Medicine, which had been seen at 
one stage as social medicine in practice. 
In the course of the 1974 re-organisation of the NHS, the position of 
Medical Officer of Health had been abolished. The functions of the MOsH were 
combined with those of the Medical Administrators of the old Regional Hospital 
10 For an account of this see Ashworth 1984, p. 32 
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Boards, and the medical staff of the university departments of public health and 
social medicine, to form the new speciality of Community Medicine. The 
function of these specialists was to investigate and assess the needs of the 
population so that priorities could be established for the promotion of health 
and the prevention of disease, as well as the provision of medical care (Report 
of Joint Working Party 1971, quoted in Garraway 1984, p. 15, see also Scottish 
Home and Health Department 1973). 
In the words of the 1972 Report on NHS management known as the "Grey 
Book" (DHSS 1972), community physicians were seen as "clinical managers". 
They were granted consultant ("specialist") status in order that the voice of 
management should have a degree of legitimacy equal to that of the 
high-spending hospital clinicians on the consensus teams at the various 
decision-making levels of the health service (for an account of the problems 
created by this reform, see Russell 1984, Lewis 1986b). 
The result of this was, in the eyes of many both inside and outside of 
Community Medicine, the worst of all worlds. The role of the MOH in protecting 
and improving the environment (both physical and social) took on something of 
the nature of a "myth of the golden age". In the words of Sir John Brotherston, 
a past Chief Medical Officer for Scotland: 
The pioneer Medical Officers of Health had many obstacles to 
contend with such as primitive organisations and attitudes, but 
they could range freely in their concerns over the whole front of 
human well-being ... (in Draper and Smart 1984) 
Dissidents regretted the loss of the charismatic public health role, (described 
colourfully as "Gotterdammerung", for example, in Acton 1 984, and as "death 
throes" in Smith 1979) and felt that community medicine had moved too far 
towards a purely managerial function within the hospital sector. Health 
Authorities, unlike local authorities, are "quangos", appointed ultimately by 
central government. Many within Community Medicine (and all who became 
involved in the unemployment and health debate) regretted the loss of 
accountability to an elected body and of the "professional advisory role" which 
this entailed. 
There was no shortage of sources of legitimating knowledge claims for this 
position. Epidemiological research had for some time (embodied chiefly in the 
work of McKeown and his collaborators, see McKeown and Lowe 1966, 
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McKeown 1976, 1979), been "demonstrating" that the major determinants of 
health lay, not in clinical medicine, but outside, in the standard of living and 
life-style of the population as a whole. An expert advisory role vis-a-vis the 
local authorities, who are responsible for housing, transport, social services and 
environment, was therefore regarded as preferable, both in terms of political 
structure and of the possibility of taking necessary actions to promote health. 
It was therefore ironic, in the eyes of many commentators on health policy, 
that at this of all times, the "community" physician should be more than ever 
tied to management of clinical medicine. 
A loosely connected faction within mainstream community medicine was 
forming around these discontents in the early days of the unemployment and 
health debate. Taking some liberty, I will refer to this tendency -- a set of 
ideas rather than a stable group of individuals, as "Manifesto" community 
medicine. The "Manifesto" document "Re-Thinking Community Medicine" (USHP 
1979), was produced by the Unit for the Study of Health Policy, a 
Foundation-funded policy and research unit, in 1979. The journal Radical 
Community Medicine began to appear in the same year. Members of the USHP 
were the promoters, in Britain, of the ideas of M. H. Brenner; and the editor of 
Radical Community Medicine became co-ordinator of the Unemployment and 
Health Study Group, the major pressure group in the debate. 
Like Aronson's entrepreneurial nutritionists (Aronson 1982a and b), the 
"manifesto" community medicine group aimed to influence both the mainstream 
discipline's major client, the Department of Health, and the content of their 
discipline itself. The entrepreneurial activity of USHP was directed towards the 
DHSS, and, simultaneously, at the "Community Medicine Establishment" (in the 
words of one of its senior staff). USHP attempted to promote a new role for 
public health and its practitioners within the re-organised NHS, and also in 
wider political and economic debates. In order to advance these claims within 
the medical profession, USHP and its sympathisers attempted to mobilise the 
anxieties of the Department over excessive spending on "high technology 
curative medicine", and to direct attention to the social and environmental 
aspects of the prevention of ill-health and its associated costs (the "upstream 
model"). In order to influence government opinion, they directed their ideas on 
the social causation of illness to the political party in power, which might have 
been expected to be sympathetic. A notion of environmental causation was 
necessary to the Manifesto group, both to influence the content of community 
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medicine as a discipline, and to promote the claims of the new sub-profession 
to a more prestigious position within medicine as a whole. Thus did 
"Manifesto" community medicine's strategy have "consequences for both the 
definition of a social problem and the development of a ... discipline", in 
Aronson's words. 
However, as the producer of appropriate knowledge for health planning in 
the late 1970s and 1980s, an environmentally oriented Community Medicine 
was then faced with a problem. In order to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness or indeed to establish these criteria at all as part of what a health 
service ought to be doing, a strong case could be made that it was necessary 
to develop indicators of need for, and outcome of, health care (Butler and Vaile 
1984, p. 127-128). It was argued by some that clinical field surveys with 
longitudinal follow-up, or at the very least "data linkage" (as proposed by 
Acheson 1967), enabling individuals to be followed in and out of the health 
system, are necessary in order for such aims to be satisfactorily accomplished. 
Comments by both academics and administrators involved in the 
unemployment and health debate illustrate their awareness of this issue. There 
were two serious flaws to this argument in terms of the realities of policy 
making. One was that the cost of the necessary studies was so great (Butler 
and Vaile 1984, p. 127-128). The other was, as Heller (1978, pp. 68-79) points 
out, that the discoveries of such exercises might themselves cause pOlitical 
embarrassment, by revealing the size of the "clinical iceberg" (Last 1963, 
Hannay 1979) and its unequal social distribution. Planners needed to know 
about population health status, the longer- term outcomes of various forms of 
hospital treatments and so on, and yet this form of knowledge threatened to 
be, in public expenditure terms, potentially as explosive as in-vitro fertilisation, 
organ transplantation and dialysis. It was not so much a technically as an 
administratively infeasible exercise. As one Scottish health planner, T. 
Drummond Hunter, put it: 
It is difficult to give advice to government if the advice you are 
giving is not what they want to hear ... there is a perpetual 
conspiracy here to tell people at the top what they want to hear 
And the way this "conspiracy" worked, he pointed out, was via the reluctance 
of civil service principals to be the carrier of unwelcome messages to their 
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superiors, for fear of "conveying the impression that he [sic] is 'unsound,,,ll. 
At this time, there was another energetic and entrepreneurially inclined 
group which also had a claim to provide the intellectual foundations for a drive 
to rationalise the provision of health and social services. Although not a 
profession of the same standing as medicine, this group's traditional 
relationship to government put it in a strong position. Professional economists 
hold a unique position within the British Civil Service (Booth and Coats 1978, 
Cairncross 1968, 1970, Sharpe 1978, C. Smith 1987). Despite the presence of 
members of other numerate disciplines such as statisticians and actuaries in 
British political administration, the economic advisers played a key role at the 
point in time when health economists outside government were launching their 
claim to a voice in health policy making (Bulmer 1986 p. 29, p. 200, p.292; 
Bulmer 1987 p. 16). 
This position of influence was described to me by civil servants who 
became involved in the unemployment and health debate. One attributed the 
success of the economic advisers to their ability to "sell their wares" and 
"good leadership". This administrator explained: 
It depends on the issue, whether I use economic advisers. But it 
also depends on the individuals involved. If I know that [a 
highly-thought of economist] is responsible for something, then I 
use the EAs[Economic Advisers]. But if there is, say, a statistician 
that I trust, then I'd use him, if he could do it. I need to consider 
questions like "If I need a quick-and-dirty on this one, will they 
stand on their professional pride and refuse to do it?" How do 
these people prove themselves? It's their UTILITY that is the 
crucial thing . 
... I would say that in this Department the economists are now 
head and shoulders above the statisticians in the ways people 
like me use them. They deliver ... What I look for is 
perspective -- breadth -- and not being tied within one's own 
discipline. 
And another commented: 
We use the economists' and actuaries' advice a lot. ... I'm not 
sure where they overlap, myself .... We also have to be aware of 
their professional jealousies. ... Generally -- can I be frank? --
11 However that this is not a phenomenon solely of the civil service under Thatcher is witnessed 
by Opie's ('19681 lament over attempts to integrate economic advice into the policy making 
process under Wilson. 
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the economists are better at giVing answers. The actuaries want 
to take over the whole policy question. I get the impression the 
actuaries don't feel like civil servants at all. The EAs see the 
problems WE have in the way that WE [administrators] have them 
... they can even anticipate the sorts of things we are going to 
ask before we do! 
Like the adherents of the public health approach to health planning and 
policy making, health economists held the view that problems about the 
allocation of resources to the health sector would not be solved by "clinical 
management" alone, but only by strategies which extended over wider areas of 
social life. However, they differed from the public health view in two main 
respects: 
a) they believed that health service planning and health policy 
could be better carried out by economists, because it does not 
require clinical training, but rather a greater sophistication in 
operational research technique, 
b) they believed that the wider questions of "the determinants of 
the distribution of health and health-related behaviour in the 
community" (which they refer to by the economists" technical 
term, "production functions,,12. could be more fruitfully discussed 
in terms of the use of models of consumer utilities to determine 
the "value of health" than in the public health tradition of Farr, 
Chadwick and Simon 13. 
For example in 1987, one participant in the unemployment and health debate 
put it: 
as economists we hope we may be forgiven for venturing in 
where other disciplines have, perhaps wisely, refused to tread. 
OUr justification, or plea in mitigation, is that the investigation of 
the determinants of population health is in many ways akin to 
the estimation of production functions Economists have 
considerable ... experience with the estimation of production 
functions ... (Gravelle and Backhouse 1987) 
Health economists play important roles in advising government 
departments, and health economists were, during the period of this study, 
12 It should be pointed out that although they do not use the term, public-health oriented 
epidemiologists ALSO use "production functions" -- this merely refers to the hypothesised 
relationship between input and output. The important difference, symbolised by different 
language, is in what are thought to be the biologically and politically relevant FORMS of input and 
outcome. 
13 see, for example, Fuchs (1972) Perlman (19741. Wagstaff (1986a and 1986b) 
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swiftly establishing a more influential position in relation to the DHSS. 
Community physicians however, are marginal to medicine, and medical advisers 
to government have not traditionally been drawn from the ranks of practising 
public health doctors or community physicians. This rendered the relative 
positions of these two subprofessions more equal in the contest for intellectual 
hegemony over health service planning than might otherwise have been 
expected. Health economists can challenge the exclusive right of community 
physicians to the planning function in a way that, for example, physiologists 
and anatomists cannot threaten the hegemony of clinical specialists in hospital 
medicine. In particular, economic techniques such as "satisficing" and 
"sub-optimisation" fitted well into the new, increasingly bureaucratic style of 
health service planning, and the implementation of the Griffiths Report 
strengthened the hand of the more "managerially" oriented school of health 
economists still further (Ledwith 1987, St. George 1985). 
An example of the confidence with which the claims-making activity of 
health economics was pursued in this period is provided by Culyer (1976): 
Economic analysis of health service problems is ... no game for 
amateurs. The quack economist is no less a threat to society 
than the quack doctor ... [because] below the surface lies a vast 
body of highly technical, mostly mathematical work in the learned 
journals and scholarly monographs, ... Medical policy-making has 
been lumbered for long enough with a baggage train of ... 
amateur ideologues, amateur doctors and amateur 
economists (p. 9) 
3.3 Social research under the IIRothschiid systemll 
In order to understand the ways in which members of the other two 
disciplines involved in the unemployment and health debate, medical sociology 
and medical/social statistics, participated in it, it is necessary to examine the 
ways in which the relationship of the social sciences (other than economics) to 
government has developed in the 1970s and 1980s. This also entails some 
discussion of the ways in which social science research is regarded, organised, 
and used in government departments. 
Social scientists other than economists have always played a more marginal 
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role in government 14. Accordingly, many of the institutions from which 
members of these disciplines participated in health and welfare policy debates 
were what Hall et al (1978, p.60) have called "intermediate bodies", and what 
Cherns (1979, p.45-46) calls "mediating institutions". These are the research 
institutes and policy units such as PSI, the Child Poverty Action Group and the 
Institute for Social Studies in Medical Care, which Hall and co-authors regard 
as situated between the more obvious interest groups such as trade unions 
and employers' organisations on the one side, and government on the other. 
In these intermediate bodies, of which the Unit for the Study of Health Policy 
was a perfect example, social scientists (including health-economists of less 
orthodox persuasion) collaborated with "social medicine" academics on 
questions relating to health policy and the health consequences of wider social 
and economic trends. The short history of the USHP stands as an example of 
the tendency noted by Hall et. al: 
There is no firm boundary between research, pressure group 
activities and party politics. Altogether this "intermediate" area ... 
probably accounts for many of the initiatives and much of the 
pressure for change in social policy. 
It may be that in the mid and late 1970's, the charismatic role which some 
groups within social medicine and public health felt obliged to adopt in 
opposition to the threats posed by the 1974 reorganisation fitted well with this 
innovative tradition of extra- institutional social science. However, 
What we have witnessed in the past decade is a major shift in 
the relative positions of independent and [governmental] 
departmental research ... Government departments are now well 
provided with the kinds of data and expertise needed to 
counteract a challenge from an outside body, should they so 
wish. They are also in a better position to influence the type of 
research being conducted outside government. (Hall et. aL, p. 79) 
Hall at. al. date from the mid-1960s the feeling that the information needed for 
planning and policy making should be produced by Departments themselves. As 
early as 1956 the Guillebaud Report on the costs of the NHS recommended the 
setting up of a Research and Statistics Department in the Ministry of Health 
and thereafter the number of statisticians and economists in the department 
increased rapidly (Klein 1982, .p389). Between 1965 and 1975 the number of 
14 for a recent and enlightening account of the position of "research oHicers" in government 
departments, see R Walker (1987). 
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professional statisticians employed in government increased from around 200 
to 500. The DHSS, DoE, the Home Office and the Department of Employment all 
established their own small social research units (Bulmer 1982, p. 131 }.The 
statisticians, although dispersed around the various departments, had their own 
Central Statistical Office, part of the Cabinet Office (Moser 1973). In a similar 
manner, the Economic Section of the Treasury presides over the work of 
economists in the various branches of government. Members of both 
disCiplines have "professional" leadership placed high in the civil service 
hierarchy (at Second Permanent Secretary level, see R Walker, 1987, p. 149), 
and centrally directed mechanisms for training and career development. Both 
statisticians and economists can enter on a "career grade" the equivalent of 
"Principal" (Grade 7) and benefit from the "fast stream" which replaced direct 
entry to the administrative principal grade. However, published reports of 
professional meetings indicate that many senior statisticians did not consider 
the careers open to government statisticians altogether satisfactory, despite 
these similarities in the career structures open to members of either 
profession 15. 
Sociologists' and psychologists' fates depended upon that of the units they 
worked for. A sociologist cannot enter the civil service via the "fast stream" 
directly into the grade-7 equivalent (Principal Research Officer), and will be 
subjected to the galling experience of seeing economists with equivalent (or 
fewer) qualifications begin at a higher level of seniority and remuneration. 
Statisticians were similarly "advantaged" in early career terms, but the view has 
been expressed by many commentators that only the economists end up with a 
truly coherent occupational or career structure with ready access to the higher 
reaches of the civil service (Bulmer 1978, p. 37-38, Bulmer 1987, p. 16, Booth 
and Coates 1978, Cherns 1979 pp. 52-54). 
Research units within government departments hold an ambiguous position, 
and working in such an environment may entail a particular type of "cycle of 
credibility" for researchers, as explained by Prince (1983). Sociologists working 
in government, like economists and statisticians, are regarded as resources for 
administrative staff. However, there is no "Central Sociological Office", and no 
15 for examples of such dissatisfaction and the continuing debate on statistical careers in 
government see, for example, Allen (1970)' Griffin (1985) 
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centrally directed scheme of training and career development 16. Sociologists 
usually work in specialist Research or Policy Units headed by a professional or 
scientific civil servant at the Undersecretary level. The Social Research Branch 
of the DHSS was one such unit. Prince comments that, in general: 
Operating within regular government hierarchies means units 
have had to adjust to the administrative culture of public 
organisations, with its concern for risk avoidance, the short term 
and the practical. This context delimits the planning and 
research functions, making them specific to a particular set of 
legislative and administrative concerns (p. 117) 
Bulmer (1982) goes further. He (like Drummond Hunter see section 3.2) feels 
that the constraint of "soundness" does not only enter into the career 
considerations of researchers working INSIDE government. As central 
departments took on more information- generating tasks, they also acquired a 
more important role in the funding of external research. After the Rothschild 
reforms in 1971, a "major change in the philosophy and organisation of social 
research" followed. 
The evolution of this structure of government support for social 
research places considerable power in the hands of 
departments to influence the direction taken by social research ... 
The requirement that research should be related to an identified 
policy concern of a department serves to bind social research 
increasingly to CURRENT interests of SPECIFIC departments. It 
then becomes more difficult to develop research which deals 
with a problem that cuts across departmental boundaries (pp. 
143-144) 
The relevance of this analysis of the position of various kind of "expert" 
within government departments to the present study is reflected in the 
comments of two other civil servants. As one administrator explained: 
[Unemployment and health is] not clearly focussed in terms of 
departmental responsibilities ... in organisational terms it doesn't 
make sense, so there's a bit of ad-hocery about it. 
And according to another: 
Unemployment and health is not at all a good example of how 
things can work together constructively. In fact, it's a particularly 
16 though see Blume's (1987. p. 81) account of the brief life of the Social Research Co-Ordinating 
Committee in the Cabinet Office. 
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bad example ... In 1980, ... there'd been a lot of discussion -- it 
did have a group of administrators who were concerned with ... 
issues right across the department .... policy responsibility for 
that work would have lain with a planning department which had 
some of the most competent administrators around .... So it had, 
beavering away at it, some of the best junior administrative 
minds .... Unfortunately the impetus and expertise got shifted in 
the department because the policy group got radically changed 
and key staff moved on. So now there is no policy location for it 
17 
And in any case, although 
... unemployment and health was a very interesting intellectual 
problem, and we got hooked on it '" what could the DHSS DO 
about it? The problem was so enormous, and not in our remit. 
Unemployment and health is a hybrid .,. it runs across two 
departments, two areas of responsibility. These issues that cross 
the pattern of organisational structures are much more difficult 
to handle successfully. It doesn't have an easy place in any client 
group oriented structures or service structures. 
Prince (1983) points out that "Policy planners and researchers choose work 
topics that have senior official support and can be implemented ... " Criteria 
which government researchers (and, if Bulmer is correct. increasingly outside 
researchers too) must take into account when deciding which topics to pursue 
include: 
political implications, administrative feasibility, "quickies", "the 
unit can do it", avoid cans of worms, anticipate issues, and 
develop a distinct domain. (p. 151) 
From which it can be seen that unemployment and health was always finely 
balanced in its chances of being taken up as a legitimate topic for research. In 
terms of cost. feasibility, the "can of worms" criterion and the distinct-domain 
criterion, the issue was a loser. Pure intellectual fascination fits neither the 
practical ethos described by Prince nor the post-Rothschild official 
commissioning process. 
However, officials DID fear that perhaps just being up to date with outside 
research might not be sufficient to allow them to deal with media and pressure 
group activity, and this created a certain amount of pressure towards 
commissioning further research. These pressures are strong, as related by civil 
17 for further explanation of these events see section 6.1.2. 
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servants involved in the debate: One spoke of the need to 
... carry out the necessary sort of work for defensive briefing, for 
Ministers to defend their indefensible policies. 
and another told of three days' hard work carried out by several high calibre 
administrative minds over a PQ which turned out to have been tabled by 
mistake. 
3.4 Questions and answers 
Many participants in the unemployment and health debate remarked on the 
importance of Parliamentary Questions (PQs) in the process by which the 
health of the unemployed came to be seen as a "social problem." The 
importance of parliamentary questions in the day-to-day functioning of public 
servants, and the extent to which the need to answer them shapes their 
longer-term concerns is little discussed, although Butler and Vaile (1985, p.l00) 
point out that the DHSS receives 5000 each year. Within the health-policy 
making community, it was common knowledge, and regarded as more or less 
routine, if not something to be advertised, that pressure groups, such as the 
Maternity Alliance for example, "briefed" MPs to ask questions. This practice 
was referred to as "planting a PQ". Stories also abounded of the friendly or 
"tame" civil servant who would help to frame a question "correctly", that is, in 
such a way that it could not be evaded by saying that the information was not 
available or too expensive to produce. The benefit to an MP of allowing 
himself to be "used" in this way was that s/he would be noticed, and noticed 
as capable of carrying out well directed probes of government policy. This is 
part of the "cycle of credibility" of the parliamentary politician. The desire to be 
"noticed" also meant that a question on the effect of unemployment on health 
might be asked as part of a whole string of others dealing with various aspects 
of health policy. For MPs, as for academics, unemployment and health was just 
one of many possible means to an end. 
The civil servants whose job it was to answer PQs ("Principals") usually 
mustered and collated the necessary information from a variety of sources, 
including economic advisers, statisticians and other professional advisers, 
seemed rather ambivalent about them. PQs certainly have "nuisance value", and 
yet they were seen as a necessary part of the democratic process. As one 
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remembered: 
Sometimes there are very important issues revealed and raised 
through POs. There are a proportion of POs that are hard to deal 
with. You've got all the rest of your workload on top of this. 
Some of them seem to be a sort of knee-jerk response to 
something that appeared in the Daily Mirror. Some of these MPs 
put down 13 or 14 at a time. It is a necessary evil. 
Although I have mentioned the usefulness of the PO to the careers MPs 
wishing to be noticed and/or to lay a special claim to one area of expertise, 
some questions seemed to lower civil servants' opinions of MPs, to the point 
where an administrator or economic adviser who was in sympathy with the aim 
of the question could feel "able to write it better myself". The problem of the 
collaboration between administrative and "expert" civil servants could be 
highlighted by a PO. As one put it: 
This is a classic illustration. Someone from the Actuaries 
Department once worked for me. He was perfect at dOing these 
sort of totally neutral, objective appraisals. But he could not 
bring himself to carry out the necessary work for defensive 
briefing, ... 
[MB: Is that really true, then, that you have to play to this sort of 
script? You make it sound like "Yes, Minister".] 
Your first job is to defend your Ministers from making fools of 
themselves. You don't actually LIE, of course. The written PO is 
the classic example of how to avoid telling the truth without 
lying, if you like. 
On the role of the PO in the unemployment and health debate more 
specifically, one DHSS official at least felt that such use of Brenner's work had 
made the Department prick up its ears. I don't know that there 
was any departmental activity [on unemployment and health] 
before Brenner's work appeared. These analyses of Brenner's did 
lead to POs being asked. It's that sort of thing that quite often 
happens -- either a piece of research or something a pressure 
group does. 
However, another official told me that a different criterion was used when 
judging how accurately a question had to be answered when it originated from 
"outside": 
There are different stages -- for example: "wouldn't it be nice 
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if--?" which could come from a PQ or an "outsider" report. For 
these, it's not too high on the policy agenda, so you work with 
broad orders of magnitude. If it's something that starts motoring 
and becomes a political option, then you have to get your data 
sorted out and do a proper analysis. 
There was seen to be a distinction here between the roles of economic 
advisers on the one hand and those of statisticians and actuaries on the other. 
The latter would only be brought in once a proposal (whether it originated 
inside or outside of Whitehall) had given rise to a real option for policy change. 
Economic advisers, on the other hand, were a good source of rapidly produced 
estimates which might have wide margins for error, but could be used in the 
sort of rapid-response mode required for answering PQs. Ultimate 
responsibility was seen, however, as lying firmly with the administrator and not 
with any of the "experts". 
I might ask ... for information, but I'd stitch it together myself. We 
don't let the professional support groups have responsibility for 
PQs -- only the administrators do that kind of thing. 
Administrators will have three to five days to "get an answer together". In the 
case of oral PQs, a further challenge to the administrator's skills is presented 
by the threat of "supplementaries" In this case 
The trick is to be able to guess what the follow-up questions are 
going to be. This is a test of your quality, whether you can do 
this. 
The Parliamentary Question, then, plays a role in the cycles of credibility of 
both MPs and civil servants. In most cases, the asking and answering of PQs 
seems to be seen as a sort of ritual which is relevant to testing the "quality" of 
contestants, and which can also be a first attempt to put an issue onto the 
political agenda, or to return it there. They do not, in themselves, lead to 
policy action. 
3.5 Appropriate knowledge 
It may be that in the case of health services research and planning, the 
trends discussed in this chapter (increasing emphasis on cost control, 
"bureaucratisation" of both research and service planning in the field of health) 
tended to force administrators away from social medicine and towards health 
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economics as the appropriate intellectual framework. Health economics could 
"produce the Black Magic rather than the Dairy Box" (in the words of a 
government statistician). Economists did not force their own views (either of 
the right answers or the right questions) on administrators, but at the same 
time accepted the role, when necessary, of "telling the customer what he really 
wanted". 
As the role of social medicine/epidemiology declined in importance, as 
reflected in the history of the Chief Scientists Research Committee, the 
influence of the economists rose. At the same time, clinical/scientific 
hegemony was restored over medical research, but under conditions of 
increasingly limited funding. Under these circumstances medical researchers, 
too, became increasingly wary of what were seen to be the difficult value 
issues raised by intellectual approaches identified with the "social sciences". In 
the correspondence between members of the newly-appointed Health Services 
Research Panel of the MRC in early 1981 was to be found, for example, the 
expressed opinion of a prominent epidemiologist that "we must not ally 
ourselves with sociology and social administration -- this would be the death 
of our discipline." 
The delicate position of epidemiology has been commented on by Kogan 
and Henkel in their comprehensive account of the workings of the Rothschild 
structure in DHSS-funded research. Unlike the civil servants quoted above, 
who found unemployment and health "untypical", Kogan and Henkel see 
problems in the collaboration between government and scientists as common 
or even routine.They point out that, at this time, epidemiology was: 
moving from a position in which the nature of evidence and 
measurement and the choice of methodology were undisputed 
into one where, because social and psychological factors are ... 
assuming dominance, this is no longer the case. Moreover, this 
means ... that value issues are coming to the surface ... (p.20) 
a fact which, in these authors' view, made funding of epidemiological research 
on the "customer-contractor" basis increasingly problematic for a major client, 
the DHSS. Accordingly, it should perhaps be no surprise that the DHSS handed 
back the 25 percent of MRC funds which had been transferred in 1973 for 
"health services research", removing them from the control of the 
social-medicine-dominated Chief Scientists Research Committee (see section 
3.1 ). 
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It is consistent with this analysis that in the event, much of the major 
British research on unemployment and health was carried out in research units 
which were independent or semi-independent of government, but under 
increasing pressure, under governments of both complexions, to increase the 
"relevance" of the work they supported: - the MRC Unit for Epidemiological 
Studies in Psychiatry at Edinburgh University, the MRC/ESRC Social and Applied 
Psychology Unit (SAPU) at Sheffield University, the MRC- (and later charity-) 
funded British Regional Heart Study, and the Social Statistics Research Unit at 
City University, which received funds from the MRC, ESRC and Cancer Research 
Campaign (although until the Spring of 1985 half its Director's salary was paid 
by the OpeS). Mentions are made of "unemployment and health" in the Annual 
Reports of both the Department and the CounCil, as an example of the 
new-style "relevance" of Council-funded work to "social problems" (see DHSS 
1983, p. 14, DHSS 1984, p. 12, DHSS 1985, p. 11,). The research carried out at 
Queen Mary College which criticised the time-series methods of Harvey 
Brenner was directly funded by the DHSS, and another important early riposte 
to Brenner was provided as a by-product of the DHSS's 1978 Cohort Study of 
the Unemployed. However, it should be noted also that the British study which 
had the greatest impact of all, in media terms, Fagin and Little's study of 22 of 
the 1978 Cohort families, was also given a small amount of support (i2,~OO) by 
the DHSS. 
As the debate progressed, the sociologists and social and medical 
statisticians working in the dispersed research units tended to draw into a 
coalition, with each other and with "Manifesto" community medicine, to take up 
the ideas promoted by the Unit for the Study of Health Policy. This was the 
process of "enrolment" (see section 1.6) which will be traced in the chapters to 
follow. Economists COULD have become "enrolled" as sources of expert 
"knowledge claims" by those who sought to promote the idea that 
unemployment caused ill health. There was work produced by economists 
(Junankar 1986, Leigh 1987, Westcott 1987) which made this sort of claim. Also, 
other "intermediate bodies" which might be regarded as politically not 
dissimilar to the USHP (the Low Pay Unit, for example) employ economists as 
producers of appropriate knowledge. Therefore, the following account will also 
explore the reasons why economists who played the most important roles in 
the debate were to be found almost exclusively on one "side". 
It will be argued that the major reason for this was that the unemployment 
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and health debate was, amongst other things, a field of contestation, not 
between whole disciplines, but between subdisciplines competing for a specific 
role. Because both groups dealt in numbers, it might have seemed that 
epidemiologically trained community physicians, and health economists "spoke 
the same language". In fact the reverse was the case. At issue was which 
numerate discipline was successfully going to lay claim to the status of 
providing appropriate expertise to those planning and administering the health 
service, and those charged with justifying these policies in the eyes of the 
public. 
It must be stressed that community medicine as a whole (the 
"establishment", represented in the Faculty) laid no particular claim to 
intellectual hegemony over the discussion of health policy. The profession's 
mainstream was content to rest upon the assurance of the medical closed 
shop -- by decree, no lay person was eligible to become a consultant in 
community medicine. By staking the subprofession's claims on a 
"structural/environmental" model of the determinants of community health, the 
"Manifesto" group was taking a major risk. No such alarming potential resided 
in the work of the health economists. For example, Culyer suggests that: 
Health care is of infinite value to none of us -- we smoke and 
drink and eat in ways that diminish our health and life 
expectancy ... All our daily behaviour denies that we value health 
infinitely (Culyer 1976, p. 5) 
and Gravelle and Backhouse state firmly that: " 
The health of a population is determined by decisions taken by 
individuals in their capacities as voters, consumers, workers, 
employers, health service employees or government policy 
makers (Gravelle and Backhouse 1987) 
If, instead of social and environmental conditions, the "determinants of 
health" were to be accepted as individual factors such as consumer behaviour, 
and inborn psychological and physical "fitness", then there was (as Mackenzie, 
1981 has suggested was the case in the early twentieth century public health 
debates) little intellectual space for any form of Community Medicine. Because 
economists can deal far better with individual consumer behaviour (which is, 
after all, part of their traditional business) and clinicians with genetic defects. 
As a result, Community Medicine was almost destined to cling to and seek to 
develop a public health approach, which stressed "the environment", and in this 
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sense, the "Manifesto" group, whilst often in conflict with the mainstream of 
the sub-profession, must also be regarded as occupying its leading edge. And 
insofar as Community Medicine was the "customer" for so much of the activity 
of medical statisticians and medical sociologists, both as teachers and 
researchers, these changes in professional ideology drew the scientists' 
concerns along behind. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROFESSIONAL INNOVATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
1975-1982 
4.1 uUncovering the social problem" 
Chapter 3 has described the institutional background to the unemployment 
and health debate, and outlined the processes of political and administrative 
change against which the events in this case study took place. This chapter 
will concentrate upon the ways in which members of professional and 
disciplinary subgroups sought to advance their (individual or group) claims to 
"expert" status by offering various ideas as "resources" in the attempt to form 
new alliances. Section 4.1 will look at the attempts made by some "marginal" 
members of the medical profession to use the unemployment and health 
debate to promote their own versions of a combination of clinical and 
social-scientific ideas as relevant to pressing social issues. Section 4.2 will 
describe the way in which the debate began to appear in learned journals, and 
to become seen as as "academic" debate, in which questions of method and 
technique took on prominence. Section 4.3 will describe three conferences on 
unemployment and health which provide examples of strategies of enrolment 
between academics, professional and activists concerned with Welsh and 
Scottish national issues. 
4.1.1 An issue in health care 
In 1975 the Unit for the Study of Health Policy began to operate within 
Guy's Hospital's Department of Community Medicine, funded for five years by 
the King Edward Hospital Fund for London (''The King's Fund"). USHP's brief 
was "to promote informed discussion on health policy." Its director was Dr. 
Peter Draper, who had previously been Senior Lecturer in Social Medicine in the 
days when academic departments dealing with public health were (as at Guy's) 
entitled "Social Medicine". 
In December 1975, Draper read an article in the Financial Times, written by 
Lombard columnist C. Gordon Tether. It was about the work of an American 
sociologist M. Harvey Brenner. The topic was the effect of economic change 
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upon health, particularly the social and health costs of unemployment. The 
article struck a chord with Draper's existing interests in two areas (1) research 
on stress as a cause of illness, which he felt that the "epidemiology and 
community medicine establishment" were "carefully censoring", and (2) the 
question of the effect of the economic environment on health. These interests 
were strong enough for USHP to consider organising a conference on the topic, 
despite the fact that they saw unemployment as "Right off our main line" and 
"not one of the central issues we saw ourselves dealing with". Peter Draper 
remembered that at that time it "felt very lonely" to be tackling such an issue 
as "the link between the economy and public health." The legitimacy of the 
topic as treated by Brenner was harder to establish, because in his earlier work 
Brenner only dealt with mental health. As Draper put it 
such data are notoriously soft, so one didn't feel on firm ground; 
had the early work been on stress and blood-pressure effects 
etc., I think it would have been assimilated -- at least by some 
of us -- much more easily. 
Draper's colleague John Dennis explained that inflation rather than 
unemployment was seen as the major political and economic "problem" at that 
time, in wider political debate. However during the following year public 
concern about unemployment continued to increase as the figures continued to 
deteriorate. In August 1976, the number of unemployed persons in the UK was 
the highest total for that month since 1938: 1.5 million, or 6.4%. (Lancet 
editorial 22 January 1977 p 182). During this year, policy responses included 
several government employment schemes: the Work Experience Project, the 
United Vocational Programme, the Youth Employment Subsidy, and the Special 
Employment Needs Scheme. Draper and his colleagues decided to organise a 
workshop on the consequences of unemployment, which took place in January 
1977. The workshop, entitled "Health, Unemployment and Ingenuity" was held in 
Abergavenny. USHP staff were gratified that a member of the editorial staff of 
the Lancet attended their conference. The Lancet editorial which followed was 
couched in sympathetic terms: 
The direct health implications of being unemployed are many and 
obvious: Despite the various benefits that are payable, poverty 
and its concomitants - bad housing, poor nutrition, sickness, and 
social deprivation - remain disproportionately common amongst 
those who are out of work. (Lancet editorial, 22 Jan. 1977 p. 182) 
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Despite the marginality of unemployment and health to the concerns of 
USHP, they took up the task of promoting Brenner's work in the UK. Their 
ability to do so was greatly helped by the arrival of a medical student Nick 
Joyner, doing an 'elective period' of study in community medicine, who wrote a 
high quality literature review on unemployment and health as his project. 
Joyner was one of the organisers of a series of meetings on "Issues in Health 
Care" aimed at students at Guy's, as was fellow student Stephen Wood.ln 
November 1977, Prof. Peter Townsend was invited to speak to the "Issues in 
Health Care" group by Stephen Wood. 
After the meeting, Wood wrote to Townsend: 
It is all too infrequent that medical students have the opportunity 
to hear about such important topics as poverty and 
unemployment [although] ... I am optimistic (or perhaps naive) 
enough to hope that the ostrich-like attitude to social and 
economic questions so predominant in medicine may be on its 
way out. 
He enclosed with the letter a copy of Joyner's project paper. As a result 
Townsend referred Nick Joyner to his colleague at Essex University, Adrian 
Sinfield, who had carried out one of the few existing studies of unemployed 
people in Britain, for advice. However, it is the nature of student electives that, 
although they may inspire considerable effort and be of good quality, they are 
then "left behind" as the student faces his or her final year of study and 
examinations. Neither Wood nor Joyner (who both went on to study psychiatry) 
ever took up the issue of unemployment again, although their actions produced 
the first signals between the "medical" and "social policy" worlds that there 
was some medical interest in unemployment. 
Another speaker at an "Issues in Health Care" group in 1977 was Dr Len 
Fagin, who dealt with the effect of unemployment on the mental and physical 
health of families. Like Wood, Joyner and several USHP staff, he was an 
occasional attender of meetings of a new discussion group, the Politics of 
Health Group (POHG) which began to meet during 1977. During this year, Fagin 
initiated a research project which was to have a major effect on the public 
debate. It was the one "psychological" study which receieved a great deal of 
media and parliamentary attention. 
Fagin was born in Buenos Aires, where he also completed basic medical 
training. 
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That was what made me aware that there was an association 
between what went on inside the university and life outside. 
he related. This awareness seemed to him to be lacking amongst doctors in 
England (he had not worked in Scotland or Wales). "In Latin America you are 
trained by circumstances to look at those sorts of concerns". He came to 
London to do further training and specialise in psychiatry. At this time, East 
London was, as he saw it an area where unemployment was rising faster than 
in other areas. Like some members of the British Regional Heart Study team 
(see section 5.2.1. below), Fagin knew of the work of Prof. George Brown on 
life events, and he, too, could see the potential for studying the effects of 
unemployment from this theoretical standpoint. He had also studied with Dr. 
Colin Murray Parkes, an acknowledged expert on bereavement and its effects. In 
bereavement, it seemed to Fagin, most individuals' "recuperative powers" 
asserted themselves after the initial period of acute mourning. In 
unemployment, however, individuals were not so well able to re-adjust. These 
were "clinical impressions" derived from his work with patients in East London, 
and he wished to test the impressions on a more representative group of 
families. 
These ideas were combined with a concern with the connection 
between political and economic events and health. And I 
thought, there was little done on how unemployment affected 
families as opposed to individuals. The family was increasingly 
the focus of interest. 
At first, Fagin and his colleague Martin Little, a psychiatric social worker, 
approached the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) to see whether they 
could study a factory closure. Objections from both management and unions 
proved too strong a barrier, 
People just were not interested in talking to researchers in 1977. 
The unions thought we were on the management's side and the 
management thought we were on the unions' side. 
They tried various other methods for picking up a sample of unemployed 
people -- standing outside benefit offices, going through GPs' lists and social 
services departments' referrals. None were successful. They then heard 
"through the grapevine" about the DHSS Cohort Study (see section 4.2.3. 
below). As Fagin put it 
They were interested because they realised it was going to be a 
bit of a superficial statistical exercise, and it mig ht be a useful 
adjunct to have a small descriptive survey attached to it. 
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The DHSS researchers agreed to contact a sub-sample of Cohort families to 
see if they were willing to be interviewed by Fagin and Little. IIAccessll to 
families now settled, they faced the problem of getting funding. 
The MSC rejected our proposal. They said they didn't think they'd 
get a lot of return from a psychological study at this stage. Then 
we got turned down by the local health research group. They 
said I had not worked out my proposal enough 
Eventually, after more IIwork on the proposal ll , it was submitted through the 
DHSS's Small Grant Scheme, and received 42,400 over two years. Like Steve 
Watkins of the Unemployment and Health Study Group, (see section 4.2.2.), Len 
Fagin was a registrar at this time, and, in common (increasingly) with registrars 
in many other medical subspecialties, they would have been not only permitted 
but expected to carry out research as part of their preparation for the post of 
consultant. Accordingly, Fagin used his study time to carry out the interviews. 
The procedure for interviewing reflected the basic hypothesis of the study, 
that families might be differentiated into IIgood ll and IIpoor copers", those who 
had overcome previous life events (crises) with differing amounts of success. 
This formulation demonstrates a certain degree of II mora l fragmentation,,18 
inherent in Fagin and Little's concepts, which appears to be present prior to the 
influence of DHSS officials upon their work. Or it may be that the formulation 
of the problem was itself the outcome of the lengthy negotiations between the 
researchers and other groups in their attempts to set up the study. 
They interviewed 22 families chosen to be representative of the Cohort 
Study sample. The resulting report, which was a largely qualitative account of 
the families' experiences of unemployment, was then presented to their 
sponsors in the winter of 1981.The report and its reception by the media and in 
Parliament will be discussed further below. 
18 The concept of moral fragmentation, which I have taken from Manning's discussion (Manning 
1985 p. 21-22, see section 1.1), expresses the mixture of "individualisation" and "victim-blaming", 
frequently found in explanatory accounts of disadvantage or misfortune (lncl,~.dlng. dlnes~ and 
mortality) which appeal to "selection" by personal characteristics such as Intelligence and 
"coping ability". 
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4.1.2 "The Reckoning" 
In November 1978, Harvey Brenner was invited to speak at Guy's Hospital 
for the first time, at a meeting organised by the Unit for the Study of Health 
Policy. In the meantime, his work had also come to the attention of Granada 
Television's World in Action team. USHP staff did not remember whether this 
had happened through them or not. The programme was commissioned by 
Granada, who asked Brenner to study two areas felt to be contrasting in terms 
of unemployment levels at that time, Nottingham and Liverpool. Some USHP 
staff were left with the impression that the producer and the programme's 
researcher had suffered a certain amount of interference in their attempts to 
promote and realise the idea, that moves had been made to prevent it being 
shown, and that the fact that it was not billed in TV Times or the daily papers' 
TV guides was an attempt to minimise its impact. For example, on 12 Feb 1979 
Peter Draper wrote to Brenner: 
We ... half suspect a Machiavellian plot to minimise interest once 
the powers that be decide they couldn't actually KILL the 
programme {too many people knew of its existence) .... I think it is 
most important that the Community Medicine establishment and 
the DHSS aren't allowed to get away with simply dismissing your 
work. 
And a USHP staff member 
couldn't decide what the truth of it was. I veered between 
thinking I was being either paranoid or naive. 
However, a Granada journalist expressed shock at these ideas: 
It is greatly to Granada's credit (he felt) that they do not interfere 
too much with how the programme is made .. , What we make 
depends entirely on those 24 people [the World in Action team of 
researchers and producers]. If you work for the programme, you 
put up your ideas ... It's not just a question of having a bright 
idea, you have to fight for it. . .. TV ... is an accident-prone 
process. There are no conspiracies involved in the making of 
documentary programmes ... Half our programmes are not billed 
in TV Times because no-one knows which one is going to be 
finished on time ... 
The same journalist related on a separate occasion that Brenner had had to be 
filmed twice, at great expense to Granada: 
It was the longest interview we've ever done on World in Action. 
It was so bad we had to pay for him to be flown back over to do 
it again ... Because the original 'rushes' were just too much like 
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Jerry Lewis playing the mad professor. 
and a USHP worker admitted: 
it had problems, it was what I call statistical television. The 
figures for deaths sort of sprang out of the screen at you. 
In the event,however, the programme proved to be the most successful 
example of "information subsidy" in the whole of the debate, at least in the 
period 1978-1985. The day of the screening, alerted by Margaret Watts, USHP 
members attempted to overcome the absence of any billing for The Reckoning 
by phoning interested parties to tell them the programme was on, and also by 
taping it. Although unemployment was as yet at relatively low levels, (an annual 
average of 5.5% in 1978) the rate of increase under a Labour government, from 
2.5% in 1974 (both these figures excluding school leavers), made it highly 
newsworthy. In deciding to use Brenner's work on unemployment and mortality 
as a vehicle to provoke debate on the role of the economy in relation to the 
public health, and thereby to suggest a more important political function for 
the new profession of community medicine, USHP had chosen well. (Figures 
from Baldock and Miller 1985 p. 140). 
News of the programme's progress reached the attention of some Labour 
MPs even before it was screened. On 23 Jan 1 1979 Mr Geoff Rooker asked a 
Parliamentary Question to the Minister for Health: 
Will my Rt Hon Friend institute an inquiry into the relationship 
between unemployment and illness, so that his Department is not 
stimulated to take that action following a forthcoming Granada 
Television programme? 
To which Mr Albert Booth replied rather limply: 
I see it as part of the role of my Department, working with the 
Health and Safety Executive, to watch carefully the relationship 
between unemployment and illness, and to take steps to institute 
good health and safety practices to avoid loss of employment in 
that way 
thus genuinely or wilfully misunderstanding the point of the question. 
The Reckoning was eventually screened on February 5th 1979. As A USHP 
worker related its impact: 
The House of Commons requested a copy and then there was a 
lot of interest. USHP got phone calls from civil servants asking 
where they could get copies of the Senate report. We organised 
a small technical seminar which Harvey gave. John Fox came. 
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This was the first time I had met Fox.... The focus was on 
Harvey's model. People like Fox were concerned with the 
techniques. There were civil servants there too. One main reason 
for setting up the workshop was because of the interest shown 
by policy-makers. We kept getting phone calls from civil 
servants. 
Present at the seminar were several people from the economic advisory staff 
of the DHSS. One of these explained their presence in the following way: 
The DHSS were interested in knowing what the costs of the 
rising rate of unemployment were going to be as far as they 
were concerned. At this time the Labour party were in power 
and they were also worried about it. So for the time being the 
interests of officials and politicians were more or less the same. 
The second reason they were interested in whether what Brenner 
was saying had anything in it was because of health service 
planning needs. In trying to allocate resources between areas, 
you are always looking for indicators. If there was anything in 
this unemployment/health business, it might mean that either an 
increased demand might arise, or it might be useful as an 
indicator for allocation of services and local health authority 
provision. Did it mean we needed some sort of monitoring 
system? 
The third thing was a Whitehall point. You see, departments are 
always looking for the best way of presenting their expenditure 
claims. At the time there was a lot of emphasis on Special 
Employment Measures and Job Creation ... So the question arose, 
to what extent should we be using the long term unemployed in 
jobs like unskilled work in the health service? Whenever a 
government department puts in expenditure claims, the Treasury 
resists them. Relating unemployment to special measures was a 
way of legitimating claims .... The key issue as far as Brenner was 
concerned, for the Department, was, "here's all this song and 
dance - what work do WE need to commission in the light of it?" 
Both officials and Ministers wanted to know. 
USHP, as "representatives" of the public-health faction within Community 
Medicine, had therefore succeeded in the first step of "interesting" government 
advisers and officials, even before the first academic publication of their ideas 
on unemployment and health. 
4.1.3 "Manifesto" Community Medicine and its political context 
In The Lancet of 17 February 1979 Peter Draper's team published the first 
British academic paper in the unemployment and health debate, entitled 
"Micro-processors, Macro-economic policy, and Public Health". The work of 
Brenner's which they quoted was his report "Estimating the Social Costs of 
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National Economic Policy", presented to the US Congress Joint Economic 
Committee in 1976. 
The key finding [they wrote] was that a one percent increase in 
the unemployment rate in the United States sustained over a 
period of 6 years 'has been associated ... with increases of 
approximately 36887 total deaths.' (Lancet 1979, 17 Feb p 373) 
They advocated, as a policy response "a transfer of funds from the social 
security side of the DHSS to the health side." These funds would be used to 
employ jobless people in health service jobs. Also significantly, they comment 
that: 
As the number of "health economists" employed in Britain grows, 
... it might be thought that many of them would be working on 
these issues -- the health implications of macro-economic policy 
But nothing could be further from the truth. The 
overwhelming focus of attention is on ... how NHS resources are 
deployed and how they might be deployed "more efficiently" ... (p. 
374) 
and ask: 
Is it not reasonable for community medicine, that part of 
medicine which is (or ought to be) specially concerned with the 
hostilities to health in the wider environment, to begin to work 
with HEALTH economists ... to develop a better understanding 
... ? .. 
This paper now tends to be remembered only for its discussion of 
"unemployment and health", It should in fact be seen as a vehicle for the wider 
ideas of what community medicine had to offer medicine as a whole, a concept 
of public health as a form of 'human ecology'. It must be placed in the context 
of the work (ongoing at this time) of a group of USHP workers and others in 
producing the document "Rethinking Community Medicine" which illustrates 
more fully the conceptual and practical background to their work on 
unemployment and health. 
The usefulness of Brenner's ideas to USHP and to "Manifesto" community 
medicine lay in the concept of a "managed" economy, an essentially Keynesian 
idea, but with the addition that indicators of health should be used as well as 
purely economic indicators, as measures of an economy's ability to promote 
"welfare" as well as "wealth". Brenner and the USHP team shared a view that 
economic policies should be designed to take into account their contribution to 
human "health capital" and their health costs. This potentially offered an 
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important role to the public-health doctors, and one nearer to that of the 
MOsH of old. It also offered the possibility of an alliance with those social 
statisticians who had promoted "social indicators" in the 1960s and 1970s, 
whose role and very existence was to be threatened by administrative reviews 
carried out under the post-1979 Conservative administration. 
During 1978 and 1979, these more general ideas began to have an 
organised expression in the form of Radical Community Medicine, which began 
as a ten-page newsletter and grew into a small journal. A series of informal 
group discussions at the annual conference of the Faculty of Community 
Medicine in June of 1978 led to a circular being sent round by a Specialist in 
Information and Planning from Liverpool health authority, Dr Alex Scott-Samuel. 
The letter proposed that a regular discussion group be formed. Those 
interested were divided fairly evenly between trainees (N=5) and academics 
(N=6), with only 3 fully qualified "service" SCMs being included. They met in 
late November, in the London flat of Dr Debbie Bartley, one of the co-authors 
of "Re-thinking Community Medicine", and drew up a "Manifesto" of their own, 
highlighting such issues as 
- Can community physicians be apolitical? 
- Are data value-free (a question which would tie them in with an existing 
group, the Radical Statistics Health Group.) 
- Should health services be under local political control? 
- Can we accept a cut-price National Health Service (at this time, Labour was 
still in power it should be remembered) 
In January of 1979 there were 28 signatories (including Peter Draper) to a 
letter, entitled "Radical Community Medicine", which was sent to the Editor of 
the community physicians' professional journal, "Community Medicine", and duly 
published. In the same edition of the journal, an article by Scott-Samuel on 
'The politics of health" was also published, which must have added to the 
impact of the letter. Early in March, a meeting was held between some of the 
signatories (who had all been doctors) and non-medical members of the 
Radical Statistics Group (which included young statisticians trained in and 
committed to the ideas around "social indicators"). This group proposed the 
publication of "a ten-page newsletter, say quarterly." Scott-Samuel took on the 
role of "catalyst" (as he saw it) or co-ordinator, on a temporary basis, a role 
which was to continue for five years. 
Shortly after the screening of "The Reckoning", a Labour MP, Jeff Rooker, 
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wrote to the Undersecretary of State for Labour, John Golding expressing 
disquiet at the Labour Party's position on possible health risks of 
unemployment. The answer to this letter indicates that there may be a risk 
(both for participants in a debate and for observers) of exaggerating the effect 
of having conservative rather than social democratic parties in power upon the 
reception of politically sensitive research. On 1 March Golding replied: 
Although there is an association between unemployment and 
ill-health, it is difficult to prove that unemployment is itself a 
cause ... since unemployment is often a consequence of poor 
health, accidents or prolonged illness [here a note scribbled on 
the margin of the letter exclaims "with 1.4 million!"]. Some 
researchers have deduced, from much the same statistics as 
Professor Brenner, that employment, rather than unemployment, 
is the most important determinant of ill-health and mortality. 
There are also problems in proving that unemployment rather 
than poverty causes ill-health, since the factors are all 
interrelated. These questions are being explored in the DHSS's 
research programme, and to some extent also in the Department 
of Employment's research on the social costs of unemployment. 
The letter will have been written by a civil servant as a "Private Office case", 
and demonstrates a considerable awareness of the research. The reference to 
the dangers of work could be a reference to the deliberations of the Black 
Report group. Or it could be to the 1977 debate between Brenner and the 
leading American antagonist of his work, Joseph Eyer (who could be 
considered politically far to the left of Brenner). As is often the case, 
"backstage" civil servants are intellectually on top of the issues raised by MPs, 
and in a position to outbid left-wing pressure whether from outside the 
governing party or within it. 
On March 31 1979 a leading article "Does Unemployment Kill?" was 
published in the Lancet. It reminds readers that unemployment has now 
reached what its editorial staff regarded as an unprecedented postwar level of 
5%, and comments: 
If [Brenner's] theory is correct then the rising unemployment rate 
in Britain ought by now to have been associated with mortality 
considerable enough to put the nation's economy firmly in the 
domain of community health. 
This leader echoes the statistic that had been found so "media-presentable" 
by World in Action, that "a 1% rise in unemployment sustained over a six year 
period could bring about 36890 deaths in the United States," and adds: 
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If unemployment is indeed the new 'great plague', then perhaps 
we should call up the shades of Chadwick and his peers and 
make a public health attack with all the missionary zeal and 
authoritarianism of the nineteenth century. 
In these words, the leader writer expresses precisely the relevance of Brenner's 
work to the ambitions of the new subprofession of Community Medicine. 
In May, a General Election swept a new Conservative government into 
power with a large majority. This did produce some change in the ways in 
which certain participants dealt with the debate on unemployment and health 
-- participants who were actively identified with the Labour party no longer 
had to take care not to "embarrass ministers" in their own Party , 9. The 
earliest discussions of the relative merits of Brenner's and Joseph Eyer's 
approaches had taken place at least in part in the London-based Politics of 
Health Group, whose members at that time ranged politically leftwards from 
the left of the Labour Party. Once Mrs Thatcher came to power, it began to be 
seen as an advantage if research on unemployment and health produced 
"something to beat the government over the head with", in John Dennis's 
words. But, on the other hand, the restrictions on civil service "expert" (and 
other) recruitment, and on the funding of universities, meant that members of 
"expert" disciplines had to be both more careful and more entrepreneurial in 
the contests for valued roles and resources. Certain sorts of value claims, 
which might have embarrassed a social-democratic administration into action 
(or at least into "research") would increasingly be found to fall upon deaf ears. 
The Unit for the Study of Health Policy suffered a setback at this point. Its 
Kings Fund money came to an end, and it was forced to fall back on "a 
temporary Band-Aid from the Charities Aid Foundation". The group did not 
publish any further papers in academic journals on unemployment and health. 
According to Unit staff, unemployment and health had never been a central 
project. One felt that 
19 To take three members of either the "Rethinking Community Medicine" author group and/or the 
group around Radical Community Medicine, John Dennis of USHP was active within the Labour 
Party as an adviser on health and related issues, Jennie Popay, who worked at USHP durtng the 
making of The Reckoning, and Alex Scott-Samuel became members of a "Front Bench Advisory 
Group" on health, convened by Michael Meacher, the Shadow Secretary of State for Health and 
Social Security, in the summer of 1984. Later, they both became members of the official health 
subcommittee of the Labour Party National Executive which drew up the health proposals for the 
1987 election. 
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After [the 1979 paper] came out ... we had played our role as a 
policy group, It was on the agenda now. 
It was not so much the priority given the issue by USHP, but the expertise of 
Peter Draper's team in producing information subsidies on health topics, which 
made them the "entrepreneurs" of this social problem. 
Peter Draper remembered that 
We felt very lonely suggesting links between the economy and 
public health in those days; the "causal" experts, the 
epidemiologists, seemed to be silent on such matters 
Nowadays [1987] .. it all seems so obvious, but it felt quite 
different then! Unemployment and health felt as though it was 
something of a research indulgence rather than basic territory. 
4.2 Academic debate begins 
4.2.1 Economy and mortality 
Brenner's own paper "Mortality and the National Economy - A review, and 
the experience of England and Wales, 1936-1976" was published in The Lancet 
on 15 September 1 979. Draper and his colleagues remembered having 
"pressed" Brenner to write the paper, and that he had been "always reluctant to 
commit anything to paper". 
In the light of the role Brenner's ideas were to play in subsequent events 
and argument, it is interesting to re-examine some of what he actually said in 
this first publication in a British academic journal. His approach is Keynesian (as 
opposed to the Marxist approach of Eyer), exemplified in the following: 
Long-term economic growth will also moderate the problems 
associated with economic instability: management of the national 
economy improves, health care gets better in quality and 
availability, and more substantial income support can be provided 
for displaced workers and other non-participants in the labour 
force. (p. 573) 
There is an underlying theme in his work, not just in this paper, that economic 
management can and should be used to moderate health consequences of 
inevitable technological change. 
The reason Brenner gives for the long and diverse "lag periods" in his 
93 
model are both medical and sociological. Not only are today's "killer diseases" 
chronic ones such as coronary heart disease, stroke and cancer (in contrast to 
the 19th century plagues of acute infections), but Brenner is quite clear that 
recession's health-related effects upon those still IN the workforce include the 
effects of work stress, downgrading and re-integration, as well as joblessness: 
In this sequence of 'downward social mobility' the illness process 
begins with recession, and, within two or three years, the 
likelihood of mortality is greatly increased ... For the downwardly 
mobile, the next major source of stress usually occurs during 
their reintegration into the economy. (p.568) 
Another point raised in this paper and often overlooked when it is quoted, 
is that Brenner puts forward, in his penultimate paragraph, the idea that "these 
instabilities in economic growth also account for the socio-economic 
differentials in mortality", and 'The mechanism by which unemployment and 
rapid economic growth act to slow the secular trend of mortality-rate decline 
is through a widening of the socio-economic differentials in mortality." This 
was to provide a link at a later stage between the unemployment and health 
debate, and the debate on health inequalities. Very little of this complexity 
found its way into the public debate, either in media accounts of 'Death on the 
Dole', or in Parliamentary Questions, although, in hindsight, many participants 
regarded the unemployment and health debate as "just part of the debate on 
health inequalities,,20. 
Proponents of "manifesto" community medicine were never particularly 
interested in the validity of Brenner's methods. They had been trained in the 
idea that early successful public health reform had been carried out on the 
basis of theories of contagion now held to be totally erroneous. This approach 
was frowned upon by economists. One remarked: 
The people who would have liked to make capital out of 
Brenner's work basically couldn't understand it. So they went to 
other people who could understand it and were warned off it by 
them. 
And another derided the "soap box methods" used (as he saw it) by Brenner. 
Neither of these economists were surprised by the impact of Brenner's work on 
20 An attempt to place these considerations more centrally in the early debate failed, as reported 
in section 4.3.2 below. 
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policy debate, however. Strongly expressed claims, they felt, were what 
attracted the attention of the media and policymakers, not academic 
rigour.What they deplored was the role played by an academic in direct public 
promotion of his own ideas. 
4.2.2 The issue community takes shape 
There was a relatively low level of "academic" activity around the issue of 
unemployment and health during 1980. One reason for this may be that this 
was the year in which the "Black Report" appeared, and attracted the attentions 
and energies of the groups involved in health policy debate, although no 
explicit connection was made between the two issues at this stage. 
In other pieces of backstage activity, the shape of pressure-group 
participation in the issue community was also being determined. By January of 
1980, Nicholas Hinton, Director of the National Council for Voluntary 
Organisations, had drawn up a proposal for a "pilot study", to replicate Harvey 
Brenner's research in Britain. It was envisaged that the National Council for 
Social Service would employ 2 or 3 people to collate the necessary statistiCS, 
which would then be sent to Baltimore for analysis by Brenner's computer 
model21 . It also proposed that a Steering Committee be set up including 
representatives from NeSS and "selected UK institutions". A budget of .£26,000 
was estimated. 
One participant in the events at this time explained this development in the 
following way: 
Nicholas was trying to make his mark in political circles and saw 
unemployment and health as an issue. NCVO was not very 
influential before he joined it. He came in as a young bright 
whizz kid and wanted to make his mark, frankly. [Projects 
Department of the NCVO] was the department in which major 
growth was prized, because they could get small bits of money 
from the government to fund small pieces of work. 
Unemployment and health was one of the bright ideas... It was a 
new idea, and they wanted to expand the Projects Division, it 
was seen as a way of getting money into the organisation ... 
21 The proposal not to analyse the data in Britain is, of course, an indication of the extent. to 
which Brenner's "model" had become a "black box", to British researchers, as discussed 10 section 
2.1. above and section 4.3.2 below. 
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Have you seen the buildings the NCVO have in Bedford Square? 
Well, you can imagine the rent... 
In this account, an entrepreneurial process involvin~ organisational and 
personal "cycles of credibility" is offered as an explanation of the way in which 
workers in VOLUNTARY organisations entered the unemployment and health 
debate. The similarity with which the notion of "Having an bright idea and 
fighting for it" is dealt with by participants from such diverse backgrounds as 
the media, the academic sphere and the voluntary sector illustrates the 
common features of claims-making activity throughout the issue community. 
Also in early 1980, a new organisation was formed which was to have some 
influence upon the course of the debate. Jennie Popay had by now left USHP 
for a post at the Study Commission on the Family. She and Trevor Davison, a 
Project Officer at the NCVO, shared a long-standing interest in unemployment, 
first developed by their experiences as students. At the beginning of 1980, 
Davison and Popay began to promote the idea of a Social Costs of 
Unemployment Forum, with the support of the NCVO, "to collect and 
disseminate information to the increasing number of organisations and 
individuals at national and local levels [who] were acutely aware of the 
potential impact of unemployment but were unsure as to how to tackle the 
problem." (NCVa Minutes, DG (81) 80). Beginning with 8 members, SCUF grew 
swiftly. By April it had 30 members, including several members of the Radical 
Statistics Health Group, and community phYSicians of "Manifesto" tendencies, 
and was beginning to be inundated with requests for information and speakers. 
In the Spring of 1980, Brenner renewed his contact with Liverpool by 
returning to address an EEC conference on "urban social problems". This time 
the invitation came from Alex Scott-Samuel who "was anxious to expose the 
delegates to more than the comfortable lounge of a cushy hotel," as he told 
journalist Steve Connor of General Practitioner (7 March 1980, p 37) In June, 
the Liverpool Daily Post produced an exemplary piece of medical journalism on 
Brenner's work. It began with the "human interest", a tragic account of an 
individual's suicide, headlined "Death of a Good and Willing Worker". Beneath 
was a series of clearly presented graphs adapted from The Reckoning. 
Granada, wrote David Utting, had brought Dr Brenner to Merseyside to see the 
human reality behind the statistics. Utting reported that Brenner had both 
pledged his "active backing" to the NCVO proposal and expressed interest in 
Scott-Samuel's plan for an "intensive study in a small area badly affected by 
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unemployment." 
This latter point will have been a reference to the founding of another small 
group which was to be more persistent in its influence on the progress of the 
debate. This was the Unemployment and Health Study Group (UHSG), based in 
the recession-stricken North West of England. They held their inaugural 
meeting, organised by Scott-Samuel, on 19 June. Their initial discussion 
centered around various projects proposed by different members of the group. 
They also discussed the research proposal from the NCVO. At their second 
meeting in September 1980, an M.Sc. student in health economics from York 
University, Pat Kennan, spoke to the UHSG about the results of one of the 
DHSS-sponsored research projects which had been mentioned in Parliamentary 
Answers. This was her own Masters project, an attempt to replicate Brenner's 
econometric analysis on British statistics, supervised by Hugh Gravelle at 
Queen Mary College, London. This was eventually to form the basis of a paper 
which, a year later, spearheaded the attack on Brenner's claims. 
This was, therefore, the year in which pressure-group activity took shape. A 
considerable number of research proposals were also drawn up during this 
period, none of which ever materialised into published work with impact on the 
debate. However, links began to be forged which were to persist and to 
influence not only the unemployment and health controversy, but the future of 
"Manifesto" community medicine, the activity of research teams, and Labour 
party health policy. In tracing out the history of these links, we will begin to 
see the extent to which the content of the knowledge claims presented in the 
debate was constructed by the wider strategies of the groups involved. 
"Unemployment and health" was a vehicle for diverse groups' and individuals' 
projects, as well as a topic in its own right. 
In July 1980 the debate re-appeared in the Commons when Dennis Skinner 
asked Patrick Jenkin "if he will establish an urgent inquiry into the link between 
unemployment and heart diseases, mental stress, suicides and other health 
problems with particular reference to those areas in the country where 
unemployment ... is of a very high and long lasting nature." 
In reply Jenkin assured Skinner that his department 
is already involved in studies of health and the unemployed, 
including questions of their interrelation. We are also 
co-operating with outside researchers on a study of long-term 
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unemployment and mortality... We are aware of the research 
being done by Prof Brenner and by the department of applied 
economics at Cambridge, ... There is as yet no published work 
which establishes with any certainty a causative link between 
unemployment and ill health." 
The "outside research" referred to here was that being carried out by Hugh 
Gravelle of Queen Mary College, London, and his M. Sc. student. Another 
contribution to the debate was also in the process of being produced at this 
time within the DHSS. There was a longitudinal study of unemployed men (the 
DHSS Cohort Study) being conducted in the department which, in 1980, carried 
out its third "sweep". In the questionnaire, an item on health was included, 
which aimed to see whether those men who had remained unemployed for the 
full duration of the study had experienced worse health than those who found 
work again. These were both relatively inexpensive pieces of work, which 
made full use of the skills and motivations of a subdiscipline, economics 22, at 
least some of whose practitioners had a self-conscious "interest" in 
demonstrating to client groups the ability of their methods to deal with 
questions of health policy. 
4.2.3 "A pilot study" 
However, neither of these new studies had reported by December of 1980, 
when Len Fagin and Martin Little (see section 4.2.3.) submitted their findings to 
the DHSS, the sponsors of their study. It seemed to them a somewhat alarming 
experience, as they remembered it: 
We met a sort of committee in a very large room with one of 
those huge round tables, like a NATO meeting, with a huge space 
between "us" and "them" on the other side. 
"They" were "about twenty DHSS dignitaries" who 
used a lot of words like pilot descriptive, sampling. 
Methodological points. 
Fagin observed that in the public debate which followed, 
22 Although Cohort Study researchers were drawn from a number of social science disciplines, 
the authors of the first paper to make use of the new "health" questions were both Economic 
Advisers. 
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George Young and Gerard Vaughan used those exact 
comments, the very words that were used that day. 
This insight into the strategic dimension of official "forms of words" was later 
confirmed to me by a senior government research manager, who considered it 
to be of the essence of the relationship between researcher and political 
administrator. In answer to a question about how researchers INSIDE 
government maintained the boundary between "fact" and "opinion", she 
remarked that it was 
a very fine line 
which was maintaned 
in practice, by LANGUAGE. We draw the line by the use of very 
careful, heavy, official prose, an attempt to make things as factual 
and flat as possible .... [These forms of words] carry a lot of tacit 
meaning. Once they have been agreed, for example, for use in an 
anwer to a Parliamentary Question, they tend to be used over 
and over again. 
The emphasis on the "descriptive" nature of Fagin and Little's study had in fact 
been negotiated explicitly, in early 1979, between the researchers and the 
Central Statistical Office, whose Survey Control Unit has to give "recognition" 
to any survey carried out by government departments. There was a conflict 
between two aims shared by the researchers and the Control Unit: On the one 
hand, people responsible for the main Cohort Study did not want too many 
families to be interviewed by Fagin and Little (who no doubt had their own 
constraints of time and energy as well), in case this influenced the responses 
to the next sweep of the whole sample. On the other hand, the Control Unit 
had to urge the researchers to interview sufficient numbers of families to allow 
statistically meaningful comparisons to be made between, for example, those 
unemployed men whose wives were employed and those whose wives had no 
job. It was in response to this dilemma that Fagin himself had emphasised the 
"descriptive" and "pilot" aspects of his study. 
There is more or less total disagreement between the researchers and the 
officials over what happened next to Fagin and Little's report. Fagin himself 
typed the report, so that 200 copies would be available for public consumption. 
These were issued by the DHSS -- for example, the Regional Heart Study team 
wrote off for a copy to the Elephant and Castle, and received one without 
delay. But Fagin felt that some attempt had been made to minimise the impact 
of the report. If this is true, it was a failed attempt. There is no example in the 
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unemployment and health debate of a (real of suspected) attempt at 
"government suppression of information" which failed to promote greater media 
interest than would have been aroused in its absence. Pressure groups (and, 
increasingly, academics) know this, so that there is some temptation to imply a 
"cover-up" in order to gain the attention of journalists (see Chapter 7.3). 
Officials who spoke frankly about departmental activity in the unemployment 
and health debate were insistent that there was no attempt to limit the 
availability of the report. 
On 9 June 1981, Sir George Young made a statement in the House of 
Commons in reply to several questions from Labour MPs about Fagin and 
Little's work. The researchers were not happy with the statement. Fagin took 
Young to task for failing sufficiently to emphasise that although the health of 
two men had admittedly improved after they became unemployed, a 
deterioration in health was found in more families. At the same time, he asked 
that the DHSS lower the price of the report (£6.00) and make more copies 
available. Young gave a long and considered reply, stressing that in his 
statement he had admitted that "it seemed reasonable to assume that there is 
some association between unemployment and health" and that he had been 
"simply pointing out the difficulty of drawing clear conclusions about cause and 
effect" from a small study. 
Shortly afterwards, Fagin also had to reproach the editor of the News of the 
World for what he felt had been a "sensationalised" report of the study's 
findings, published on August 16. The argument died down during the summer 
parliamentary recess, but re-emerged in October when a group of Labour MPs, 
organised by the Junior Opposition Spokesman on health, asked a battery of 
oral questions on unemployment and health. Dr Gerard Vaughan, then Minister 
for Health, had the task of replying. Like Young's, Vaughan's replies angered 
Fagin, who felt that the Minister had "misguided Parliament ... for what I can 
only conceive are political purposes". 
Even so, it was not the accuracy of Vaughan's statement that Fagin 
quarrelled with, but rather its emphasis. Rather than taking the acknowledged 
preliminary nature of the research as an indication that more and bigger 
studies were needed, the fact that it had been "only a pilot" was being used to 
minimise the importance of the findings. In his reply to Fagin, Vaughan spoke 
of the research at Queen Mary College (Gravelle's work with Pat Kennan) and 
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the Cohort Study as responses to the need for more knowledge, and made 
rather vague references to "fresh work designed to clarify the nature and 
significance of any unemployment-health links ... with the benefit of expert 
advice from independent sources". This correspondence between Fagin and 
Vaughan was placed in the House of Commons Library in mid-November, and, 
after another small flurry of letters between Fagin, the Labour MPs who asked 
the original questions, and Vaughan, the matter rested there. By this time, also, 
major developments had taken place in the academic debate, which will be 
discussed below. 
Fagin himself, three years later, felt that the major impact of his and Little's 
work had been on other professional groups, rather than on pOlicy-makers. 
Another effect he felt was that, by 1984, the media tended far less to treat the 
unemployed as "scroungers", and more to admit that unemployment could not 
be the fault of individuals. This had also been part of the purpose of the Cohort 
Study as a whole, to investigate the question of the "replacement ratio" in 
order to see whether a large proportion of the unemployed were indeed "better 
off on the dole", as some headlines in the late 1970's had described them. In 
the longer term, therefore, the impact of the smaller study (as perceived by 
Fagin) and the larger one of which it was a part were, in this sense at least, 
consistent and in the desired direction. 
4.3 The "Celtic fringe" conferences 
4.3.1 The Cardiff Conference 
In 1981, two pressure groups adopted the unemployment and health issue, 
without whose promotion it is doubtful whether the work of Brenner would 
have continued to have quite the same amount of impact. These were the 
Welsh and Scottish National Parties, which, for various reasons (Drucker and 
Brown 1980, Clarke and Drucker 1978) were in a relatively active phase of their 
own development at this time. The idea that unemployment could harm health 
was particularly striking to them because of the way in which unemployment is 
regionally distributed in Britain. 
The conference which had an impact on the subsequent development of the 
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academic debate was that sponsored by the Welsh National Party. It was held 
on April 10 1981 in Cardiff, and speakers included a mixture of pOlitical medical 
and social-science "names". Brenner duly put in a well-publicised appearance. 
The conference was attended by a wide range of experts from all over Britain, 
as well as local activists. Speakers included such respectable figures as Prof 
George Brown (co-author or "Social Origins of Depression", and the leading 
British authority on life event research), and prominent members of the local 
medical community, as well as a consultant psychiatrist associated with the 
Welsh National Party, and a research officer for the Wales TUC. In the words of 
its organiser, Senior Lecturer in Community Medicine Dr Stephen Farrow, his 
objective for the conference was "to put Social Medicine back on the agenda of 
my own Department." The unanticipated furore which it caused, including an 
American camera team, was not, for that reason, unwelcome although it may 
not have been strictly intended. Although the Cardiff conference was planned 
as a claims-making exercise, aimed at influencing both the theory and practice 
of community medicine, and wider public opinion on government policy, the 
most lasting result of what took place was a contribution to the moral and 
technical fragmentation of the issue. 
The Lancet wrote of the conference (April 18 1981): 
The causal chain - from economic depression through organic 
illness to premature death is instinctively believable ... [but] over 
the teacups there were serious criticisms of Brenner's findings: 
UK workers do not seem to be able to confirm his work, but this 
criticism is not yet, as the Americans would say, in the public 
domain 
One of the events that took place over the teacups was an encounter between 
a deputy editor of The Lancet and an economist whose career had included 
spells working as a government adviser (on the Cohort Study amongst other 
projects). As he remembered: 
I went down there [to Cardiff] and watched the NBC cameras and 
all the carry-on. [two colleagues] were there too. We sat 
ourselves in the first two or three rows. Early on, I threw in a 
couple of Cohort results we had obtained. Brenner said the 
Cohort Study results missed the point as most of the effects of 
unemployment were not on the unemployed themselves but on 
the health of the non-unemployed. Well, this I could not 
understand ... It was just his way of dismissing the Cohort Study 
results. 
After tea, a man came up to me and said he liked my question 
he turned out to be the deputy editor of The Lancet. I asked if he 
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would welcome a paper on this. 
The suggestion by the editor of the Lancet that a high-status medical journal 
might "welcome" papers by economists on unemployment and health was an 
important step in the shaping of the next stage of the "technical" debate, which 
will be discussed in section 5.1. 
4.3.2 The Glasgow conference 
During 1979-1981, because of USHP's funding problems, Peter Draper was 
having fairly intensive discussions with the members of his Steering 
Committee, and other senior advisers. This group included several prominent 
characters in the Scottish health policy field: Sir John Brotherston, ex-Chief 
Medical Officer for Scotland and Emeritus Professor of Community Medicine at 
Edinburgh Unjversity, Dr. John Loraine, an eminent endocrinologist in 
semi-retirement who headed Edinburgh's Centre for Human Ecology, Dr David 
Player, Director of the Scottish Health Education Group since 1975, and Mr 
T. Drummond Hunter of the Scottish Health Services Planning Group. Some of 
these people also had sympathies with the ideals of Scottish nationalism, more 
specifically with the notion that there was something special about the Scottish 
approach to Community Medicine, as reflected in the Gilloran Report (Joint 
Working Party 1973). By early 1981 (before Cardiff), there had been links 
established between Peter Draper, David Player, Sir John, a senior medical 
officer in the Scottish Home and Health Department, and lain More, a full-time 
worker for the Scottish National Party. 
The connection between USHP thinking and that of a certain group of 
Scottish health planners and policy advisers was centered around a set of 
ideas less directly related to devolution, perhaps exemplified by Drummond 
Hunter's 1976 paper on The Reorganised Health Service in Clarke and Drucker's 
book "Our Changing Scotland": 
In Scotland [he wrote] a more imaginative stance [on the 1974 
health service reorganisation], which may have reflected 
oft-repeated views of the CMO, Sir John Brotherston, was 
adopted ... reorganisation in Scotland was not simply an attempt 
on the part of government to regain control of a runaway health 
service ... (p. 31) Health ... has less to do with services than with 
life-chances and life-styles ... (p. 35) ... 
It was the uniqueness of the Unit for the Study of Health Policy that it briefly 
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attempted to combine all these issues in its work.. The ideas came together 
into the Glasgow conference scheme because of largely informal link.s between 
the Scottish participants, a fact perhaps reflected in the constant good-natured 
references to "a Mafia". 
For the senior medical officer, it had been his political ideas and contacts 
which lay behind his interest in the issue. 'We [self, Player and Brotherston] are 
a sort of Mafia." 
The SNP [had] tak.en a political and psychological k.nock [by the 
combined effects of the failure of the devolution vote in 1979 
and the return of a right wing government] ... we were using 
unemployment and health as a political issue. In fact, I now think. 
this was wrong. It should have been used not as a party issue, 
but as an evil in itself. 
For lain More: 
[David] Player thought unemployment and health was a good 
issue ... There were 3 people in the SHHD who had done some 
sort of studies on unemployment and health and [one of them] is 
on the policy committee of the SNP. We thought that a quality 
conference with a minimum of party politics would be a good 
thing, at least that was my first idea. We [SNP] would then get 
the credit for it .... Brenner appeared to be the most outstanding 
person in the field. So I wrote to him. He was interested. He said 
he'd be across in the UK for that conference in Cardiff ... We 
[SNP] try to do one thing lik.e this every year .... You need to 
build up credibility in the eyes of opinion makers. Short term 
things are most important to political groups like the SNP ... You 
get your mileage out of something like this and then lose 
interest. 
It is interesting to note here More's account of what constituted the "cycle 
of credibility" in a political group, and his awareness that the form tak.en by 
this cycle leads to an emphasis on the short-term. Like the policy advisers 
studied by Prince, and (despite what he seemed to think, in many ways) the 
academics, More was caught in a conflict between "intellectual fascination" and 
commitment to finding short-term problems to which SNP policies could be 
offered as plausible answers" one of the organisational exigencies of his 
professional role. 
For David Player, according to one colleague: 
His own back.ground was poor - so he was conscious of 
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Scotland's health problems ... He was generally concerned. He is 
a close friend of Peter Draper's and Gerry Morris's ... They were 
also in touch with Raymond IIlsley. They are a bit of a Glasgow 
Mafia really ... 
So there appear to have been institutional (through the Steering Committee of 
USHP), philosophical, political (through the SNP and wider group of nationalist 
sympathisers), and informal links between the leading figures behind the 
Glasgow conference (they were "golfing buddies" according to one participant). 
As well as being seen as a "good political issue", unemployment and health 
articulated several concerns common to community medicine, health education 
and "promotion", health economics and NHS planning. This is the source of the 
impact of Brenner's ideas in these professional circles, despite his 
methodological vulnerability and awkwardness in putting his message across. 
However, several participants in the organisation of the Glasgow conference 
later expressed a view that using Brenner's work too uncritically and too 
"politically" had perhaps been a mistake. 
The two academics brought in to debate directly with Brenner were Steve 
Engelman, Senior Lecturer in Health Economics at Edinburgh Medical School's 
department of community medicine, and Mike Porter, the medical school's 
sociology lecturer, also an economist by training. Like Porter and the USHP 
staff, Engelman had been finding Brenner's work useful in teaching, since the 
late 1970s. Engelman's memory was that Brenner's work was not, at this time, 
thought to be particularly controversial, but he had thought it "interesting", and 
the sort of thing medical students ought to know about. From the technical 
point of view, like other economists, Steve Engelman realised Brenner's work 
was "econometrically unsatisfactory" but that it had "potential shock-horror 
value". 
Usually, econometric work has problems, but other people take it 
up and work on it and either it improves or it gets forgotten. 
The way in which academics involved in the Scottish debate turned away 
from Brenner provides an illustration of what can happen when a knowledge 
claim is pushed too far too soon (see section 2.1), exposing its advocates to 
"dissidence and betrayal". The actor-network which used Brenner's work to 
impress doctors and medical students was strong enough to defend its status 
as an unexamined "black box" as long as it was (in Engelman's words) "not very 
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controversial". By the time of the Glasgow conference, however, the paper on 
the Cohort Study (Ramsden and Smee 1981) and Gravelle, Hutchinson and 
Stern's critique of Brenner's method had been published, with great impact 
(more fully discussed in section 5.1). Having attracted hostile attention by 
producing political controversy, Brenner's model was to prove too weak an ally, 
his own methods could be turned against the arguments of his supporters. The 
evening before the SNP-organised conference, Brenner spoke to a small invited 
audience at a seminar held in the University to "discuss the scientific issues". 
Participants remember that at this meeting Stern and Gravelle made an 
intensive and successful attack upon Brenner's position. Because the underlying 
concern of even his supporters was not "the effect of unemployment on 
health", but the relationships of their subdisciplines to the powerful forces 
represented by the medical profession, Brenner's early academic advocates 
readily relinquished his ideas once they came under this type of fire. Most of 
them also abandoned "unemployment and health" as a major work priority. 
In the short term, however, the outcome of the Glasgow conference 
satisfied at least some of the organisers. Like the USHP, the SNP succeeded in 
presenting Brenner's work as a "information subsidy" - the press and TV took 
the bait. However, as a non-party, academic conference aimed at serious 
consideration of evidence on a public health issue, the outcome was less 
favourable. Fragmentation had by this time progressed too far for the "truth" of 
Brenner's claims even to be discussed in a "legitimate" way at such a 
non-technical type of gathering. 
David Player thought the Glasgow conference had been a success, as did 
one SHHD official who felt it had had "an enormous impact", although he was 
less happy about Brenner's presentation. However, Mike Porter described 
Brenner's speech as a "disaster", and in the view of a Glasgow University 
health economist: 
You'd think someone would send Brenner to 'Subject A' [classes 
held in the US for academics to teach style and presentation 
technique] to teach him to communicate. It is atrocious really, a 
Fourier analysis in fifteen different slides. 
A scathing account was given by an Edinburgh medical school academic, 
which provides an example of what a scientific "black box" begins to look like 
when informed opinion no longer accepts it as such: 
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It was terrible to be preached at like that for so long .... it was 
like an evangelical meeting, no one had a chance to talk back Oh 
yes, they gave Harvey Brenner a chance to talk back and we got 
MORE figures and charts and he unfolded all this other data. He 
tried to blind people with figures any time anyone tried to make 
a point ... It wasn't fair. 
Instead of being seen as technical virtuosity, Brenner's complex methods and 
large volume of date (some of which may have been added in to the 
presentation as a response to Gravelle and Stern's attack of the previous 
evening) are now referred to as "preaching" and "BLINDING" people with data. 
lain More admitted to having faced some criticism for his use of Brenner as 
centre piece: 
It was suggested to me that by using Brenner we could destroy 
the issue ... The argument was that people interested in the 
politics were not really interested in serious research. You get 
you mileage out of something like this and then lose interest. 
This is true to some extent. 
At the end of the conference, Richard Smith, an Assistant Editor at the BMJ 
and a graduate of Edinburgh University's medical school, highlighted the 
non-academic agenda of the conference for his readers by reminding them that 
Sir John Brotherston had called for "a Scottish forum where issues like this one 
that are especially important for Scotland could be debated." Accordingly, 
academic participants in the conference were not optimistic about the 
possibilities for "further research", despite the frequent mentions of research in 
answers to Parliamentary Questions at this time. Steve Engelman and a 
colleague at Glasgow University, John Forbes, put in a proposal subsequently 
to the Scottish Health Services Research Committee23, although they were 
aware that this topic was, as Engelman put it "not health SERVICES research ... 
but I thought it was of considerable public interest." The £120,000-130,000 
they had asked for was, Engelman realised, a lot of money, but the only 
appropriate method was an expensive longitudinal design " ... if you're really 
going to throw any light on the matter." Despite having lowered their original 
financial estimate, their application was not successful (but for an account of 
the fate of Forbes and Engelman's proposal from within Whitehall, see section 
23 a body whose raison d'etre was similar to that of the CSRC and MRC Health Services Research 
Panel discussed in section 3.1. 
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6.1.2). 
John Forbes saw the future for research in the area quite clearly: 
We tried [himself and Engelman] to get a proposal together [in 
1982]. The Scottish Office said they didn't have the money, they 
sent it to the Dept of Employment, the DHSS, all around the 
place. It was just after the [1983] General Election that they 
wrote back saying it had been given low priority... Now, I feel it 
is curious the way they turned it down. They might have jacked it 
on methodological grounds or said it was not do-able. One way 
you might get them to support your research might be to say 
you believed there were econometric problems with any existing 
piece of work which seemed to show an effect. This can always 
be done: 'Dear Minister, We think there are problems with 
Brenner ... ' But as soon as you get a rejection like this one, you 
lose interest. It is a big investment that has gone to nothing. 
These comments show how participants viewed the process by which 
research can be presented so as to have an impact both in terms of policy 
debates and in generating future research. It shows how researchers, activists 
and professionals puzzle over which alliances are the best ones to seek, which 
groups need to be "inter-ested" and what is the best way of accomplishing 
that aim. The difficulty of choosing the best strategy is further illustrated in 
the fate of the next Scottish conference on unemployment and health. 
4.3.3 The Stirling "Consultation" 
The Edinburgh Medical Group Consultation 'Work, Health and High 
Unemployment", which took place on 1 - 2 June 1982, had been in planning 
stages almost since the beginning of the Glasgow planning process. Unlike 
Glasgow, which had been put together by lain More and a member of the SHEG 
staff , Stirling had a Steering Group, which held its first meeting on 23 April 
1981. The purpose of the Stirling "consultation", as it was termed, was "to be 
complementary to Glasgow rather than competing." (Steering Group minutes 
23/4/81). It was seen as a more overtly "political" event, in that political 
subjects would be explicitly raised, instead of being implied by the factual 
claims presented as "research". And yet, in its organisation it was far LESS 
"political" - no particular party or pressure group was involved - lain More was 
invited to give advice only. A colleague of Player's at SHEG related: 
.. ' Stirling was an attempt to provide a responsible medical basis 
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for the unemployment and health debate ... Dr Player saw that 
there was another dimension to the debate, an economic and 
political as well as an epidemiological argument .... 
Although David Player and others regarded Stirling as "less political" than 
Glasgow, the Scottish Office were not convinced. In May 1982, a letter arrived 
at SHEG from St Andrews House which criticised Player for becoming involved 
in the Stirling conference. The letter's author (a civil servant, not a politician) 
wrote: 
I know you will not take it amiss if I offer my strong personal 
view that it is stretching the Group's role well beyond the limits 
that the Management Committee are likely to endorse ... What is 
the health education point? If unemployment is bad for health, 
are health educators to argue for higher levels of employment 
than the combined wisdom of economists, industrialists, and 
politicians would otherwise achieve? If it should transpire that 
unemployment is sometimes good for health, is SHEG to be in 
the business of preSSing for Government health warnings on 
appropriate pay packets? 
The letter's author in fact puts his finger squarely on the point that Peter 
Draper and his USHP co-workers, the "Re-Thinking Community Medicine" team, 
the group around Radical Community Medicine and the Unemployment and 
Health Study Group had been trying to make since 1979 by using Brenner's 
work on health and the economy. That is, the "Manifesto" faction's claim that a 
true "community medicine" should be involved in wider issues of policy and 
politics. There was disagreement, however, among the conference's organising 
group, over what sort of alliance between "medicine", "science" and "social 
policy" should be pursued. Some organisers and speakers felt that the major 
theme of the conference should be "inequality", and that the links should be 
drawn more explicitly than in Glasgow between general issues (both "scientific" 
and "political") of inequality and the question of the health of the unemployed. 
One speaker, Chris Pond (director of the Low Pay Unit) remarked: 
... there is a close link between unemployment and low pay. I am 
critical of some of the work on unemployment and health as it 
sees unemployment as something discrete. . .. Really there is a 
spectrum from the casual worker to the well-paid, permanently 
employed person with a whole range in between. So the [Low 
Pay] Unit can't afford to ignore unemployment. 
This theme was also reflected in other contributions to the Consultation. 
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One speaker, Prof Bernard Crick, had previously written "Certainly, if there was 
no difference in the death rate between social classes, we would know that we 
no longer had social classes." (In Defence of Politics, 2nd edition, 1982, p. 225). 
He told the Stirling audience: 
The Black Report has established that ill-health is bad enough for 
the lowest social classes compared to the higher classes even 
when in jobs, but unemployment is associated with poverty not 
merely absolutely but also relatively. There may be no direct 
evidence that unemployment creates ill health, but the evidence 
is overwhelming that poverty creates ill-health. (Contact no 76 
1983:3 p 12) 
In David Player's contribution, he concluded " ... those of us in the NHS 
should try to do something about social class inequalities in health along the 
lines recommended by the Black Report ... If social class inequalities in health 
could be tackled many unemployed people would benefit." (Contact no 76, 
1983:3 p 8). 
This might seem to portray the beginnings of a promising alliance between 
political scientists, "neo-Keynesian" economists (as Pond described himself) and 
a segment of the medical profession represented by Player. That Pond had 
hoped (and feared) for this is reflected in his reactions to some backstage 
activity at the conference. 
I was expecting a hostile reaction [from the audience] because 
they were medics, and because I had had a minor row with Crick 
the evening before. He pooh-poohed the suggestion that one 
should look at low pay and unemployment on a continuum. It 
rather pulled the rug out from under me. 
However, what the extracts from conference papers ("Contact" is the journal 
of the Scottish Pastoral Association and Clinical Theology Association) reflect is 
the outcome of a conflict within the steering group over the orientation of the 
conference. 
In an informal discussion on 28 September of 1981, during the planning 
process for the Consultation, Adrian Sinfield had expressed concern at the lack 
of connection between those studying health and those studying the effects of 
recession on living standards and the labour market. Minutes of this meeting 
note that he had 
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instanced the separation of studies on unemployment, 
redundancy, and chronic poverty, also the split in academic and 
government departments between the various interests of health, 
economics, sociology and social administration. 
These concerns come near to echOing (almost certainly unintentionally) 
Brenner's theme that unemployment strikes hardest at those already most 
vulnerable, and exerts its effects on health by increasing inequalities in both 
living standards and mortality. Although this theme was prominent in many of 
the papers, both those reported in "Contact" and those which were not, it was 
not reflected in the (rather scant) public reporting of the consultation. Nor was 
it remembered by many of the participants that I spoke to. The question of 
social inequality did not re-appear with any prominence in the unemployment 
and health debate until some three years later. 
Some on the organising committee interpreted the references to the 
importance of poverty and inequality as an attempt by the "poverty lobby" to 
over-influence the agenda of the consultation. This, it was felt, might militate 
against unemployment and health being seen as a vehicle for enrolling 
"responsible medical" opinion. To accomplish this aim was important in two 
ways to academic social scientists involved with health issues: 
- in order to consolidate their OWN claims to respectability and expertise 
- for some, there was the additional wish to mobilise doctors in a campaign 
of criticism of government economic policies. 
The second objective was shared with the "poverty lobby". What seems to have 
made the difference was that the first was not. As one participant saw it: 
The social consequences of unemployment are hard to measure, 
but medical data is different, lay people trust it more, it has more 
legitimacy ... I thought it was very important to use doctors and 
epidemiological information -- it would be more effective if we 
had doctors ... than the same old, tired battery of activists ... I 
wanted a new medical dimension people who were 
uncontaminated by identification with a particular political line 
[such as] the left wing crowd from the Study Commission on the 
Family and the Low Pay Unit. 
Only much later was it to be suggested that consideration of wider 
questions concerning social inequality might be a way out of the academic 
impasse into which the debate now descended (see section 8.2, and for an 
interpretation of the research using this approach see Bartley 1988). For the 
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time being, any association between those promoting the involvement of the 
medical profession in the social problem of the health of the unemployed and 
those who had for long been analysing and commenting upon inequalities in, 
for example, income, working conditions and security of work was seen as 
undesirable by the former group. 
By seeking to make "political" considerations an explicit topic for the 
Consultation, some members of the planning group were violating one of the 
most powerful reasons why science can be used as a form of "politics by other 
means, that is, precisely by constructing value-claims as knowledge-claims, in 
this case as "medical data" which "has more legitimacy". As Latour has 
observed: 
Whilst in politics both the offi cia! (legislative, executive, judiciary) 
and the offic ious (compromises, cocktail parties, "arrangements") 
processes of decision-making are recognised, in science it is still 
believed that no decisions are taken at all. Rather, science is held 
to proceed according to superior knowledge, a sort of divine 
right, which in essence escapes from the sordid negotiations of 
politics. 
In addition, the introduction of questions about inequality and the operation 
of labour markets into the discussion would have produced a more complex 
and less topical and media-friendly approach (given the failure of the Black 
Report to generate very much public debate or policy activity). It was the 
simple link between unemployment and mortality which had both "inter-ested" 
the medical profession and gained media coverage. By diverging from this 
theme the organisers of the Stirling conference, despite the generally 
acknowledged quality of the speakers and their contributions, took the risk of 
reducing any possible impact it might have on the public debate, and thereby 
on policy-makers' views of "what research was needed" at that stage. 
This chapter has given an account of the "political" phase of the debate, in 
which the social-problem claims were raised onto the political agenda by way 
of publicising the knowledge-claims formulated by Brenner. It has shown the 
treacherous nature of this kind of exercise, which tends to attract opponents as 
well as allies, and the failure of Brenner's claims to survive the first trial of 
strength unscathed. It has also shown the failure of a potential enrolment 
between groups such as the Low Pay and Unemployment Units (whose staff 
included "neo-Keynesian" economists) and reforming physicians which might, 
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even using the same material as Brenner, have produced a different type of 
account of the problem. However, "the health of the unemployed" had now 
become a topic, and even the activity undertaken to prepare an "official 
response" had the effect of interesting a new set of researchers who were 




THE SECOND STAGE: MORAL AND TECHNICAL FRAGMENTATION 
Chapter Four has reported the beginnings of the process which created "the 
health of the unemployed" as a significant problem of "interest" to both the 
media and researchers. It has shown the ways in which members of 
professional and disciplinary subgroups became involved in pressure-group 
activity and were "enrolled" in alliances with political groups seeking to 
promote the cause of regional autonomy in Britain. 
This chapter shows the unfolding of Spector and Kitsuse's second stage in 
the history of a social problem, that is, 
1. the development of the "official response" to a claim which has 
successfully gained the attention of the media and of political and 
pressure groups, 
2. the beginnings of an involvement by researchers active in other fields, 
some of which would not immediately seem directly related to 
"unemployment" 
These two processes ran in parallel: an explicitly "contracted" piece of work 
which threw serious doubt on the methodological adequacy of Brenner's paper; 
and a series of reports from ongoing studies which had not been set up to 
investigate the health of the unemployed. The combined effect of these was to 
produce what Manning would call a "loop" (see chapter 1.2), a circular 
argument into which the issue as source of public concern and debate tended 
to disappear. In order to understand how the latter process happened, it will be 
necessary to see how the studies involved (the non-"contracted" ones) 
THEMSELVES emerged from previous social-problem processes, and the way in 
which this influenced the sort of "answers" they were able to supply. This will 
be discussed in section 5.2. In this way, it will be possible to trace both the 
tendencies towards the "moral" and "technical fragmentation" of the issue 24, 
and the acts of resistance to these tendencies. 
24 Taken here, as explained in section 1.2, to mean the "individualisation" of the "health problems 
of the unemployed" and the construction of the question as something so "complicated" that only 
experts could understand it. 
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5.1 Opening the black box: the Ilofficiai ll response to Brenner 
In November of 1980, following a tour which included testimony to the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Unemployment, Guardian economic 
correspondent Frances Cairncross interviewed Brenner. The resulting article 
was written in a sceptical vein. Cairncross was obviously well aware of the 
work in progress at Queen Mary College, although this was not to be published 
for almost another year. She also quotes research from the Policy Studies 
Institute showing that 90% of all people who became unemployed in the year 
1979 had left the register within 6 months. 
Those who remained out of work for long periods could almost 
be predicted in advance: they tended to be older workers, 
unskilled, with poor mental or physical health. They are precisely 
the people who, for a whole host of other reasons, would tend to 
have exceptionally high sickness and mortality rates. 
This concentration upon the question of "who, in terms of health, ARE the 
unemployed?", referred to by one DHSS advisor as "the ceteris paribus 
argument", was to figure prominently in the future progress of the debate. Yet 
set in temporal context it can be seen that Brenner's work in itself did not 
justify such an emphasis. In the autumn of 1980, NO-ONE had produced an 
academic paper claiming to demonstrate that individual unemployed persons 
were adversely affected in health. As an economist herself, it may be that 
Cairncross had access to information on how certain economists intended to 
steer the debate, and her relatively small article, placed in an inconspicuous 
position in the newspaper, marks an important turning pOint. 
USHP economist Howard Cox remembers that: 
When [Brenner] made that return visit, his work was already 
coming under fire. The main criticism seemed to be that he 
looked at an atypical time period. I told him I didn't think it would 
wear.... I was conscious of a critical attitude the first time I 
mentioned Brenner's name in a group of economists. 
Whereas 1981 may perhaps be regarded as the high point of the public 
debate and of Brenner's influence upon media comment, political controversy 
and government response it was also the period in which credibility in 
Brenner's work was steadily undermined. It may have been knowledge of the 
forthcoming Cardiff conference (see section 4.2.4.) which precipitated a 
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statement by undersecretary of state for health George Young to the 
Conference of Northern Region Community Health Councils on April 3. Young's 
speech was the first example of a careful information subsidy produced by the 
Department of Health under a Conservative administration: press-released and 
full of promises of "research results". It was headed: 
and went on: 
"Possible Link Between Unemployment and 
III-Health Deeply Concerns Ministers" 
Sir George said that two relevant research projects were 
commissioned by the Department some time ago and a third had 
been commissioned more recently. "I understand they [the 
results] are likely to suggest that there is little or no causal 
relationship between unemployment and health . where the 
duration of the unemployment is less than one year .,. The 
median period of unemployment for the individual who goes on 
to the register is still comparatively short, about 3 months. So far 
as possible, we should be aiming our help at the minority who 
reach ... the third stage, when depression sets in: these are often 
the people who are at a disadvantage already, perhaps for health 
reasons, or perhaps because they are old, or unskilled. 
By 7 July 1981 (provoked by a somehwat heated exchange in the House of 
Commons over the Fagin Report, as described in section 4.2.3. above), the 
backstage progress of Brenner's collaboration with his new found British 
enthusiasts was appearing in the public forum once again. Nigel Duncan wrote 
in PULSE: 
For a long time the field has been left largely to an American 
research scientist, Prof Harvey Brenner of Johns Hopkins 
University... But there have been a number of criticisms of his 
work ... The DHSS is now sponsoring its own research at Queen 
Mary College to see if it can repeat Brenner's findings ... But the 
findings will only show associations between unemployment and 
death rates. They cannot show causality, the effect of 
unemployment on health, and it is this which many people 
believe is of far greater importance. 
In the "News" section of the same edition of the journal, Duncan wrote of 
suspicions that the DHSS was deliberately trying to muffle debate on the issue 
by limiting the availability of the Fagin Report. On the 23rd July, The Guardian 
and New Society referred to the unemployment and health issue. New Society 
commented: 
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There hasn't been a lot of critical evaluation on [Brenner's] 
findings. Some people have been concerned .,. that, should 
Brenner's work not be substantiated, pOliticians who wished to 
play down the effects of unemployment would have a field day. 
On 1 August 1981, the Lancet published a letter by Brenner which included 
figures for England, Wales and Scotland: Referring to the major critique which 
the group of economists were developing, to the effect that the equations used 
to describe the 1936-76 relationship failed to predict when applied outside of 
this specific time period. Brenner promises work on "trends in mortality for 
several major causes in England and Wales and Scotland during the period 
1950 to 1978" which "confirm the main conclusions of the earlier report on 
England and Wales ... for the post-war period in England, Wales and Scotland, 
unemployment rates, specified for age, sex and duration of unemployment are 
strongly associated with increased death rates" (for the eventual results of 
these studies see Brenner and Mooney 1982, 1983, Brenner 1983). Howard Cox 
wrote to Brenner that this analysis would "make Gravelle et. al.'s critique of 
your earlier paper redundant." 
The results of the Cohort Study health questionnaire were officially 
press-released on 24 Sept 1981 by the DHSS. It reads: 
This is the first British study to examine this possible link using 
data from a national survey... and accepts that an association 
[between unemployment and health] is not disputed. What is 
disputed is whether unemployment itself causes ill-health. 
Unhealthy people may well be more likely to lose their jobs and 
have difficulty finding a new one: the worse the sickness record, 
the less the chance of re-employment. 
The paper advertised in this press release (Ramsden and Smee 1981) illustrated 
these claims with figures on the health of those members of the DHSS Cohort 
Study who had remained unemployed during the whole period of the study. 
This group's self- reported health did not appear to have been any more likely 
to deteriorate than the health of those re-employed. 
On 26 September, the Lancet published "Mortality, and Unemployment: A 
critique of Brenner's time-series analysis" by H.S.E. Gravelle, G. Hutchinson and 
J. Stern. Brenner's work, they argue, 
is important because it suggests that the social costs of 
unemployment may be higher than has previously been thought. 
Further [they claim, somewhat surprisingly] time series analysis 
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CAN provide a fairly precise estimate of how much mortality 
rates would rise following a given increase in unemployment. 
The first section of the paper concentrates on (a) the 1930s studies and (b) 
what Brenner had claimed in Cardiff on April 10. 
Stern disputes the pOint that "high unemployment is associated with 
declines in real income for the employed as well as the unemployed." This 
scholarly if brief review then tackles the problem that CROSS SECTIONAL 
STUDIES tend to SUPPORT the notion of a correlation between measures of 
unemployment and mortality in different geographical areas. However, Stern 
reminds the reader: 
these studies typically find that a number of other variables such 
as income, occupational structure, educational levels, 
consumption patterns and housing are also associated with 
mortality and that these variables are strongly correlated with 
unemployment rates. If these other variables are included in the 
analYSis, the reliability (in terms of standard errors) of the 
estimates of the effect of unemployment will be reduced ... On the 
other hand, if these other variables are omitted, the estimates 
will be biased, in that some of the effects of omitted variables on 
mortality will be wrongly attributed to unemployment. 
The tone is set here for all the subsequent attacks on Brenner's work. Although 
the rest of the paper is highly technical (as was Brenner's original paper), no 
detailed account is necessary in order to understand the role played by the 
economists' arguments. The task they performed, despite the complexity of 
their papers throughout the debate, was not one of "technical" but rather of 
"moral" fragmentation. In essence, they argued that people who were found to 
be unemployed were always "different" in other ways to those employed, and 
that this "difference" resided in essentially "moral" characteristics such as 
health-related behavior, intelligence, and other aspects of "human capital". 
The argument contained another strand as well. This was the importance 
of the "once for all" change in both mortality rates and unemployment rates 
which took place at the end of the Second World War. In statistical terms, 
these two sharp changes were so large as to determine the value of the 
equation linking mortality and unemployment, so that if one attempts to apply 
the same model to time periods which exclude the postwar period, or which 
split the period 1936-1976 in two, it fails. In political terms, this argument 
marks out the professional territory of the economists. They were arguing, in 
effect, that the welfare state had brought about a decisive improvement .in 
118 
health, such that any analysis of the much smaller changes in the periods 
before and after 1945 was of little relevance. Gravelle, Hutchinson and Stern 
conclude: 
his [Brenner's] evidence does not support the hypothesis that 
aggregate unemployment rates have a serious adverse effect on 
population mortality rates. 
Though cautioning: 
Our results ... do NOT mean that unemployment has no adverse 
health effects. Indeed it is plausible that such effects do exist -
but there is as yet no evidence which can be used to estimate 
their magnitude, timing and form. 
The effect of these two papers on the public debate conducted by pressure 
groups was to damp it down very considerably. For example, by 30 Sept 1981 
the Unemployment and Health Study Group had concluded that their previous 
(May 1981) enthusiasm for the idea of "mobilising the medical profession 
behind unemployment as a depoliticised health issue (as with nuclear 
weapons)" had been misplaced and that a "Medical Campaign Against 
Unemployment" was a "non-starter because there was no broad core of 
medical commitment as with nuclear weapons." 
On October 3 1981, the ever-alert Pulse journalist Nigel Duncan reported: 
A major new row has broken out over unemployment and 
ill-health and the government's role in the affair ... Both reports 
[Ramsden and Smee and GH&S] will be welcomed by ministers 
and will harden their controversial refusal to accept any link 
between ill-health and unemployment critics of the 
government [were] describing them as deliberate attempts to 
discredit the growing campaign which sees unemployment as a 
major threat to public health. [This] comes just 5 weeks before 
Brenner is due to produce a major new analysis on 
unemployment and health in Scotland ... DHSS officials hope that 
critical scrutiny of Brenner's work will inject an element of 
caution into the debate. 
On 20 October a series of Parliamentary Questions were asked about Len 
Fagin and Martin Little's report (see section 4.2.3. above) and other research 
into unemployment and health which the government was suspected of 
manipulating. Gerard Vaughan told Dale Campbell-Savours that the work of the 
research team at Queen Mary College 
calls into question the validity of the statistical model used by 
Professor Brenner since it fails to take account of the relevant 
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factors such as improvement in diet and medical care which 
occurred during the period. (Hansard 20 Oct 1981 WA col (10)97) 
Gravelle et. al. had called Brenner's bluff in using his own complicated 
methods against him, they had, to some extent, broken open the "black box" 
(the time-series analysis). Up to this point, interviews with social scientists 
working in medical settings showed, the fact that few "really understood" 
Brenner's methods had not dissuaded them from using what seemed to be a 
persuasive example of the power and value of a social science perspective 
when applied to pertinent questions about health. In Latour's sense, the 
methods comprised a "black box", passed on co-operatively from person to 
person, because it could be used to further their several and various 
"interests". For example, it made impressive teaching material to present to 
sceptical medical students. It was this disciplinary entrepreneurialism which 
provided the "respectable" academic backing to the "Celtic fringe" conferences 
discussed in section 4.3. However, such success can also have its costs, in 
that it attracts powerful ENEMIES as well as allies. 
Gravelle et.al.'s response to Brenner and the "health" paper from the DHSS 
Cohort Study (Ramdsen and Smee 1981) therefore comprised the "official 
response" to the use made by "Manifesto" community medicine and pressure 
groups of Brenner's work. The failure of the DHSS to produce a more formal 
version of the Fagin report (and the fact that there only 200 were made 
available), and Ministerial denial in the House of Commons that the report 
demonstrated any "causal" effect were taken, by some participants, to be 
another indication of official opposition. Also, media interest was, at this time, 
beginning to shift from the effect of unemployment on health itself to the 
(sometimes thrillingly unseemly) conflicts between the medical profession and 
ministers, and the associated accusations of "cover-up". 
5.2 Stage two (B) - Setting up the loop 
This section will be concerned with the ways in which an "epidemiological" 
response to Brenner's work and the concern it aroused was constructed. It is at 
this point that some concept of a "loop" (see Ch. 1) is needed. The policy 
debate now appears to "dwell", awaiting the outcome of "research", and this 
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hiatus lasted a considerable time. The nature of the early academic response 
was shaped by the fact that there was felt to be no time to await the outcome 
of new studies, so that "customers" were asking researchers for relevant work 
based on existing programmes. This section describes the three research 
programmes which produced information that was fed into the unemployment 
and health debate, and attempts to understand their contribution in terms of 
these programmes' relationship to previous social-problem processes. They will 
be discussed in the order in which their first published work on unemployment 
and health appeared. 
5.2.1 The British Regional Heart Study 
The initial impetus for the setting-up of this major prospective study of 
coronary heart disease might appear to have been derived from a research 
programme far removed from the field of health inequalities or unemployment. 
The rationale for the initial MRC grant in 1975, was the investigation of the 
relationship between heart disease and hardness of water supplies. And yet, the 
history of the MRC Social Medicine Unit, from where the research proposal 
originated, tells a different story. 
In 1948, one author of the pioneer epidemiological paper on health and 
recession (Morris and Titmuss 1944), J N Morris, was appointed Director of a 
new MRC Social Medicine Research Unit at the Central Middlesex Hospital. Early 
projects included the investigation of biological and social factors in infant 
mortality, of social and psychological factors in reproductive efficiency, and the 
occupational incidence of heart disease in middle life (Committee of the Privy 
Council for Medical Research, 1949, p 180). An early member of the staff was 
Richard Titmuss, co-author of the 1944 paper. On Titmuss' death in 1973, the 
annual report of the council went so far as to state, in his obituary, that 
working as Deputy Director of the Social Medicine Unit "provided the stepping 
stone to his academic career" (MRC 1975, p. 153). 
In the academic year 1955-6, the units staff was joined by Dr M D 
Crawford. In 1961, she published, in association with Morris and J A Heady, 
who in that year became Assistant Director of the unit, a paper on "Hardness 
of water supplies and mortality from cardiovascular disease in the county 
boroughs of England and Wales" (Crawford, Morris and Heady 1961). In 1962-3 
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Peter Draper jOined the Social Medicine Unit, and stayed until November 1964. 
During this period the basic research programme changed little. It was not 
confined to cardiovascular disease, but included work on juvenile delinquency, 
mental illness and pollution of air and water, but heart disease seems to 
become a more dominant concern. On 30 September 1967 Morris was 
appointed to the Chair of Public Health at the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical MediCine, and the Social Medicine Unit moved to Keppel Street. It 
seems that Crawford's work on what came to be known as "the water story" 
was the most successful aspect of the unit's work at this time. In the School's 
annual report for 1968-9 (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 
1969) some prominence is given to it, and to an account of further work 
planned on mortality in 12 soft water and 12 hard-water towns. This classical 
public-health initiative was to be undertaken in collaboration with the local 
medical officers of health. 
In January 1970, Dr A G Shaper, who had previously been Research 
Professor in Cardiovascular Diseases at Makerere University College, joined the 
staff of the unit. The MRC's annual reports from 1971-2 onwards betray new 
concerns following on the implementation of the Rothschild reforms, which 
have been discussed in chapter 3. It does appear that concern with "arterial 
disease" and the causes of the kind of change and damage in blood vessels 
which is thought to eventuate in heart attacks was seen as a topic which 
would appeal both to scientists and to "customers" in government. 
By 1970, also, the Hunter working party on the reform (some would say the 
destruction) of Public Health (see Lewis 1986b) and the development of the 
new "community medicine" had been set up. Morris, still Director of the Social 
Medicine Unit, was heavily involved in this, as were many other members of 
School of Hygiene staff. In this ferment of change in both health policy and 
science policy, the "water story" may have seemed an attractive investment 
from several different points of view. 
In the words of member of the British Regional Heart Study staff, it seemed 
that this might pose a "classic public health problem" -- that is, water quality 
might turn out to be the sort of aetiological factor which could only be 
affected by "mass intervention" of a type which would have to be sanctioned 
by government (the most "successful example of this was perhaps the Clean 
Air Acts; another example of such an issue would be water flouridation to 
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prevent tooth decay.) It also involved combining epidemiological skills with the 
more traditionally highly valued clinical skills which were needed to frame 
hypotheses about the possible pathways by which water constituents might 
affect the heart, and to integrate the results of case histories, blood chemistry, 
electrocardiography, spirometry, etc. 
In 1975, the Social Medicine Unit was wound up, on the retirement of 
Morris. As funds had been obtained from the MRC for the Regional Heart Study 
in the shape of a five year "Programme Grant", Shaper, who became study 
director, moved, project and all, to the medical school at the Royal Free 
Hospital, where he took up the chair of clinical epidemiology. The design of 
the Regional Heart Study reflected aspects of the method adopted by Morris 
and Titmuss in the 1930s (Morris and Titmuss 1944, see also discussion by 
Bartley 1987a), and continued by the work of Morris, Crawford and Gardner at 
the Social Medicine Unit. Twenty-four towns were chosen to represent all 
combinations of water quality and heart disease mortality so that 
investigation could be made into the "exceptions": those towns with high heart 
disease and hard water and vice versa. Approximately 350 men between the 
ages of 40 and 59 were interviewed and physically examined in each town 
between mid-1978 and mid-1980, and the quality of drinking water was tested 
from the homes of a 10% subsample of these. As well as lung function and 
blood lipid analysis a quesionnaire was administered to all men.The 
questionnaire collected details of present state of health (so that the 
researchers knew not only what diseases, if any, each man was suffering from, 
but also where he and his doctor KNEW about them), diet, exercise, smoking, 
drinking and occupation. Occupation was not coded according to present job, 
but according to longest held occupation. As a more or less accidental 
product of this exercise, 408 men were found to be unemployed, most of them 
(according to their own accounts) "because of ill-health". 
At the beginning of the academic year 19aO-81, the team was joined by an 
American Millbank scholar, doing the practical work for an M. Sc. in 
Epidemiology at the London School of Hygiene, Richard Cummins. Cummins 
was from Arkansas, had graduated from the liberally-inclined Case Western 
Reserve medical school, and worked in programmes designed to bring medical 
care to underserved poverty areas. He did some work on smoking and drinking 
behaviour, and in the process teamed up with a GP who was doing some 
"sessional" teaching in the Department, Ray Hume. Hume was particularly 
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interested in tranquilliser use, in particular the idea that if patients were 
withdrawn too quickly from tranquillisers, they might turn to alcohol. Running 
through the data, they discovered that an unexpectedly large number (in view 
of their age and gender) of the study's subjects were taking tranquillisers. It 
also appeared that one factor significantly associated with tranquilliser use was 
unemployment. At this stage, Hume and Cummins enlisted the help of one of 
the statisticians working on the study, Derek Cook. 
The results of running employment status against health variables, at first 
sight, were quite striking. Thirty-one percent of the unemployed, as compared 
to 15% of the employed men had bronchitis, 28% of the unemployed and 15% 
of the employed had obstructive lung disease, and 26% of the unemployed, in 
contrast to 9% of the employed had chest pain indicative of ischaemic heart 
disease. It was then necessary to allow for the fact that so many of the BRHS 
men without jobs were unemployed BECAUSE of their ill-health. Doing this 
changed the picture considerably. The "not ill unemployed" were far less likely 
than the "ill unemployed" to be suffering from symptoms suggestive of heart 
and lung disease. There was still some difference between the employed and 
the unemployed, though this was further decreased when statistical adjustment 
was made for social class, town of residence and smoking. However, even then, 
men unemployed not because of ill-health were still significantly more likely 
than the employed to have chest pain indicative of heart disease. 
A version of the paper was presented at the BSA Medical Sociology 
Conference in September. It caused little comment. Cook then continued to 
work on the draft with the study director until they were satisfied, in late 
March 1982, and submitted it to the Lancet. It was accepted without major 
alteration, and published on 6 June. Somewhat to Cook's surprise (and 
disappointment), the appearance of the paper caused very little media 
comment, a few column inches on an inside page of The Guardian. 
5.2.2 The opes Longitudinal Study (the "LS") 
On 9 June 1982, the monograph "Socio-Demographic Differentials in 
Mortality" appeared, published by Her Majesty's Stationary Office. It did not 
provoke any great media response, although there was a certain amount, for 
example a Times piece on page 2 headed "Unemployed Have Higher Death Rate 
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-- Study Shows" by Nicholas Timmins. It reported that the results showed a 
death rate from accidents and violent causes, including suicide, amongst the 
unemployed well over twice as high as that for men in work, and a death rate 
from cancer half again as high as that for the employed. It should be noted 
here that the article in the Times more or less allows readers to define for 
themselves what is meant by "the unemployed". In fact, "unemployment" in this 
study is operationalised as "'seeking work' in the week before Census night 
1971". 
It is worthwhile giving some fairly extensive background information on the 
LS, in view of its major influence in the debate on unemployment and physical 
health in England and Wales. Traditionally, measures of mortality differences 
between occupations and social classes are given by The Registrar-General's 
Decennial Supplements (OS) which accompany (usually at considerable delay) 
each Census. By 1971, the Office of the Registrar General had been merged 
with the Government Social Survey to form a new Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys. 
For a considerable time, misgivings had been expressed as to the adequacy 
of existing methods for the measurement of social class differences in 
mortality. The technical problem arises from the use of different sources to 
establish the numerator and the denominator when calculating mortality rates. 
The denominator (i.e. the numbers in each social class) is derived from the 
census count. The numerator (the number of deaths occurring to members of 
each social class, usually in a three-year period around the Census date) is 
taken from the occupations stated on death certificates. As discussed by 
various commentators (Leete and Fox 1977; OPCS 1986 p. 12-17) this gives rise 
to the risk of "ecological fallacy" and "numerator-denominator bias". Leete and 
Fox, for example, found that of the 89 male members of social class V who 
registered a birth in 1971 (a Census year) after enumeration day, over 49% 
were allocated to a higher social class on the basis of the occupation that they 
stated at the registration of their child than they had been at Census. 
In 1973, OPCS Report on Medical and Population Subjects No. 25 (OPCS 
1973) "Cohort Studies -- New Developments" had suggested a way round this 
problem. It stated that: 
chronic diseases, which occupy a large and increasing proportion 
of the facilities and cost of the health service, develop over many 
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years ... with present-day job mobility many persons exposed to 
an occupational hazard adopt other occupations before their 
disabilities become apparent (p. 5) 
The new kind of cohort study that it was proposing, the Report pointed out, 
would "take statements of occupation as given at Census both for the 
numerator (those who die) as well as for the denominator (the population at 
risk). This study will also allow a comparison to be made of the statements of 
occupation given at Census with those given at death registration, and so will 
provide a measure of the errors introduced in consequence into the traditional 
methods of measuring occupational mortality." 
According to a senior government research manager, the first initiative 
which led to the setting up of the LS "came from the General Register Office" 
because of concern about the comparability of information about social class 
obtained at death registration and at Census. 
It is the business of this office to produce classifications which 
are meaningful and useful, and concepts of what is meaningful 
and useful change ... The specific debate in 1973 was the validity 
of the [social-class-specific] mortality rates .... It could also be 
seen as efficient [to set up an LSl because it made use of 
existing data in new ways. [Nevertheless] there were formidable 
problems of organisation. It is not a cheap thing to set up a file 
on half a million members of the population and add to it year by 
year .... You do have to have a very good story to justify these 
longitudinal studies being set up. Our story was ... traditonally we 
have produced social class differentials [in mortality and fertility 
rates] so we could say that we could do our job better with a 
longitudinal study. 
The idea of a longitudinal study of one percent of the population had also 
been linked to moves towards quinquennial Censuses, and a growing interest in 
"record linkage" as in aid to population surveillance and planning
25
. In 1966 a 
10% Census was carried out, and plans for a 1976 Census were only cancelled 
at the last moment (Whitehead 1984). So, in the early 1970s, it had been 
thought that there would be a FIVE-yearly input into the LS, which would have 
allowed access to much greater detail on the succession of events occurring to 
25 see Acheson 1967, 1968; Dr. Donald Acheson later became Chief Medical Officer at the DHSS 
and chaired the committee on the future of community medicine and the public health function 
set up in 1986. 
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sample members. As one administrator put it: 
In the early 1970s, you see, planning was all the rage, and we felt 
that planning purposes required more frequent Censuses. 
The task of following one percent of the 1971 population, linking Census 
records to records of births, deaths and cancer registration, and then on to 
1981 data, did prove formidable. It was not until 1975 that the 1 percent 
sample of the 1971 Census had even been assembled, and no reports appeared 
until 1979. The sample was drawn by choosing 4 days in the year and including 
anyone born on that day (because 4/364 = approximately. 1 %). In all 
subsequent years, new births or immigrations taking place on any of those four 
dates were added to the sample. In principle, data on each individual from each 
Census would be added. This meant that occupation and economic position 
would only be available every ten years. The study could really only claim, 
therefore, to measure long-term changes in occupational status or employment 
status, and was unsuitable as an indicator of short-term mobility within, and in 
and out of, the labour market. 
In 1975 a young statistician, John Fox, was recruited from the Health and 
Safety Executive to write the Decennial Supplement on Occupational Mortality 
to the 1971 Census. While still working on the OS (OPCS 1978), Fox became 
interested in the idea of the LS and began to assemble some resources to 
push the analysis forward. In 1979, he argued that a team of full-time 
personnel would be needed. Many at OPCS agreed with this, but at the time of 
restraint on civil-service recruitment, there would have been little chance of 
staff being allocated to the study26. The method by which staff are recruited 
into the OPCS's Medical Statistics Division (of which Dr A M Adelstein was 
Chief Statistician, and in which Fox and the co-author of "Socio-Demographic 
Differentials in Mortality" Peter Goldblatt worked) would also not, perhaps, have 
been appropriate to attract the sort of colleagues now needed. Recruits into 
OPCS (in contrast to the Government Economic Service) can only be taken 
from the Government Statistical Service by internal selection. 'The best we 
could have got that way" remarked one LS worker "was a numerate 
26 The "Rayner Review" of staffing in the Government Statistical Service was being carried out 
during this period, reported in 1980 (Rayner 1980) and resulted in a White Paper in 1981 (HMSO 
1981). It recommended that the GSS be cut by 25 % in real terms between May 1979 and April 
1984, see Hoinville and Smith 1982 for an account of the Report, and of statisticians' reactions to 
it. 
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administrator." So Fox decided to apply for a two-year Professorial Research 
Fellowship in the Department of Mathematics at City University, and asked 
OPCS if he could try and obtain outside funding to build up a research team. 
He obtained funds, eventually, from the Cancer Research Campaign (for a post 
which was taken up in 1980) and the SSRC (1981). The OPCS continued to 
cover the costs of half Fox's salary and the heavy costs of data processing. 
These were the resources which lay behind the production of the first 
monograph "Socio-demographic Differentials in Mortality" which appeared in 
1982. 
As early as 1979, Fox had published a paper in the Annals of Occupational 
Hygiene which included a table showing raised mortality amongst those men 
classified as "seeking work" in the week before the 1971 Census (Fox 1979). 
The paper went totally unremarked except by workers on the DHSS Cohort 
Study who were preparing the third-interview phase of their survey, and had 
decided to include a question on health, in order to make the Cohort Study's 
results relevant to policy-makers disturbed by The Reckoning. Prior to this 
time, contact between the two studies' personnel had, perhaps surprisingly, 
been low -- though one government statistician remarked that back in 1978 a 
DHSS scientific adviser had "offered the Cohort Study to OPCS and some idiot 
turned it down". 
However, political events had changed attitudes temporarily (contact 
between the two studies did not last very long). There are two accounts of 
what happened next in my field notes: one given on a formal occasion (a 
presentation of results at an ESRC funded seminar on Employment and 
Unemployment) and the other informally. According to the formal account, "The 
Department of Employment and the DHSS approached us to see if we were 
interested in dOing research on unemployment and health. However, in the end 
we went to the MRC, and other bodies, for our funding." According to the 
"informal" account, a professional adviser at the Department of Employment 
had suggested "over lunch" that they take another look at the data first 
presented in the Annals of Occupational Hygiene paper. Although this account 
displays the importance of informal networks, in this case the LS researchers 
decided not to proceed on the basis of mere social contact. They asked that 
the Department of Employment officially approach the Registrar General and 
make the request in writing. The Department of Employment never funded any 
work on the LS, and the DHSS did not do so until late 1985. 
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Those involved in the LS (in contrast to those involved in the BRHS) were 
well aware of the policy-making process in which public-health research is 
located: 
Take the Decennial Supplement [one remarked]. It's done every 
10 years. Why? Because it reminds people of the old things we 
already know about, but that would be forgotten about otherwise. 
Otherwise it might be assumed that all the inequalities had gone 
away. 
The idealistic and ameliorative spirit of many involved in the collection and 
analysis of official health statistics is combined with a sense of the tradition in 
which their work is located (one factor providing links with the concerns of 
Manifesto community medicine). Another government scientist reminded me 
that: 
We should continue to look at structural variables, and to make 
what assessment we can of what you can infer from the 
time-series. That is our traditional role ... Our role is to ensure 
that the data is of the best possible quality ... 
However, and perhaps somehow rather contradictorily in view of the comments 
just cited, this civil servant insisted that: 
We only provide background information fundamental 
information as it exists, and also what assessment we might 
make of that situation ... 
And this line, between "information" and "assessment", was maintained by the 
"careful forms of words" discussed in Section 4.2.3. 
It was in this spirit -- of a sense of tradition, concern for accuracy, and 
cautious awareness of the political role of the oldest "government research 
unit" -- the General Register Office -- that the OPCS LS reported on the health 
of the unemployed. The SMR for men of working age who reported themselves 
to be "seeking work" on Census night 1971 was 130, that is, their 
age-standardised death rate was 30% above that for all men. Fox and Goldblatt 
noted that "there are no clear health grounds for expecting this category to 
record high mortality" (Fox and Goldblatt 1982, p.26) and suggest that it may be 
an effect of the social class distribution of the unemployed, i.e. the tendency 
for unemployment to be concentrated in the lower and less healthy classes, or 
by the higher risk of losing a job experienced by men who are already ill. At 
this stage, answers to these two question were sought by looking at the 
CAUSES of the excess deaths (which turned out to be accidents and violence 
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and cancer) with the results quoted in the Times. The high mortality from 
accidents and suicide was seen as evidence for a causal effect, and that from 
cancer as evidence for a "selection" effect (men already ill losing their jobs). 
What the researchers did next offers evidence on the ways in which 
scientists operate as "analogical reasoners" (Knorr-Cetina 1981). A certain set 
of ideas about how the effect of work hazards on health should be studied 
were carried over from the field of occupational medicine into the Longitudinal 
Study. In studies of specific potential hazards, account has to be taken of what 
is known as the "healthy worker effect". By this is meant the consistent finding 
that mortality rates for ANY kind of worker are lower than general population 
age-specific rates, which include those not in the workforce at all. If followed 
over time, however, it can be seen that these low mortality rates return back to 
the level for the population as a whole, that is, in the jargon, the healthy 
worker effect "wears off" 27. It is therefore considered necessary to choose, as 
a control group in studies of possible industrial hazards, not a sample of the 
general population, but a sample from another industry which may be regarded 
as similarly selected for GOOD health. Otherwise, the healthy worker effect may 
conceal the effect of the hazard. One promise of the LS was that it would allow 
the healthy worker effect to be compared across many different occupations. 
However, by 1981, only deaths up to 1975 were available for analYSis, and not 
enough deaths had taken place to permit statistically meaningful results to be 
obtained on individual occupations. Instead, its effect on the differences in 
mortality between men in different economic POSITIONS was examined. 
The effect is duly observed in the LS sample, with, between 1971 and 1975, 
the 3021 deaths of men employed on Census night 1971 giving an SMR (ratio 
of observed deaths to those expected if the death rate of the employed had 
been the same as that for "all men" -- i.e. employed, unemployed, retired, 
permanently and temporarily sick, and students) of only 86. The healthy worker 
effect was so strong that in the first 5 years following the 1971 Census, all 
members of the LS sample allocated to ANY occupation experienced low 
mortality rates in comparison to those found by the ecological method used in 
the Decennial Supplement. This is because at death registration, very few 
people are left in the residual category "unoccupied". Unemployed and 
27 For a clear explanation of this idea, see Carpenter 1987. 
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permanently sick men are usually given an occupation on their death 
certificate, generally the last one they held, or which the informant at 
registration remembers. As a result, in the LS, where men were classified at 
death according to their occupation and economic position AT CENSUS, there 
were MANY MORE deaths to "unoccupied" men. And the categories 
"unoccupied" and "inadequately described" were found to have very high 
mortality indeed. Because these men were not included in the LS analysis of 
mortality by occupation or social class, the gradients in mortality for the period 
1971-1975 were far flatter than those found in the Decennial Supplements and 
used in the Black Report. 
Now, this might at first have appeared as a blow to the Black Report's 
contention that inequalities in health were still a significant policy issue for the 
1970s and 1980s. An account of how the results of the OS entered the wider 
debate on health inequalities is given elsewhere (Bartley 1987b). But what was 
important for the unemployment and health debate was to be the use made by 
Fox and his colleagues of the notion that, like the "healthy worker effect", the 
"selection effect" (of workers already in poor health out of the labour force) 
could be regarded as likely to "wear off". Their interpretation of what their data 
could show about the effect of unemployment on health hung crucially upon 
this analogical move between occupational and general-population 
epidemiology. 
5.2.3 The work of the MRC Unit for Epidemiological Studies in Psychiatry 
The study whose results were reported last of all was probably the one 
which had the greatest media impact. Like the other two, it was funded by the 
"independent" MRC and carried out by full-time researchers (i.e., academics 
with minimal teaching commitment). The authors were two members of the 
MRC's Scientific Staff in a long-established research unit in Edinburgh. It will 
be worthwhile, in this case, also, to give an account of the development of the 
Unit's work, which provides an example of the way in which another scientific 
team become involved in "social problem claims making". 
The Unit began to operate in April of 1960 in London, directed by a 
psychiatrist, Prof G M Carstairs. In January 1961, Carstairs was appointed to 
the Chair of Psychological Medicine at Edinburgh University and, as is the 
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custom with MRC Units, this one moved (in April 1961) with its Director. The 
interests of Carstairs and his Assistant Director (W I M Kessel) did not explicitly 
include unemployment as a specific topic. However, the unit's ethos partook of 
the rationalist and optimistic spirit of the time in regard to health planning: 
Epidemiological studies have two principal purposes [said an 
early progress report]. The first is to explore aetiological factors 
in mental illness; the second is to estimate needs and evaluate 
treatment services ... the former will in the long run provide 
information enabling prevention and treatment to become rational 
instead of empirical (Unit Progress Report for 1960-64, 21 May 
1964, p. 1) 
From the start, the Unit formed a link with the Edinburgh Regional 
Poisoning Treatment Centre (RPTC), at this time a ward (Ward III) of the Royal 
Infirmary, which received over 90% of all cases of self- pOisoning and 
self-injury in the city that required hospitalisation. The first study of the 
aetiology of what was later to become known as para suicide (the phrase 
"attempted suicide" was still in use at this time) explored the clinical, social, 
demographic and ecological characteristics of cases -- this included social 
class but not employment status. There seems to have been a plan at this time 
to set up RPTCs in all major British cities. 
Dr Norman Kreitman joined the Unit's scientific staff in January 1966, and 
became Director in April 1971. By this time, studies of suicide and "attempted 
suicide" took a prominent place in the publicly presented image of the Unit's 
work. Parasuicide was seen as being "on the increase", especially amongst 
young women, and was found to be correlated with overcrowding, juvenile 
delinquency, divorce, and residence in tenement dwelling, both at the 
ecological and at the individual levels. A member of the staff, J W McCulloch, 
wrote an M. Sc. thesis on "The social consequences of acts of deliberate 
self-poisoning or self-injury" (Edinburgh 1965) in which "particular attention 
was paid to the patient's status at the time of admission, with respect to age, 
civil state, marital adjustment, social class and work record, finance and 
housing. 
By November of 1971, studies of completed suicide and parasuicide had 
become the Unit's major research activity. One hypothesis now being explored 
was that certain "problem" areas with high parasuicide rates were characterised 
by a "subculture of parasuicide" in which self-destructive behaviour was 
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regarded as normal or acceptable (Unit Progress Report November 1971, p. 3) 
The "social problem" of parasuicide continued to grow. Rates of parasuicide 
amongst young men had trebled between 1962 lnd 1967. By 1973, annual 
admissions to the Regional Poisoning Treatment Centre had risen to 1650, from 
860 in 1967. Rates for men had risen from 179/100,000 to 296/100,000 and for 
women from 209 to 427 in the same period. In 1968 a Ph 0 student, Alex 
Robertson, had joined the Unit. His study looked particularly at young working 
class male parasuicides, and found that they differed from controls in 
"frequency of recent stress, hostility and depression scores, and sense of 
relative deprivation" (Unit Progress Report October 1974, p. 7). It seemed that 
these young men had been subjected to a particularly high frequency of life 
events. 
Stephen Platt jOined the Unit in June of 1977. The social problem status of 
parasuicide had been maintained up to this point ("Between 1968 and 1976 
annual admissions have almost doubled" according to the Progress Report of 
July 1978) and the recording system at the RPTC had become even more 
sophisticated. Platt started work on the "subculture" theory for his Ph D. But 
by June 1981, the Unit was beginning to suffer from a contraction in research 
funding. Only one project on suicide remained. Staff vacancies had been frozen 
and staff members had been reduced by around 20% between mid-1980 and 
mid-1981. The priority in research was now alcohol and alcoholism. The 
progress report for 1978-1981 stresses that: 
The RPTC ... probably represents the best facility in the world for 
the study of hospital-referred parasuicide, and it is regrettable 
that this resource cannot be more fully exploited. Parasuicide is 
still a scientifically fertile area and poses major issues for health 
service provision and clinical management 
However, in the period 1977-1979 all three rates of parasuicide (person, 
event and first-ever) had been falling by 10% annually. This trend puzzled Unit 
staff, as "the changes [among males] were largely due to fewer short-term 
re-admissions and a decrease in 'acute situational reaction' presentations, 
despite increasing economic recession and unemployment in the community." 
They seem to have been unaware of a temporary fall in the rate of 
unemployment during 1977 to late 1979. The Unit's progress report for 
1978-81 admits that if a choice were to be forced upon it, studies of suicidal 
behaviour would have to be placed fourth (and last) in its order of research 
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priorities. 
Like Leonard Fagin, Steve Platt's interest in unemployment derived from a 
more general political orientation which had developed during experiences in 
South America. He had lived and worked in Allende's Chile for 18 months after 
completing a Master's degree in social policy at the LSE. His work with Chilean 
psychiatrists committed to alternative humanistic forms of treatment deeply 
influenced him. By mid-1981, his subculture study was beginning to show that 
in the high-rate areas of Edinburgh the local subculture seemed to express, if 
anything, a MORE punitive attitude towards self-destructive acts than that 
found in low-rate areas. During 1981, Norman Kreitman had come under some 
pressure from the MRC to develop work on unemployment in the Unit, but no 
definite plans were made, as few staff had any interest of expertise in the area. 
However, as part of his work on parasuicide, Platt had been using data from 
the RPTC. When discussions about unemployment resulted from the 1981 
review of the Unit's finance by an MRC subcommittee, he remembered that 
data collected on each admission included employment status. At around this 
time, Unemployment and Health Study Group member Gill Westcott wrote to 
the Unit asking if anyone there would be willing to give a paper on 
unemployment and suicidal behavior at a WHO conference to be held in Leeds 
in December 1982. "That" Platt recalled "gave me a deadline". As he looked at 
the possibilities of the RPTC data he became increasingly excited by them. He 
thought that they could both throw new light on structural factors in 
parasuicide and, in more abstract methodological terms, provide an opportunity 
to carry out an epidemiological exercise combining individual and aggregate 
levels of analysis. 
The transfer of ideas from his previous work to unemployment was 
different in Platt's case to that in Fox's. Whereas Fox carried over the model of 
the healthy worker effect by analogy, Platt was attracted to using 
unemployment as a variable in the study of parasuicide precisely because it 
was so DIFFERENT from the "cultural" factors involved in his PH D. (Platt 1984 
p. 74-5). For some time he had been worried about the potential for misuse 
presented by any "subcultural" theory of social phenomena. Any theory on a 
subculture of parasuicide could, he felt, fall into this trap. The ideas of 
Henderson (in, for example, Henderson and Williams 1974) seemed to him to 
suggest potentially that parasuicide should be "re-criminalised" in order to 
combat it, and had gained, Platt felt, unjustifiably wide currency and credibility 
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both in academic and policy circles. He remembered the ways in which Oscar 
Lewis (who also wrote about Latin American society) had been "misused" in the 
"culture of poverty" debate in the United States to justify neglect of the 
problems of the urban poor, and to distract attention from "structural" causes 
of poverty. In preparation for work on unemployment (a "structural" factor) as it 
related to parasuicide, he began to write an extended literature review of the 
evidence relating unemployment to suicidal behavior. He presented a 
preliminary report of this work to the Scottish Medical Sociology Conference in 
the early spring of 1981. At the behest of a member of the editorial group, he 
then submitted a version of this paper to Sociology of Health and Illness, who 
turned it down, though it was eventually published in Social Science and 
Medicine (Platt 1984) and widely quoted. He then gave a small workshop at the 
Edinburgh Medical Group's "Consultation" in Stirling (see section 4.3.3) in June 
of 1982. He felt that the conference had provided him with valuable contacts, 
but "none of this was ever followed up". 
In August of 1982, however, while Norman Kreitman was on holiday, BBC 
Reporting Scotland phoned for the Director's comments on rising suicide and 
unemployment in Scotland, and his secretary, knowing the interests of other 
staff, passed the call through to Platt. His comments were repeated on August 
12th in the Glasgow Herald ("Study Links Suicide with Unemployment") and on 
13 August in the Scottish Daily Express ("A Job to Survive"). 
A short version of Steve Platt's review of the evidence relating 
unemployment to "completed suicide" was published in the Unemployment Unit 
Bulletin in November 1982 (platt 1982). The paper made no claims that 
unemployment necessarily exerted a "causal" effect on suicide. It was a 
cautious account of his research to date, very much in the model of 
MRC-funded work, despite the somewhat unorthodox nature of the journal. 
The Unemployment Unit, like the MRC (and notwithstanding its status as a 
"intermediate body" with the reputation of being "political") placed high value 
on balance and impartiality, which it maintained despite its explicitly 
campaigning purpose. Platt concluded: 
My own view is that the weight of evidence provides some 
ground for suggesting that the risk of both unemployment and 
suicide are elevated by the presence of psychiatric illness 
(especially depression), rather than that unemployment is an 
immediate cause of suicide. This is not to deny, however, that 
joblessness may indeed constitute an important intervening or 
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moderator variable affecting the strength of the association 
between psychiatric illness and suicide" (Platt 1982, p5) 
This work on suicide laid the foundations for the analysis of the RPTC 
figures on parasuicide amongst the unemployed, which came to public 
attention during 1983 and will be more fully dealt with below. It claims no 
more than that unemployment is an "intervening" or "exacerbating" factor which 
comes between personal states and characteristics and suicidal behavior. As 
later described in the Unit's Report to the Medical Research Council for the 
quinquennium 1981-1986: 
At an individual level the rates of parasuicide among the 
unemployed have declined, suggesting a progressive dilution of 
the pool of the unemployed with respect to personal pathologies. 
The relative risk for para suicide of being unemployed varies 
according to how dominant unemployment is in various ... 
subgroups Psychologically, hopelessness rather than 
depression per se seems to be the important discriminator. This 
finding has led to a more general theory concerning the role of 
hopelessness and depression in parasuicide. 
The last two sentences relate the work on unemployment back to the Unit's 
central concerns (which lie elsewhere)28. This synopsis also demonstrates the 
ways in which the research could be presented as "about" personal 
psychological tendencies in unemployed people, an interpretation which was 
later to prove the "undoing" of attempts to present the effect of unemployment 
on self-destructive behaviour as a "public health problem". 
This section has described the origins and design of the three studies 
which provided the most important data used in the rest of the debate. It has 
been shown that adoption of "the health of the unemployed" as a social 
problem worthy of research was a move which emerged out of the research 
teams' previous participation in debates on quite different types of 
social/medical "problems". This move was encouraged by the senior 
researchers' perceptions of the need for the work of their "laboratories" to 
appear "policy-relevant" and "service oriented" in the light of the extension of 
the Rothschild principles into medical and social research, combined with 
28 For recent examples see Ingham et. al. 1986, 1987. 
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restrictions on funding which made the "normal" types of scientific 
entrepreneurialism all the more important. 
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CHAPTER 6 
STAGE THREE (A): EVIDENCE AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
6.1 Academics and policymakers 
The unemployment and health debate can now be said to have entered the 
third stage of a "social-problem process" as seen by Manning and Downs. This 
chapter will therefore begin by setting the stage for an attempt to break out of 
the "loop" described in chapter 5, and then show how entrepreneurial activity 
by officials failed to accomplish this, and how similar activity by the pressure 
group forced the issue slightly more successfully. In this stage, what is 
important is not the development of new knowledge claims, but the promotion 
of value claims more or less regardless of the state of the academic debate, as 
reflected in the decision to emphasise "policy" rather than "research" in the 
major event of the year in the unemployment and health debate. 
6.1.1 "Mere associations" 
During the summer of 1982, one paper appeared putting the other side of 
the story: Jon Stern's "Does Unemployment Really Kill?" in New SOCiety, was 
published, coincidentally, it seems, the day after the OPCS Longitudinal Study, 
10 June (p 421-422). Stern noted (correctly) that up to that time, debates had 
centered around Brenner's work. He posed the question of why the relationship 
between unemployment and mortality should be the major issue, and 
concluded that apart from the obvius headline-worthiness of "Death ... ", the 
finding of high mortality rates in groups of people, whether socially or 
geographically defined, with high unemployment rates, is so consistent. 
However, "the statistical association" he insisted, "demonstrates nothing at all 
about cause". What if the real problem was that the unemployed "are far more 
likely to live in depressed areas, to have low incomes, and to live in bad 
housing conditions when they ARE in work?" He succinctly summarizes the 
"ceteris paribus" question: Given that "a lot of unemployment is concentrated 
among groups who have high mortality rates anyway, one must also allow for 
ill-health -- physical or mental causing unemployment and/or causing 
people to remain unemployed for long periods." The reason Brenner's 
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time-series had obtained results strongly suggesting a causal relationship 
between unemployment rates and mortality rates for the period 1926-76 was 
the massive social change which occurred roughly in the middle of this period 
which included the introduction of the Welfare State in Britain. Stern 
enumerates specifically the improvement in working class diet and medical 
technology (though not Beveridge's aim of "full" employment). He concludes, 
however, with a personal opinion that unemployment "does have some effect 
on health" though this effect has not yet been satisfactorily demonstrated. 
At the end of October, two papers were published which aimed to give an 
overview of the whole debate, from two rather different perspectives. One was 
published in the Times Health Supplement under the major heading "Out of 
Work, Out of Sorts?" (29 October 1982), subheaded "Where are today's pioneers 
of public health?" The double page spread included two articles by 
Scott-Samuel and one by Stephen Farrow (the organiser of the Cardiff 
Conference). There are two interesting aspects to Scott-Samuel's contribution. 
On the "academic" side, he admits that Brenner's work has not been able to 
demonstrate causation (as opposed to "mere association"). On the 
"professional" side, Scott-Samuel draws a blueprint for how unemployment can 
be defined as the sort of social problem to which Manifesto community 
medicine may offer itself as the answer: 
I have attempted to provide a model for health and local 
authorities (ideally via their joint consultative committees) to 
address locally the health problems created by unemployment" 
The idea of joint action by health and local authorities is, of course, an appeal 
to the pre-1974 Public Health role. This comes out even more strongly in the 
piece by Steven Farrow: 
The first MOH in Glasgow ... was in fact dismissed for making too 
much fuss about housing. If one looks at the modern equivalent, 
the district medical officer, it is difficult to uncover the same 
level of concern for the health of the community and passionate 
desire to alter the system. 
The second "overview" paper to appear in October 1982 was "The social 
consequences of unemployment" by Catherine Hakim, a principal Research 
Officer at the Department of Employment. (She had previously worked at OPCS, 
at the same time as Fox, who, it will be remembered (see section 5.2.2.) had 
previously worked at the HSE, a part of the Department of Employment. So, in a 
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sense, Fox and Hakim "crossed over", in organisational terms.} 
She comments that: 
the very high and rlsmg levels of unemployment currently 
experienced appear to have been absorbed without widespread 
breakdown of the social and political orders, although it no doubt 
contributed to the riots of Brixton and Toxteth in 1981. 
One reason, she suggests, is that unemployment, despite the increasing level, 
is still highly concentrated amongst certain social groups, industries and 
regions. In other words, 
Labour market segmentation means that unemployment is 
concentrated in the secondary labour market ... there is extensive 
evidence, ... that a small minority of the labour force accounts for 
the major part of the total volume of unemployment over a 
period of years. 
Hakim was not the first to raise these questions. For example, Jon Stern's 
paper "Who bears the burden of unemployment?" had been published in 1979. 
What Hakim does do for the first time is to juxtapose (if not exactly relate 
systematically) the issues of the unequal social distribution of unemployment 
and the health of the unemployed. But Hakim has a more detailed grasp than 
any of the epidemiologists of the distribution question, the income replacement 
question (many people becoming unemployed in the present recession have 
not enough contributions in the previous relevant year to entitle them to 
unemployment benefit at all, but must rely on Supplementary Benefit from the 
beginning of their spell), the standard of living of the unemployed, and the 
tendency of individual spells of unemployment to take place in a history of 
intermittent work. 
Her review also throws some light on the differences between the 
perspectives of the medical statisticians/epidemiologists and the economists. 
This emerges from her comments on the significance of the use of "aggregate 
data". This type of study, such as Brenner's, carried out by economists and 
using econometric methods, cannot demonstrate causality, and is vulnerable to 
"ecological fallacy", she admits. However, their advantage is that they "Iend 
themselves more readily" than individual-level studies to processes of social 
accounting and cost-benefit analysis. It does not matter, from a policy point of 
view, she writes, whether a rise in crime accompanying rising unemployment is 
due to unemployed people themselves committing crimes. Only "targetted" 
policies need individual-level research. For example, youth employment policies 
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would be ineffective in preventing crime if it were the unemployed PARENTS 
who committed crimes. 
It might seem strange to a non-economist, or to any researcher not 
involved in cost-benefit or social accounting that a method which could not 
establish causality might EVER be preferred over one which could. But Hakim's 
paper demonstrates the ways in which the manner of their involvement in the 
policy process appeared to exclude certain forms of "understanding" (or 
"enrolment", see sections 1.6 and 2.2) between those participants in the debate 
who did work with concepts of unemployment patterns and the labour market 
(mostly economists) and the social and medical statisticians (even ll.ose who 
were also working for Government) from whose accounts of the health effects 
such terms were missing. Because aggregate time-series studies play a part in 
policy formulation, even critiques of Brenner by economists were followed by 
ALTERNATIVE aggregate time-series analyses (Such as those of Gravelle, 
Hutchinson and Stern, Forbes and Macgregor 1984, and Macavinchey 1984). 
There was no move to attempt to incorporate the concepts discussed in the 
TEXT of the economists' papers into the individual-level statistical work made 
possible by the LS data set. It is interesting to speculate whether Hakim could 
eventually have done this integrative task if unemployment and health had 
been more than one minor concern amongst many others for someone in her 
position. However, in mid-1987 Hakim was considering writing an update of 
the 1982 paper, subject to "time constraints".According to some accounts, there 
had been, in the mid-1970s, a closer collaboration between government 
researchers involved in health and demographic issues, and those involved in 
labour market issues, mediated by the relevance of the Decennial Supplements 
(carried out by OpeS) to the work of the Health and Safety Executive (located 
within the Department of Employment)29. This relationship had, it was felt 
"tended to lapse" during the 1980s. 
In an important passage of the paper which anticipates developments two 
to three years away, Hakim asks whether the rising prevalence of 
unemployment may be expected to "dilute" the (purported) ill-health of the 
group amongst which spells (particularly long term spells) seem to be 
29 One example of this was the Women in Employment Survey (Martin and Roberts 19801. 
commissioned by DE, carried out by opes, and co-authored by a member of each department. 
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concentrated. 
In practice the opposite trend is observed,... that a second 
process is clearly at work, with unemployment itself contributing 
to an increase in morbidity and, at the extreme, mortality. 
This finding is unreferenced, and was derived from as-yet unpublished 
results of the Longitudinal Study. She is also aware of the relevance of 
Townsend's work on the close relationship between poverty and instability of 
employment, so that "attempts to distinguish the effect ... may be primarily an 
academic exercise." The implication of rising unemployment, whatever the 
causal chain, she feels, is that there will be "increasing pressure on health 
services, and associated costs, in a period of, or in areas of, protracted high 
unemployment." 
At the end of November, a Marplan poll carried out for the Guardian 
showed that "a mood of fatalism" had settled over Britain, whereby seven out 
of ten voters thought unemployment the dominant political issue, but few 
thought there was any solution on offer by opposition political parties. Ten 
times as many people cited unemployment as "the main problem" as cited 
inflation, with law and order taking second place. This "mood of the country" 
may be considered one reason why the new research on unemployment and 
health had so little impact. Other reasons may have been that at this time it 
was not the policy of the MRC to encourage "information subsidy" by its staff 
(though by early 1986, under pressure of cuts in research council funding, it 
appointed a Press Officer), that the LS monograph was too long and 
complicated to be digestible by the media, and that no pressure group had, as 
yet, produced anything suitably pre-digested. Fox, and also Cook, were 
somewhat disappointed by the lack of impact of their work. They had, at that 
time, little idea of "information subsidy" or of how the media work, and rather 
expected journalists to contact them enthusiastically, having read the full 
academic paper or monograph. Only poor scientists, they felt, needed to 
engage in deliberate "soapbox" exercises. 
6.1.2 Policy and strategy 
From 1982 onwards, in terms of "public opinion", unemployment came to 
hold a somewhat paradoxical position. From available evidence, it seems that 
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unemployment was both acknowledged as the biggest "social problem" in 
British society, AND that it was decreasingly regarded as something which 
could strike at anyone. For the majority of people, therefore, to be worried 
about unemployment came to be seen as a disinterested moral concern rather 
than an immediate worry. These tendencies had been predicted by Daniel 
(1981) and by Hakim (as discussed in the last section), and were confirmed in a 
survey carried out in 1986 (Linton 1987). which showed wide contrast in the 
issues which respondents saw as "important to the nation as a whole" and 
"important to them as individuals". In terms of labour economics, these shifts in 
public attitude were well founded upon the tendency of the British labour 
market to become more segmented as unemployment stabilised at a higher 
level, after the rapid rise of 1981. In terms of debates on the effects of social 
conditions upon health, these social and economic trends could have prompted 
a turn away from the effects of unemployment per se, back towards the wider 
debate on social inequalities. Although it was never explicitly spoken of in this 
way by researchers, this is in fact what eventually happened. In many ways, the 
unemployment and health debate was only temporarily detached from the 
debate on health inequalities. 
In terms of the model of the social problem process proposed in Chapter 1, 
the issue was now caught in a "loop" -- arguments for and against an "effect" 
becoming increasingly academic and unrelated to plausible or seriously fought 
proposals for policy change. SCUF was perhaps somewhat demoralised by Jon 
Stern's address to their September 1981 meeting, which Trevor Davison 
remembered as "crushing". Nevertheless, Davison and Jennie Po pay had been 
working on an article for the Times Health Supplement with a community 
medicine academic of the "Manifesto" school, John Ashton. The group hoped to 
produce an "Action Pack", some speakers' notes, and to circulate a list of 
people willing to speak on the topic to all interested or potentially interested 
organisations. However, the first meeting of 1982, on 6 January, was only 
attended by 5 people, and by March of 1983 this group had stopped meeting 
altogether, for reasons which participants were not fully able to explain, but 
seem to have been dominated by pressure of work on Po pay and Davison, who 
both took up new posts during the period. 
Early in 1982, pressure groups were picking up some echoes of the debate 
going on inside the Health Departments as to whether or not further research 
was needed. On March 8th, SAPU researcher David Fryer told a meeting of the 
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UHSG that a review paper by Ken Mullen and Raymond IIlsley of the Medical 
Research Council's Medical Sociology Unit in Aberdeen was being circulated 
around academic departments "with an invitation to submit research projects to 
SSRC", although it had been decided by SSRC at council level not to go for a 
major initiative on unemployment and health. Most research councils have 
traditionally adopted a "re-active" mode of operation, whereby they respond to 
applications. But at this time SSRC was making a particular effort to "drum up" 
applications on specific topics, or utilising specific methods (for example, 
ethnomethodology). Ilisley may, in this case, have been circulating suggestions 
for research proposals on a number of topics as well as unemployment and 
health. In any event, the UHSG seem not to have taken any particular notice of 
this piece of information. 
In the summer attendance at UHSG meetings was falling off and discussion 
on the role of the group began to be felt necessary. The July meeting was the 
first one in which the possibility of publishing a pamphlet or series of 
pamphlets was discussed. Steve Watkins also raised the possibility of a North 
Western Unemployment Alliance. Having by now read Cook et. ai's paper and 
the relevant bits of the LS, he told the group that "the causal link between 
unemployment and health could be confidently upheld, " and felt it was 
"important that people should realise this, that DHSS and political interests [sic] 
... should appreciate that scientific evidence was now available to disprove the 
claims based on the inadequate and unscientific DHSS Cohort Study." 
It is notable that, despite passing references to invitations to tender for 
research funds extended by Raymond IIlsley, the UHSG shows, throughout the 
period from late 1981 to the end of 1982, no awareness of the most important 
behind the scenes activity going on at the Elephant and Castle. Had they 
operated in the way Whitely and Winyard (1983, 1984) describe other types of 
pressure groups, keeping in close touch with actual or potential sympathisers 
within relevant government departments, they could hardly have failed to 
become aware of developments. As it was, the DHSS, perhaps because of the 
role played by the Cohort Study in the controversy over Brenner's work, was 
seen as monolithic and hostile. Whiteley and Winyard have stressed the 
importance to the success of a pressure group of being able to "respond 
quickly and understand the [Whitehall] environment within which policy is 
made ... " (1987, p. 63). Heclo and Wildavsky have suggested that just being in 
London can be important for the effectiveness of a pressure group, and it must 
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be remembered that members of UHSG seldom came to London at this time (a 
fact that was even commented on by members of SCUF). In early 1981, 
Scott-Samuel had met Sir George Young's secretary at the Northern Regional 
CHCs meeting which both he and Young had addressed, and suggested that 
she write an article for Radical Community Medicine about research in the 
DHSS. This never came to fruition, however. The only regular contact the 
Study Group had with the the Elephant and Castle was to send a set of 
minutes to an official (John Middleton) each month, minutes which were on 
occasion carefully doctored to ensure that information judged sensitive would 
not be entrusted to a civil servant. 
What they might have discovered (and had in fact been mentioned to 
Scott-Samuel at the CHC meeting, without his realiSing its significance) was 
that a small policy unit called PSU (Policy Strategy Unit) had been set up within 
the DHSS in 1980, on the model of a mini-think-tank. Middleton was one 
member of this group. It existed from 1980 to 1984, and in a Minutes of 
Evidence to the Social Services Select Committee (SOCial Services Select 
Committee 1981, p.2) was described thus: 
the policy planning unit [of the Community Services Division of 
the DHSS] has been replaced by the policy strategy unit, headed 
by an assistant secretary and composed of 3 full-time prinCipals 
and 3 part-time profeSSional staff. It is charged to maintain an 
overview of policy work in all parts of the Department, preparing 
periodic review of policy initiatives and identifying all apparent 
gaps (particularly of a cross-sector character). It will also receive 
papers on all major policy reviews within or involving the 
Department, and is expected to comment from the angle of wider 
and future policy considerations. Additionally, the unit will carry 
out specific policy studies or reviews, mainly but not always 
short-term, ... 
The Policy Strategy Unit had presumably taken up the issue of 
unemployment and health precisely because it crossed departmental 
boundaries and required a wider perspective. Therefore it met Prince's criterion 
(see section 3.3), in that "the unit [and in this case perhaps ONLY the unit] can 
do it" (for a discussion of the history of policy planning units, see also Blume 
1987, p80-84). PSU closely matches Prince's account of an entrepreneurial 
policy or research group concerned with its own "organisational survival". It 
was described to me as "close to ministers.. a top-level special initiatives 
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unit, very small, full of high-flyers ... very high-profile in its time,,30. 
Jack Barnes, a member of PSU, was present at a meeting in Professor 
Walter Holland's Department of Community Medicine at St Thomas's Hospital 
Medical School on 14 October 1981 (also present were Alwyn Smith and 
Stephen Farrow). It had been called to see what light the combined forces of 
community medicine and epidemiology might be able to throw on the effect of 
unemployment on health. Much of the work of the St. Thomas' department is 
funded by the DHSS, which makes it possible that this meeting was also a PSU 
initiative. On 14 July 1982, a proposal was submitted to the Health Services 
Research Committee of the Scottish Home and Health Department by two 
health economists, Steve Engelman of Edinburgh (who had attended the 
meeting at St Thomas') and John Forbes of Glasgow, and from there passed on 
to the DHSS (see section 4.3.3). In accordance with his encouragement of 
research proposals on unemployment and health from methodologically 
sophisticated researchers, Raymond IlIsley had promised Forbes and Engelman 
that theirs would "go the rounds", and indeed it had. It ended up in a DHSS file 
as having been "deferred pending consideration of resources", with an attached 
proposal for a jOint initiative between the Health Departments, the Department 
of Employment and the research councils. 
In September 1982, DHSS officials involved in the work of the PSU 
submitted a proposal to Ministers encouraging further research. Officials came 
down on the side of a large-scale longitudinal study, of the type which 
academics had consistently advised. This preference was also supported on 
political grounds: senior administrators cautioned that anything less would be 
seen by MPs as a "low-key response". The Department of Employment was 
thought to be about to publish a report on "Social and other aspects (including 
health) of unemployment" which "was not likely to be reassuring". This could 
be a references to Hakim's review which was about to be published, or to the 
DE-funded work on "long Term Unemployment and Labour Markets" undertaken 
by the Policy Studies Institute (White 1983). Ministers were warned to expect 
fireworks in Parliament, and would "want to have a line agreed" on 
unemployment and health by the next session. The seriousness of the issue 
30 However, it must also be said that civil servants were critical of the factual accuracy of 
Prince's account of what went on during this period inside DHSS, and saw his book as more 
useful "theoretically" than as a practical guide to what "really happened" within the department. 
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seemed to justify a large, 3-year cohort study, despite the projected cost of 
£20,000 as "anything else would be hard to justify in the House". Other 
studies, smaller in scale, might be useful (these officials admitted) to "promote 
good practice" by health authorities, however, any discussions on job creation 
might risk "stepping on the toes of the Department of Employment or MSC", 
something to be strictly avoided. 
By early November of 1982, the PSU and the Chief Scientist's Office were 
already in the position of having to try and change the minds of the 
unsympathetic Geoffrey Finsberg and Kenneth Clark. "Crudely" one official later 
remarked, "The Minister didn't want to know." Kenneth Clark had been willing to 
admit, as he frequently did in public, that unemployment was bad for 
everything, health included. The answer was, therefore, to create more real 
jobs, which was what government policy had consistently attempted to do in 
any case. The civil servants protested that the Health and Personal Social 
Services side of DHSS had a duty to see whether there were measures it 
should taken to mitigate the effects of unemployment, and justified their 
persistent desire for research to proceed on these practical grounds. Different 
measures might be needed according to whether ill health was a cause or 
consequence of unemployment, and only the long-term study of the problem 
could answer that question. Their appeals were unsuccessful. 
On 17 January 1983, Mr. Ernie Ross, MP for Dundee (West), asked the 
Secretary of State for Scotland "what evidence he has that infant mortality 
rates amongst unemployed families are greater than amongst employed 
families", and "if the Secretary of State was sponsoring any research projects 
into the effects of unemployment upon health in Scotland" (Hansard 25 January 
WA col. 37) Under-Secretary of State for Scotland John Mackay replied "My 
department is not funding any research projects directly related to the effects 
of unemployment upon health in Scotland". On 25 January, Ross followed-up 
by demands that the Secretary of State for Scotland seek to fund research 
projects related to the effects of unemployment upon health in Scotland. 
(Hansard 25 January WA col 423). At this time, Under-Secretary of State 
Mackay responded "My Department has under consideration an application for 
funding of a research project related to unemployment and health." What may 
have happened here is that after the decision of November 1982 not to provide 
DHSS funds for a project based on Forbes and Engelman's proposal, the 
Scottish Home and Health Department gave some consideration to funding a 
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more limited project. No one I spoke to in Scotland in the spring and summer 
of 1983 mentioned any further applications subsequent to the rejection of 
Forbes and Engelman's. However after the decision of November 1982, DHSS 
funding looked extremely unlikely. Forbes remembers getting a letter finally 
turning down the proposal "sometime after the general election". In the event, 
Mackay's answer seems to have satisfied the Scottish MPs for the time being, 
as the Adjournment Debate on Unemployment in Scotland introduced by John 
Maxton on 8 February contains no references to health at all. 
None of this was reflected in the recorded discussion of the members of 
the Unemployment and Health Study Group, either at the end of 1982, 
throughout 1983, nor indeed as late as 1986.Steve Watkins commented that 
UHSG had not really been set up as a "pressure group" at all, but more as what 
its title implies -- a study group -- to support his own research, undertaken as 
part of his training in community medicine, and that of others such as Birt and 
Westcott. In 1982, he felt, looking back, the group's meetings had become 
"stereotyped meetings that had lost their point." It had kept going partly 
because there was a demand for information and speakers (as SCUF had also 
found), and because his own work and that of Westcott still needed a forum for 
discussion. The group's only new idea was on the "politics of unemployment", 
and Watkins worked some of this into the paper he gave to another WHO 
conference, "Health Policy Implications of Unemployment", held in Leeds in 
December of 198231 . Although the conference, and the papers presented there, 
had very little impact on the wider public debate and none whatever on the 
"scientific" debate, it began to turn the ideas of the Study Group away from 
research and towards "policy". The first result of this was the attempt to set up 
a North Western Unemployment Alliance (see section 6.1.2). 
6.2 Breaking the loop 
31 Proceedings of this conference have appeared as Westcott et al. (eds), 1985 
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6.2.1 Interests and alliances 
Early in 1983, Fox and Scott-Samuel entered into a discussion on the 
question of the fragmentation of the issue of health inequalities The occasion 
for this was provided by a series of three seminars on health inequalities in 
Europe, financed by the ESRC and the European Science Foundation. Fox, as 
the organiser, invited Scott-Samuel to participate (no other member of the 
British medical profession was invited). They were both disturbed by a recent 
paper by one of the government economists involved in the unemployment and 
health debate, which showed by means of a mathematical model that it was 
theoretically possible for most of the inequality in health between the social 
classes in Britain to be attributed to downward social mobility of those with 
adverse prior characteristics (Stern 1983). Both in tone and content, the 
communication between statistician and uManifestoU community physiCian 
carries striking echoes of Mackenzie's account of the way in which professional 
involvement in public health affected the development of intellectual currents 
within medical statistics in the early twentieth century. Genetic determinism 
(one sense in which uprior characteristics u could be read) would have left no 
space for a reformist practice of public health, as Major Greenwood had 
concluded (see Mackenzie 1981, p.l11), nor for a statistical practice oriented 
towards public health as its client profession. In his comments on Stern's 
paper, Fox was concerned that the explanation of inequalities as being due to 
selection and selection alone would be the most acceptable to government, as 
it would give inequality the appearance of being uone of the laws of nature and 
therefore beyond our control. U 
This may have been something of a misunderstanding on the part of those 
academics who were now beginning to form links with uManifestoU community 
medicine. Fox saw Stern as motivated by upolitical interestu. The last few 
paragraphs of the paper by Gravelle, Hutchinson and Stern, as well as the 
authors' interviews and other publications, imply that they, like the usocial 
statisticiansu, took a broadly reformist, "social engineering" approach to policy 
questions. It was no more in their interests than in those of uManifesto U 
community medicine to see ALL social problems as "naturalu. The differences 
lay rather in WHICH problems could be seen that way. Health economists had 
little interest in developing (or re-capturing) a more general political-advisory 
role, similar to that of the MOsH, centered around the physical or 
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socio-political "environment". Health (and other) economists were well 
entrenched within the existing structure of government departments (see 
section 3.2), nor was their role in any way threatened by the spectre of health 
service reorganisations32. As far as the role of economists who acted as 
advisers to the Health and Personal Social Services side of the DHSS was 
concerned, they could afford to accept that one of the things government 
should do is deal humanely with some sort of small "residuum" or "underclass", 
a phenomenon which both Stern's and Gravelle's published work seems to 
imply. If social class mortality differentials could be shown to have widened 
during the existence of the NHS, the economists may have felt, this "fact" could 
be used to play into the hands of those who wished to challenge the very 
concept of existing welfare measures such as a free health service, social 
security and so on33. Now, this DID threaten their role. The disagreement 
between the economists and Manifesto community medicine and its academic 
allies was frequently couched by participants themselves in terms of the 
political allegiances of their opponents. However, analysis of the progress of 
the debate over time seems to point to a greater influence of professional 
(including "personal advancement") rather than political factors. Positions 
adopted in relation to the "facts" seem to have been the result of different 
perceptions of potential tasks, alliances, and balances of forces amongst the 
entrepreneurial and innovative members of professional and disciplinary 
subgroups. But it should not be assumed by the coincidence of abstract ideas 
and professional interests that the relationship between the UHSG, particularly 
its "Manifesto" community physicians, and academic social scientists and 
statisticians were simple or straightforward. The correspondence between Fox 
and Scott-Samuel (which was extended into a working relationship that lasted 
throughout the present debate and into another) demonstrates ONE form of 
interaction between members of different subdisciplines and their professional 
"clients". 
Following the social mobility paper in February 1983, another paper by Jon 
Stern was published in Population Studies in March (Stern 1983), which was on 
32 The abolition of the Area tier of Health Authorities in England in 1982 had done away with 
some Community Physician posts, and the Griffiths proposals for General Managers threatened the 
positions of these "clinical managers" even more, see Ham 1986. 
33 For an explicit statement of this position see IIlsley 1987, IIlsley and Ie Grand 1986, Le Grand 
1987. 
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unemployment and health. The paper did little more than summarize his 
existing work available in the Lancet and in two Discussion Papers from the 
Centre for Labour Economics which had been available since late 1981. It 
contained some very technical discussion of the use of panel data, including 
that of the National Training Survey, on which Stern's ex-colleagues at CLE, 
Steve Nickell, Wiji Narendranathan, and David Metcalfe had been working. This 
longitudinal study of a large sample of 17707 men aged 25-65 in 1975-9 was 
interpreted by Stern as showing that experience of sickness before 1965 
increased the probability of both sickness AND unemployment after 1965. But a 
spell of unemployment before 1965 did not increase the probability of a spell 
of certified sickness after 1965. Unemployment between 1965 and 1975, 
however, did increase the probability of a long spell of sickness during the 
same period, and conversely. But the data do not allow a causal order to be 
established. Stern concluded that 
inequalities in mortality and other health indicators, and 
inequalities in the incidence of unemployment are jointly caused 
by wider inequalities of income and wealth, education, and 
inherited characteristics. If our concern is to improve the health 
of people with low incomes ... then the effect of unemployment 
on health is largely a red herring. 
Perhaps because it was essentially no more than a recapitulation, this paper 
seems to have been less quoted (formally and informally) in the subsequent 
debate than the "mobility" paper. 
In the April edition of the Journal of the Royal College of Physicians, a 
review paper by Steven Farrow provided an up to date statement of what the 
"state of the art" was thought to be in the debate. 
Unemployment [he states] presents a difficult problem for the 
researcher because of its interrelationship with other important 
social factors, including class income and housing. In addition, 
the so-called healthy worker effect has to be distinguished so 
that the specific effect of unemployment on health can be 
examined. 
Farrow is therefore the first academic to see the importance of the concept of 
a "healthy worker effect" as it was used in the work of the LS team (see 
section 5.2.2) to the unemployment and health debate, although he does not go 
into any more detail, and to most readers this may have meant very little as it 
stood. "Almost nothing" he complains, "is known about the community'S health 
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at a local level", and bemoans the lack of a clear role for community medicine. 
In a statement of the Manifesto position, (though Farrow never attended UHSG 
meetings and did not have regular contact with the community physician 
members of the group), he concludes: 
The evidence linking unemployment to health is circumstantial 
but strong. In these circumstances, medicine ... has a duty to 
speak out against· those policies that lead to increased 
unemployment. 
An example of a group altering its strategy to pursue a new set of alliances, 
and of the way in which this strategy affected the group's assessment of 
knowledge-claims, is given by the next phase of the UHSG's development. At 
its first meeting of 1983, congruent with the general tendency throughout the 
debate for labour movement organisations to be uninterested in "the health of 
the unemployed", it was reported that the initiative to set up a North-Western 
Alliance had met with a very disappointing response -- only two County 
Councils and a Single Trade Union had replied. The February date for the first 
meeting was postponed. So UHSG decided to take over the organisation of 
what was at first described as a "national research conference". This might 
seem at first to be a turn away from "politics" towards "science". But from the 
beginning, the purpose of this conference was ambiguous. Steve Watkins 
remembered it as having been projected as a "policy conference", following-on 
the WHO meeting in Leeds in December 1982. The minutes give a different 
picture. This ambiguity was to be reflected in the final outcome. The quality of 
the MRC-funded work published during 1982 was generally acknowledged by 
UHSG, but apart from Steve Platt, none of the authors had been invited to the 
Leeds WHO conference -- the "policy" theme having predominated. The 
Regional Heart Study researchers were committed to extreme caution, and Fox, 
at this time, was (at least publicly) far from convinced that the LS results were 
not due to prior selection of the unemployed by ill-health. 
At the 24 February meeting of UHSG, further discussion took place on the 
desirability of holding a conference, but no decision was taken as to whether it 
should be on "policy" or on "research". Members of the Study Group were 
usually prepared to be very bold in making claims about the "evidence" that 
unemployment caused ill health, but seem to have hesitated over the question 
of whether further discussion of "the evidence" could be done away with 
altogether. It seems that even by those sympathetically inclined, the debate on 
152 
whether or not unemployment could be regarded as "causing" ill-health was 
not at this time regarded as "settled". The appearance of new, post-Brenner 
British research using less contentious methods had not made that much 
difference to the position which any person or group wishing to be seen as 
"fair" and "reasoned", whatever their sympathies, could take. 
Of course, while all this was going on, a general election campaign was 
being waged. The involvement of various members of the Study Group in the 
Labour party has been discussed in section 4.1.3. There is no suggestion, either 
in UHSG minutes of in interview accounts of what was happening to the group 
at this time, that the election affected the decisions it took or the plans it 
made. However, the presence of only three people at the meeting on 21 April 
may have been partly due to members' other political commitments. At this 
meeting the idea of a North-Western Unemployment Alliance was decisively 
dropped. Most time seems to have been devoted to discussion of the 
proposed conference, or as it now comes to be called, Workshop. It was 
decided to hold it in Leeds in late November, and to deal solely with policy. 
Afterwards, a smaller g roup of 12-15 people could stay overnight at the 
Nuffield Centre for Health Service Studies and write a document which the 
Centre had agreed to produce as an Occasional Paper. Research papers, were 
to be solicited, but only as "background". By 6 July, the Study Group had 
decided (at a meeting of still only three people) that precirculated research 
papers would only prove "diversionary". So brief "summary papers" were to be 
requested, from Watkins on physical health, Platt on suicide and para suicide, 
and Prof Peter Warr of SAPU on general mental health effects. 
6.2.2 "Making the papers" 
Some of the ambivalence of the atmosphere in which the debate now 
proceded, and the sheer contingency of some of the processes involved, may 
be seen by close examination of the way in which unemployment and 
parasuicide made its next major appearance in the media. On 13 March, Steve 
Platt gave a talk on youth and drugs at Moray House College of Education in 
Edinburgh. A Scotsman reporter, Bryan Christie "covered" the event as part of 
his routine work -- tasks are allocated to reporters at the beginning of a 
working shift, and this one happened to fall to him. He reported it on 14 March, 
but this was not the end of the matter. As it happened, Christie had ambitions 
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to be a feature writer, was interested in health issues, and the Scotsman had 
no-one else writing on health at this time. As Christie described events: 
It was just an off chance. He [Platt] said he hadn't finished the 
research yet, so I left it for a while, and then phoned him and 
said how's it going? He said he was writing it up so I left it a few 
more weeks. I was looking for things to write features about .... 
The trouble is, if you follow up something like this, you still have 
to do all the other stuff as well, all the routine reporting. 
Nevertheless, Steve Platt felt that Christie dealt with the issue (in a feature 
which appeared on 2 August 1983) with great care and accuracy. The article 
acknowledges that a "significant relationship" does not amount to a "causal 
link". However, Christie quotes Platt: 
''The trouble with this area of research is that it is very 
contentious and the academic community have in the past sat on 
the fence. They have felt for too long that they have to dot the 
i's and cross the t's but it can now be said that the risks 
associated with long-term unemployment are just not 
acceptable." 
Combining the requirements of "journalist" with those of "science writer", 
Christie added other items to his summary of the work on parasuicide: a 
"human-interest story" about two young men who suffocated themselves, 
leaving a note saying they had "nothing to live for"; parliamentary questions, 
including the one from Frank Allaun, and Ministerial denials. 
In common with other Scottish journalists whom I interviewed, Christie 
bemoaned the way in which the organisation of work and limitation of 
resources on a small newspaper made it difficult to deal with issues in depth. 
As he put it: 
I can understand that the journalistic profession is not renowned 
for treating things like this with care. It is very easy to read the 
figures wrong. If you're handed something on a piece of paper at 
five thirty and told you've got half an hour to work on it, 
mistakes do happen. 
and his colleague on The Scotsman, Robbie Dinwoodie, remarked: 
You have to understand ... there are only nine reporters on The 
Scotsman. So ... journalism becomes a reactive business. If 
someone doesn't come to tell you about something [that 
happens in a scientific debate], you'll never find out about it. It's 
fire-brigade journalism. 
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To add to the difficulties, Christie had other strong interests apart from health 
at this time, for example, in defence issues. Sarah Nelson, who also wrote 
some features on health and medicine, was soon offered (and accepted) the 
specialised post of education correspondent, a particularly important topic in 
Scotland. Not only for unemployment and health, but for any technically 
complicated issue, lack of a specialist writer was a serious problem. In the case 
of "The Scotsman", quality did not suffer, but quantity may have. 
Christie concluded his 2 August feature in eloquent Calvinist vein: 
Work, it has been said, is nature's physician .. , 
He admitted later, however, that there had been no letters to the newspaper 
following his feature, and that he had been "surprised at how quickly it went 
flat". By the time Steve Platt felt ready to discuss his work, Parliament had 
gone into recess, so that it had been 
hard to find people to chase up for comments on it. It was hard 
enough work trying to make sure I got all the figures right.. I 
phoned the Press Office at the SHHD and tried to arrange a 
meeting with MacKay. Of course he wasn't going to have any of 
that. 
The World at One did follow up the article, but no other Scottish newspaper 
did, not even the Edinburgh Evening News, which shares premises with The 
Scotsman and has a good local reputation for covering medicine and health. On 
4 August the Daily Telegraph carried a very small piece and the Morning Star 
gave the story rather more space ("Joblessness Kills, Shock Probe Reveals"). 
At around the same time, the regular bulletin reporting the doings of MRC 
researchers, "MRC News" carried a long discussion of Platt's work, and this was 
reported in the Daily Star as: 
Doctors are shocked by a huge increase in suicide attempts by 
the unemployed ... 
the Medical Research Council says there is "cause for alarm" 
This somewhat sensational-sounding phrase, "cause for alarm" is in fact a 
direct quote from MRC Bulletin No 20. It provides an example of the fine line to 
be trodden by the scientific entrepreneur, between keeping a social problem 
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sufficiently in the limelight and not giving grist to the mill of sensationalism. 
The report in MRC News cautions that the existence of the association 
demonstrated by Platt's work does not "constitute proof of a causal link," and 
then goes on to state that "a causal explanation appears more likely". 
In November of 1983 Steve Platt's research on unemployment and 
parasuicide was published in the Unemployment Unit Bulletin. Like the report of 
his work in "MRC News", this paper stresses the "public health" aspect of the 
problem: 
Clearly, far more research remains to be carried out in this area. 
It should have high priority... because of its practical, public 
health implications. If trends in long-term unemployment are 
indeed crucial for predicting the future course of parasuicide, 
then there is grave cause for alarm ... 
This was the "social problem claim", and was followed by the "factual claim" 
that: 
Whatever the nature of the association between unemployment 
and parasuicide, it has been shown that [the] long-term jobless 
currently run more than 18 times the risk of parasuicide of the 
employed. 
and finally, the proposed solution: 
This .. risk may be reduced to some extent by allocating more 
resources to help alleviate the economic, psychological and 
social impact of prolonged joblessness ... But ... these measures 
do not address the fundamental underlying problem ... Urgent 
government action is required to reduce the level of 
unemployment (Unemployment Unit Bulletin, November 1983, no 
10 p 4-5) 
Surprisingly, the Scotsman carried no report of this publication. The 
Unemployment Unit was experienced in the art of information subsidy as 
practised in England, and had provided copies of the Unemployment Unit 
Bulletin to all national newspapers' head offices. Many did carry the story. The 
editor of The Scotsman decided not to carry another article as it was too soon 
after the August one. Bryan Christie was on holiday. When he returned he was 
dismayed at his editor's decision. To add insult to injury, the Glasgow Herald 
HAD covered the story. As he put it: 
Not many people read both the Glasgow Herald and the 
Scotsman, except for journalists, that is! But if they had, it would 
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have looked as if the Herald had got a good story and we had 
missed it altogether. At the very least, we could have pointed out 
that we covered it months ago ... We could have pointed out 
that we had beaten the Glasgow Herald. 
In fact, the article received wider coverage in English newspapers than in 
Scottish ones, which puzzled Steve Platt. This was a result of the 
Unemployment Unit's unfamiliarity with the ways in which the media deal with 
Scottish issues. The Daily Mail contacted Platt from London after reading the 
story in the Glasgow Herald. Why was this necessary when copies of the 
Bulletin had been sent to the Mail's London HO? The right thing to have done, 
explained Bryan Christie, was to have sent it to the Mail's Scottish HO. 
Otherwise, if they decided it was not a "British" issue, London would not bother 
to notify the Mail's Scottish offices in Glasgow. If one had wanted to get 
coverage in the Scottish Daily Express, just to complicate matters further, the 
best thing would be to send press notices to the Express's Manchester offices, 
where their Scottish News Desk is located. "It all depends," he pointed out, 
"what you men by a national newspaper." 
This account of how one piece of research "made the papers" shows the 
operation of an "accident-prone process" by which scientific "findings" reach 
the wider public (as shown in section 4.1.2. for World in Action's coverage of 
Brenner's claims). It also provides an example of how a researcher's 
participation in one social-problem process (on drugs) can lead to the adoption 
of an "expert" role in quite a different one. This account demonstrates the role 
of "chance" in giving public importance to a researcher's work. But it also 
shows the part played by social-problem claims-making in the cycles of 
credibility of both academics and journalists. In the collaboration between Platt 
and Christie, appears a type of symbiosis similar to that between officials and 
activists discussed by Richardson and Jordan (1979, see section 1.2). Like the 
official, the journalist is only "interested" in a piece of research as it relates to 
one topic on a long list s/he has to deal with. But, like the pressure-group 
member, the researcher has specialist knowledge which may benefit the 
journalist in two ways: both by helping him or her to write something "new" 
and "interesting", and by subsidizing complex information, effecitvely reducing 
the amount of time needed to produce an article on a difficult or controversial 
topic. 
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6.2.3 Research to policy: an attempted transition. 
The fairly extensive media coverage of Steve Platt's paper set an 
appropriate background for the forthcoming Policy Workshop of the UHSG, 
which took place on the 24th of the same month. At this point in the 
unemployment and health Debate, "central" non-academic participants saw this 
conference as the most important event of 1983. 
The first part of the day was taken up with an uneasy discussion which 
hovered constantly on the brink of the discouraged re-evaluation of "research". 
Steve Watkins, author of a position-paper circulated prior to the conference 
which made very sweeping claims in favour of a "pro-Brenner" position, at one 
point admitted that "It is still not clear just what it is that is important for 
health about work." And Scott-Samuel reminded the meeting that "A minister in 
the House of Commons can get up and say there are no proven links. They are 
still able to do this, though I don't know how they can after the evidence of 
the Longitudinal Study". 
Composition of the Leeds Policy Seminar 
"Activists" (local councillors, 
trade unionists, local 
action groups 12 
"Academics" 17 
of which: Economists 2 
Psychologists 4 
Sociologists 11 









The scope of possible alliances for Manifesto community medicine is visible 
here: academics from various disciplines, health educators, and "activists" of 
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various kinds, all groups which were also represented by papers published in 
the "official" journal Community Medicine as well as its "Radical" doppleganger. 
Some examples can be taken from the day's field notes to try and illustrate the 
different orientations of these participants. For example, as one would expect, 
community physicians were concerned about health planning and what the 
relationship between unemployment and health meant for that aspect of their 
function, but they were also concerned with their relationship to local 
authorities and to national policy makers: 
What are our policy objectives? My own are to formulate policy 
to improve health. The objective is not to discuss ways of finding 
more jobs. 
If we are thinking about treatment, then we need a medical 
model of research. It will need to have credibility with doctors. If 
you are looking to aim at politicians, other models might be 
more appropriate. Or if you are aiming at encouraging community 
action, you could use models which look at the impact of 
unemployment on whole communities. 
One community physician offered an interesting insight into the ways in which 
scientists "need" there to be different kinds of "problems", in addition to those 
to which practitioners and planners offer THEIR skills as the "answer": 
Those involved in research find it difficult to at the same time be 
questioning about the limits of the state of knowledge and also 
to saY,in a policy-making sense, 'we can regard this as fact'. 
Here is evident the irony involved in the scientists' need to promote a certain 
degree of "uncertainty", in the absence of which the importance of their own 
role diminishes 34. Yet at the same time, researchers must produce enough 
"facts" to maintain the legitimacy of their claims both to technical effectiveness 
and to the attention of both public and policy makers (for a recent discussion 
of this dilemma see Jasanoff 1987). 
Academic social scientists (leaving aside psychologists for the moment), did 
not confine themselves to research and its application, but also made more 
openly political contributions. However, in general their interventions in the 
discussion reflected concerns with their relationship to the state: 
It is increasingly obvious to me that the response of the state is 
... always an attempt to refute these studies [such as Brenner and 
-- ------
34 For discussion of this point within one perspective of SSK, see Whitley (1982). 
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the LS]. That's the way it was in the 1930s and that's the way it 
is now. 
and the media: 
Part of the problem is in the timidity of researchers about their 
own results ... We cannot PROVE the connection in the same way 
as a randomized controlled trial can. You have to educate 
people in the media that this kind of research is not 'inferior' to 
natural-scientific research ... 
and with making sure that their own special topic was not left out of the 
formulation of the "social problem": 
The research we have is sexist, racist and individualist, let's not 
forget that. There is also a total neglect of poverty. 
Community workers and "activists"(delegates from Labour Parties, Trade Union 
research departments, Action Groups, etc) debated the relative merits of 
attempting to change national macro-economic policy versus those of 
encouraging local initiatives, though on the whole these participants were not 
particularly vocal,and the solution to the central-local conflict was offered by 
an academic who was also involved in political initiatives at both levels: 
there seem to be two perspectives among health workers: The 
first is, we don't want to get involved in unemployment ... it's too 
political" Others take the attitude that the response is 
ameliorative ,not political enough. One way to meet these 
objections is not to separate prevention and modification of 
effects. If people get involved in preventive work, it may help to 
transform their attitude to unemployment on the wider political 
level. 
There were two groups who contributed fairly extensively to the general 
debate in this meeting, the psychologists and what I will call the "futurologists", 
that is, economists and other social scientists engaged in the study of 
"long-range" economic and scientific policy and planning. One of the latter, 
from the Institute of Economics and Statistics at Oxford University, took a 
pessimistic view: 
My research is on what employment will look like in the 1990s .... 
The trends in that period [since 1930] are towards increasing 
output at the expense of shedding labour ... The net increase in 
jobs ... was in the service sector ... But can service industries 
continue to grow in the next thirty year period? 
Even in the case of some service industries such as banking, he pointed 
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out, new technology was now cutting jobs. Another "futurologist", Ian Miles of 
Sussex University's Science Policy Research Unit, felt that as a result, efforts 
should be turned towards finding other ways of providing the health-protective 
features of work: 
We need to talk about restructuring society so as to provide 
more opportunities for people to exercise control over their 
everyday lives, to become involved in social networks, and 
constructive activities. 
The contribution of the psychologists was perhaps most sobering of all. 
They accepted the prediction of the "futurologists" and saw the task of local 
educators and service providers to be one of countering the "work ethic". Steve 
McKenna of SAPU pointed out that 20% of people in their studies experienced 
improvements in physical health after redundancies or during periods of lay-off 
from heavy jobs such as shipbuilding. He also felt that "The will to work is 
diminishing. We should think about how we are training school kids to demand 
work. We're turning out people with a high employment commitment which 
cannot be satisfied." And clinical psychologist Graham Stokes asked 
When we talk about local campaigns, what is our focus? Should 
we not acknowledge that technology is changing and a lot of 
people will never get paid employment again? Even if we got 
back to the level of production of the 1970s, in the West 
Midlands, the effect on employment would be minimal, because 
of changes in technology and higher productivity 
This account of the meeting which concluded the activity around 
unemployment and health in 1983 shows the ways in which the composition of 
groups of discussants profoundly affected perceptions of the very nature of the 
the "social problem". Professional and institutional affiliations not only 
influenced what was regarded as "fact", or as a "researchable question", but 
also the ways in which these were, in turn, related to policy prescriptions. 
Because of the contingencies of social and professional network organisation, 
the Leeds meeting, which was explicitly about "policy", did not have access to 
some of the unpublished and proposed research which might have been most 
relevant to the type of local, grass-roots strategies which many participants 
wished to discuss (much of which was first publicly discussed at the BSA 
Annual Conference in the spring of 1984, but which must have been "available 
knowledge" on the industrial sociology networks by this time, for examples see 
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Roberts et. al eds. 1985, Wood et. al eds 1987) By accepting as real a series of 
research findings based on a black-box model of "cause=unemployment" 
leading somehow to "effect=ill health", participants in the Leeds seminar of 
November 1983 were unable to deal with questions of local labour market 
change, as only national and regional trends were familiar to the futurologists. 
Westcott's research on Scunthorpe could have provided such information. But 
her perspective, derived from medical and macro-economic models, had not 
sensitised her to look for it. At the Leeds meeting, it fell to the psychologists 
to step in to the space provided by the black-boxing of the intervening 
processes linking economic change to health status. The product of this 
meeting was the document "Unemployment, Health and Social Policy", the 
impact of which is further discussed in sections 7.3 and 8.1.1. 
This chapter has given an account of the "third stage" of the 
social-problem process in which those who made the original claims that the 
health of the unemployed was a "problem", and one to which their skills could 
be seen as "the answer", rejected the official response. After some hesitation 
and false starts, this rejection took the form of a strengthening and extension 
of the "Manifesto" community medicine group's alliances, not with labour 
movement organisations or political parties, but with other subprofessional 
groups who also had an "interest" in claiming an expert role. By the time of 
the Leeds conference, alliances between "Manifesto" community medicine and 
academic disciplines were still at a preliminary stage, which was reflected in 
the emphasis placed on "policy" and the reluctance to discuss "research". In the 
next chapter, the consequences of a strengthening of this latter alliance, that 
between community physicians and academics in medical statistics and 
sociology, will be traced. A revival of the "moral" claims was followed by a 
strong revival of "knowledge" claims as well. 
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CHAPTER 7 
STAGE THREE (B): REASSERTION OF 
KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS 
7.1 January 1984: The status of the debate. 
The last chapter set out the ways in which the pressure group, and some 
other participants, decided to take the initiative regardless of whether or not 
the academic debate need be regarded as "settled". This chapter will describe 
new initatives by "experts". At the end of the chapter, we will see how these 
two trends came together and produced a moderate political impact. 
1984 began with the swansong of the Unit for the Study of Health Policy. 
Its original Kings Fund money had run from 1975-1980, and was then replaced 
by a grant from the Health Education Council, and others for specific projects 
from the Leverhume Foundation (1980-1983) and the Rowntree Trust 
(1981-March 1984). By the end of 1983, most USHP staff were looking for or 
had found other jobs. A final conference was planned for 6 January 1984, which 
was well attended (both in terms of numbers and the prestige of participants), 
and addressed by, amongst others, Dr Leo Kaprio of the WHO, and Christopher 
Huhne, Economics correspondent of The Guardian. All papers were invited. 
Chris Birt (a member of the UHSG) gave one billed as "Unemployment and 
Health" which in fact dealt more with the Black Report. The conference was 
attended by many representatives of Community Medicine, the groups oganised 
around such ideas as "Community Development in health", and "Green 
economics". Less well represented were medical sociology or social policy. 
On 19 January, New Society feature writer Martyn Harris summed up the 
"state of the art" in unemployment and health research as far as non-expert 
but informed opinion may have seen it at this time (Harris 1984). Harris 
reminds his readers that while the average two-child family spent }124.75 per 
week excluding housing costs in 1981, the current (1983) rate of Supplementary 
Benefit for such a family was }.)9.20 per week, around 40% of the amount 
SPENT (not EARNED) by a family with an employed breadwinner. Under a 
subheading "The problem of proof" he deals with the debate on health. Work by 
Len Fagin and Dennis Marsden is described as not "particularly rigorous or 
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exhaustive". He regards Brenner's work as "The most powerful argument for a 
causal link between unemployment and health" and reports that although 
Brenner's results "not surprisingly ... have been savagely attacked" nevertheless 
"they appear to be standing up fairly welL with many social scientists paying 
respectful attention to his findings, if only because they don't understand how 
he obtained them." On mental health, Harris reports, there is agreement, except 
for suicide and attempted suicide, and here he quotes Steve Platt's work, which 
demonstrates Platt and the Unemployment Unit's success in producing the 
November 1983 information subsidy. Although he either has not read or has 
not understood the LS and BRHS papers, Harris HAS read Catherine Hakim's 
paper in the Journal of Social Policy. What he picks up from this paper is 
Hakim's comment on the relative "lack of interest" in unemployment and health 
in comparison to the 1930s. In his final paragraph he asks: 
Is it that the social science establisment has actually collapsed 
under the steady sniping from the Keith Joseph quarter and lacks 
the self-confidence to tackle the major social issue of the day? ... 
It is a bit difficult to argue for the defence of benefits and 
services if you can't even establish the true COSTS of 
unemployment to the hatchet men in Whitehall. 
In this final paragraph, Harris foreshadows the way in which the media, at 
least, will now begin to deal with the unemployment and health issue. No 
longer as a "social problem" in its own right, but as JUST ONE indicator of two 
other "social problems", now more interesting and relevant to the media, and, 
importantly, shared by media workers, government scientific advisers, and other 
academics and scientists. One of these new "problems" was the decline in the 
volume, availability and intelligibility of officially produced and available 
information on "social indicators". This was not only a problem for journalists, 
(who, as has been explained in Chapter 1, need information not just in ANY 
form, but preferably in a "subsidized" form), but also for research and policy 
units WITHIN government departments, in the wake of the Rayner reviews and 
changes in the organisation and funding of official surveys35 
The second "problem" was the "decline in British science". For participants 
in the unemployment and health debate, this came closest to home in the form 
35 The numbers in the Government Statistical Service had been reduced from 263 in May 1979 to 
193 in March 1984, see Boreham (1984). 
164 
of the review of the working of the Social Science Research Council initiated 
by Sir Keith Joseph, as reflected in the above quote from Martyn Harris' article. 
The review was widely seen as a prelude to cuts in funding for social science. 
In the event, the recommendations of Lord Rothschild's report (Rothschild 1982) 
were far more benign (Posner 1982), although in its aftermath the Council lost 
the word "science" from its name36. A new alliance then began to take shape, 
between officials and government researchers on the one hand, and journalists 
on the "quality" papers on the other. Academic advisers to government as well 
as civil servants appear to have been increasingly willing to talk off the record 
to journalists. In early 1986 a senior academic gave the opinion that: 
the really interesting story [concerning unemployment and health 
in Britain] is why the research in Britain IS so thin ... [but] this 
could not be investigated by an academic, but would have to be 
left to investigative journalism. If you tell a journalist something, 
the more confidential you say it is, the more certain he is to 
print it.... But as an academic, you [the interviewer] cannot betray 
those confidences. After all, these people [academics] have to go 
on trying to get funded by this blessed government. It is a 
question of the best being the enemy of the good. 
In this quote, the speaker also gives his perception of how the debate 
might have been affected by "political context", in that he clearly believes 
research funds would have been easier to come by under a government of a 
different complexion. It was in this context that the results of the analyzing 
the 10-year mortality data from the OPCS Longitudinal Study first became 
available, and began to be presented as fresh support for the claims that 
"unemployment harms health". 
7.2 Point of Passage 
The first full account of the ten-year follow-up results of the Longitudinal 
Study were given in a talk by David Jones, a senior research fellow working 
with John Fox at the Social Statistics Research Unit at City University, to a 
conference of the Institute of Staticians at Kent University in July 1984. One 
36 The preservation of funding for the social sciences by way of increasing the emphasis 
symbolically laid upon economics would constitute a topic for a separate research project in the 
sociology of knowledge. see Flather (1987), which cannot be dealt with here. However. the 
symbolic change is altogether consistent with the argument of the present study. 
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half day of the conference was devoted to the topic of unemployment and 
health. The rest of the conference, on "health statistics" was, however, 
dominated by topics of interest either to planners or drug companies. Perhaps 
as a result of this, the session on unemployment was poorly attended. 
Derek Cook gave the first paper, in effect repeating most of the material in 
a review paper which he and Shaper had written for an edited collection of 
"Recent Advances in Occupational Health" (Cook 1985, Cook and Shaper 1985). 
For the purposes of this public presentation, however, he emphasised the 
dramatic nature of the public debate, starting with a slide which showed a 
collage of headlines representing both "sides" of the debate: "Death on the 
Dole", "A scandal on the conscience of Margaret Thatcher", "Dole is Like a 
Holiday, Says Economist". He also reminded his audience that 
The funding of research is a political matter. It is futile to pretend 
that we can deal with such a topic in a purely objective way. 
In this and other ways, the tone of this paper was very different from that of 
the review. Cook laid more emphasis on the material on nutrition, taken from 
papers by Cole, Donnet and Stanfield (published in 1983) and by Doyle and 
co-workers (published in 1982). Cole et. al. had studied the birthweight and 
growth of babies in two areas of Glasgow, one prosperous, the other deprived. 
They had demonstrated lower birthweight in babies whose fathers were 
unemployed. Doyle et. al had studied the diets of pregnant women in two 
similarly contrasting areas of London. Using the painstaking "one-week 
weighed survey" method, they found that pregnant women in the poorer area 
were consuming under 1700 calories per day on average, and that these diets 
were particularly lacking in essential fatty acids necessary for cell-growth, and 
thus particularly important in pregnancy. That neither of these studies had 
made any great impact on the public debate was regarded as justified by Cook, 
in the light of their small size and the fact that they had not been designed to 
investigate unemployment. 
He concluded: 
as in the 1930s, national indicators are reassuring, but local 
studies may tell a different story. I say "may", because I don't 
think the studies are good enough at present. 
However, Cook made no concessions to Brenner, devoting the last section of 
his talk to an exposition of Gravelle, Stern and Hutchinson'S critique ("On the 
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whole, I feel they did succeed in taking his paper apart" ... ). In general, he felt, 
longitudinal aggregate studies of this nature could give us no more help in 
deciding such issues as whether unemployment affected health. 
The second speaker, Paul Jackson, concentrated on the psychological 
effects of unemployment, and will therefore not be dealt with at length here. 
He did, however, feel that at this time there WAS "more of a consensus on the 
CONSEQUENCES of unemployment". 
Although the first author of Working Paper No. 18 from the City University's 
Social Statistics Research Unit (SSRU), and of all subsequent papers on 
unemployment and health was Kath Moser, a Research Fellow in the Unit, she 
disliked giving papers publicly, and as a result David Jones was allocated this 
task. The way in which his talk was constructed was typical of LS "style". He 
began by setting out three alternative hypotheses about the relationship 
between unemployment and health: 
1. that unemployment has an adverse effect on health 
U ----l- H 
2. that unhealthy people are either 
a. more likely to be unemployed or 
b. at a higher risk of death [so that it is their ill health which "causes" 




3. That there are OTHER factors associated with both unemployment and an 
increased risk of mortality (,'These might be social disadvantage" he 





(Where: U= unemployment and M= mortality) 
He gave the basic numbers on which the findings are based, and here it is 
notable that the numbers of men "seeking work" in the week before Census 
Night 1971 who died between 1971 and 1981 were only 328. 
At risk 1971 Died 1971-81 
All men 250,588 29,923 
15-65 161,699 8,061 
seeking work 5,861 328 
(i.e., those "seeking work" were approximately 
12% more likely to die in the following ten year 
period than all men in the sample aged 15-65) 
The unemployment rate was 3.6% in 1971 




In longitudinal studies, death rates are not calculated in the "crude" manner 
used in the above table, but by a somewhat more complex method which 
makes use of the concept of "person-years at risk". Having carried out this 
correction, the Standardised Mortality Ratio for those seeking work in 1971 







Standardised Mortality Ratio by Age 












"It seems" Jones observed here "that the effect is greater in the young." He 
then presented the first of the arguments, that the mortality excess of 36% in 
the "unemployed" was due to their social class distribution: 
Social Class Distribution of the IISeeking Work" 
% Seeking Work 




1.2 1.8 2.1 2.9 3.9 8.6 
SMR for those "seeking work" in different social 
classes (i) standardised for age only 
I II IIIn 111m IV V 
79 109 113 123 155 150 
SMR for those "Seek ing Work" in different soc ial classes37 
(ii) standardised for age and class 
Class I II IIIn 111m IV V 
SMR 103 139 116 132 150 124 
Social class standardisation reduced the excess mortality of all 
"unemployed" men in the sample from 36% to 21 %. However, Jones then 
37 The difference between these two tables is that in the first one the "standard population" to 
whose death rates the rates in each class are compared is the population of all men seeking 
work; in the second table it is all men 
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pointed out that when all the men seeking work whose usual occupation was 
"inadequately described" (those with inadequately described occupations had an 
unemployment rate of 50.6%) were removed from the analysis, the excess 
mortality adjusted for social class was 33% (i.e. SMR 133), a much smaller 
effect of standardisation. On standardisation for housing tenure, a variable 
which the LS team regarded as a good measure of social position, the excess 
was also reduced, to 27%. From this Jones concluded that "SOME of the 
mortality in the unemployed may be accounted for by their distribution by 
social class." 
He next asked, was there a "reverse effect", which had been strongly 
proposed by Derek Cook in his paper, whereby those already in poor health 
were selected into unemployment. At this point Jones introduces, for the first 
time in a public report of LS results which I witnessed, the "reverse healthy 
worker effect", which was to playa decisive role in the rest of the debate: 
Is there a health related selection effect? If that were the case, 
we'd expect the mortality rate to falloff with time, as the 
unhealthy subset died off. We'd expect the fall to be much more 
marked in the acute diseases, as well. 
In fact, what we find is that for all-causes there is an INCREASE, 
not a decrease in the excess mortality associated with 
unemployment. Suicide does not decrease at all. Lung cancer 
does show a larger fall, but bronchitis and emphysema do not. If 
you standardise for social class, the all-causes rise in the 
differential mortality rate disappears. Social class gradients are 
wider in the second five-year period of observation than in the 
first. This is because the very sick HAVE died. 
Here can be seen the emergence of the intricate relationship between the 
LS work on social class and that on unemployment, in relation to mortality. 
Jones concluded this section by observing that his figures could not be 
regarded as providing "strong corroboration of the view that the unemployed 
have a higher mortality rate because they are sicker in the first place". This 
cautious formulation was congruent with the general approach taken to this 
topic in the study. 
Having dealt in this way with both the social class and the health-selection 
hypotheses, Jones added a new piece of information, on the mortality of wives 
of men seeking work in 1971. It had been found that these women also 
experienced higher mortality than that for wives of men in the whole sample, 
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an SMR of 120 for all-causes mortality, which included SMRs of 160 for 
accidents, violence and suicide, and of 157 for lung cancer. Now, whereas it 
might still be that somehow or other, men were selected into "unemployment" 
by ill health, it did not seem at all plausible that women would somehow be 
selected into marriage with "unemployed" men by similar criteria (we shall see 
that this was to be contested but it was not questioned at this meeting). 
Jones concluded "That leaves us with explanation number (1.), the direct 
mechanism, if I can call it that." His overall conclusions were: 
1. Mortality is raised in those seeking work on Census night 1971 
2. Some, but not all, of the excess is attributable to social class, housing 
tenure, etc. 
3. Some, but not all, of the remaining excess is explained by a health 
selection effect 
4. Mortality is also raised in other members of the unemployed person's 
household 
5. The residual excess is possibly attributable to unemployment per se. 
How did members of the LS team account for their involvement in this 
work? Several of them expressed considerable detachment from whatever 
substantive issues they might happen to find themselves working on, including 
the present one: Far from declaring any particular "interest" in the question of 
unemployment and health, one told me: 
this sort of work is just what I happen to be doing at the 
moment. This is very much just a job for me. ( ... ) It's an odd 
feeling to have when you're working with people like the ones 
here who are really involved. 
Despite what this researcher may have felt, another member of the team 
thought that it was very important I should understand his (as well as other 
peoples') work on unemployment and health as a contingent event in a 
"normal" scientific career. He gave an account of the organisation of research, 
and his own place within it, closely congruent with Latour and Woolgar's 
description of the "cycle of credibility". 
Do you find that a lot of people are embarrassed by making a 
living out of other people's lack of a living? It's a bit of a 
bandwagon, isn't it? ... I was keen that [unemployment and 
mortality] shouldn't be pushed too far just because it is an OK 
topic and you can get money to do it. A lot of people have 
moved into it. A lot of people have been opportunistic in going 
into the field because it is an area that shows they are dOing 
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policy-relevant work. Even if the results of the research are not 
gOing to lead to anything that's going to be implemented .... This 
sort of thing happens in Medical Stats. Fashions come and go .. It 
[is] easier to publish because there [are] more people doing 
things like monographs and special editions of journals. These 
are the sort of practical reasons why people get into thll,gs .. 
you get asked to give talks and things like that because it is of 
interest to a wider group. So that you get a lot of positive 
reinforcement. 
Despite (or perhaps because of) the clarity with which he saw the workings 
of the academic cycle of credibility, this researcher had moral and practical 
objections to merely being carried along by it. His account of his own 
involvement stresses the role of "chance". On the one hand, his arrival at City 
University was due to unexpected developments in his career. Additionally--
my first reaction to the idea of doing [unemployment and 
mortality] was that it was a waste of time .... Our measure of 
unemployment is so weak. And mortality is an extreme measure 
of outcome, so we would be unable to see very much. What I 
didn't see at that time was that we could address the topic of 
social class, which was an issue then. 
He himself had been attracted by medical statistics (as opposed to any 
other "applied" field) because of the opportunities it offered for "theoretical 
work". A disadvantage of working on the LS for him was that these 
opportunities had been reduced. An advantage, however, was 
that you are talking to a very wide range of people, from 
theoreticians to complete pragmatists. You have to try and 
reconcile all their requirements .. It's a bit like being an 
entrep ren e u r. 
Here he echoes the thoughts of both government statisticians and economists 
(inside and outside government) whom I interviewed on the importance of: 
(a) being seen to have a firm grasp of the more abstract aspects 
of the appropriate discipline FIRST (you have to show you CAN 
do "theoretical statistics") before gaining access to policy-related 
work, despite what often seem to be a rather tenous relevance of 
these skills in their more elaborate forms. 
(b) an ability to "reconcile requirements" ("Seeing whether they 
want the Milk Tray or the Dairy Box") and to "sell one's wears" to 
pOlicy-makers and others 
As some of the civil servants whom I interviewed had warned, however, the 
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professional-statistician role described by some LS researchers did not extend 
to relinquishing the less convenient aspects of one's discipline in the face of 
administrative demands. For example, on one occasion while working for a 
health authority one told me he had: 
proposed four measures [to be used in a resource allocation 
formula], like GHS self-reported sickness for example. It was 
quite fun. It was discussed by the Regional Team of Officers. 
Then they just chose the measure which met their prior 
intentions best. Now, if they had been Bayesians [laughing] ... 
Well, they were obviously not. They knew absolutely nothing 
about statistics. I wasn't so naive that I'd thought this wouldn't 
happen. It was the blatancy of it which surprised me. 
He felt that part of the job of a member of his discipline was to make clear 
both the underlying "subjective and political element" in statistical work, and 
also to convey to non-statisticians the importance both of these elements and 
of the underlying technical assumptions with which they might not be familiar. 
What the accounts of medical statisticians involved in the unemployment 
and health debate seems to show is a set of sources of dissidence from the 
ways in which they felt they were being asked to "operate". These are also 
visible in the wider profession, as can be seen repeatedly in presidential 
addresses to the Royal Statistical Society and other similar published 
documents (see, for example, Chandler 1984, Royal Statistical Society 1968, and, 
for a civil service "view", see Armstrong 1973). These are: 
1. A desire to become more fully involved in the policy-making 
process (which led them into contact with pressure groups), but 
without having to abandon those aspects of their professional 
identity which often led to a critical and questioning stance, 
2. A desire to be more involved in the substantive issues of the 
research in which they participated (whether these were the 
effects of work on health, health inequalities, drug trials or health 
service planning) rather than being "called in" merely to analyse 
data at a later stage in the research process (Cauliffe 1976), 
3. A feeling that their discipline was being "misused" by people 
who either did not understand or did not clearly state the 
"underlying assumptions" involved, or the extent to which 
statistical "results" themselves involve an element of choice and 
deCision-making. 
The last point was sometimes made by statisticians whom I spoke to in the 
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form of "Bayesian jokes". Whenever Bayes is mentioned (which he quite often is 
see for example, Durbin 1987), the reference is to an alternative theory of 
statistics, which does not take it that everything in the world should be taken 
to be randomly distributed as a first assumption, but rather that the statistician 
explicitly BEGINS with certain ideas about how things "really are". These ideas 
are called "priors". The charm of the Bayesian approach will be evident from 
the obvious difference it would make to any group involved in a policy making 
process, as the "priors" will have to be derived from some knowledge or 
understanding of the substantive issues, which some statisticians wished to be 
credited with more often. The comments made above on health authority 
managers reflects a tendency amongst statisticians (and perhaps other 
scientists in fields closely related to policy making) to be reluctant to leave the 
"priors" entirely in the hands of politicians. Unfortunately, what is substantively 
gained is technically lost in this case, as the severe problems in characterising 
the distributions of test statistics and therefore of establishing the significance 
of results, have not been overcome by Bayesians. 
This is not to say that in that group of medical statisticians which became 
involved in public health issues, as in "Manifesto" community medicine, there 
was no political source to the critical and innovative themes which emerged in 
the unemployment and health debate (amongst other places). There were 
certainly no members of the conservative party or workers at any of the 
right-wing "Institutes" involved in the development of the new ideas which 
emerged. But political "interests" only help us to understand the actions of 
participants when firmly combined with an understanding of the mediating 
roles of the subprofessions (in this case community medicine, health service 
management and planning), and the subdisciplines ("social" and medical 
statistics, medical sociology, health economics) in the relationships between 
policy-makers and wider social movements. Aronson (1982a) for example, has 
suggested that the type of moral fragmentation involved in the reduction of the 
problem of low industrial wages in early twentieth century United States to a 
cultural/psychological question of nutritional knowledge and skills was a 
product of "reformism". That is, the obligatory point of passage "working class 
nutritional ignorance" was produced by an alliance between the entrepreneurs 
of a new science and a reforming social movement which, however, wished to 
stop short at suggesting structural changes of a type which would have 
entailed redustribution of income. Following Aronson, therefore, we would 
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perhaps expect that there might have been "more research" under a social 
democratic or liberal conservative administration, but this would not necessarily 
mean greater "success" for an explanatory model which was only susceptible 
to "structural" interpretations. 
At this stage in the unemployment and health debate, the effect of the 
formation of professional, disciplinary and personal alliances was to have 
created an intricate interpretation of the findings of the OPCS Longitudinal 
Study. The "wearing off of selection" was found extremely difficult to 
understand by many participants. It became an "obligatory point of passage" (as 
described in section 2.1), but only in the limited sense that it was not 
challenged during the rest of my observation of the debate. It was not so 
much accepted or taken-up by other groups, but rather constituted a barrier to 
further work, particularly to the work of "moral fragmentation" which depended 
on attributing a high level of mortality in a social group to the personal 
characteristics of group members. There WAS an agreement (tacit rather than 
explicit) that consideration of the wearing off of selection effects had to be 
included in future "serious" papers on unemployment and health, either to 
support it or attempt to refute it (though see Forbes and Macgregor 1987). 
Because few researchers felt able to do this, the "wearing-off argument" 
produced the beginnings of another impasse. Even sympathetic groups failed 
to take it up and use it in pursuit of THEIR objectives, and its factual "solidity" 
was accordingly fragile. However, a simpler construction of the message of 
SSRU Working Paper No. 18 was now taken up by the Unemployment and 
Health Study Group, and succeeded in once again raising the political profile of 
"unemployment and health". 
7.3 liThe Balloon Goes Up Again - but not so far this time 
By the next meeting of the Unemployment and Health Study Group, held on 
22 August, the report "Unemployment Health and Social Policy", (the product of 
the seminar held in Leeds in November 1983), had been printed. A publication 
date was set for 17 September. Scott-Samuel had been sent a copy of the 
SSRU Working Paper on which David Jones' talk to the Institute of Statisticians 
had been based. This happened automatically, as his name was on a list (at 
SSRU) of "Interested Persons". The Study Group had been advised, by medical 
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sociologist/journalist Anne Karpf amongst others, to look for some "new 
research findings" with which to link the release of their Report, and it looked 
as if this would serve the purpose very well. After this meeting, Scott-Samuel, 
on other business in London, found time to speak to both the Sunday Mirror 
and the Guardian, in an attempt to associate the Report with the new research 
in the minds of journalists. 
The press releases went out embargoed until 16 September, a Sunday, so 
as to "catch the Sundays" (attract the attention of the large Sunday 
newspapers). It described the Study Group as involving "doctors, pOlicy-makers, 
academics and unemployed people". That is, it did NOT concentrate on the 
"mainly academic" identity of the group, which in other contexts tended to be 
emphasised. Specific policy measures advocated in the Report were: 
- improved levels of benefits 
- free public transport and recreation facilities for unemployed people 
- job creation 
- voluntary and flexible early retirement poliCies 
- work sharing and shorter hours of work 
- avoidance of psychological damage to unemployed people through stigma 
- encouragement of support groups 
In fact, the Sunday Mirror of 16 September carried nothing about 
unemployment and health. Later the editor wrote to Scott-Samuel apologising 
and explaining that "Princess Diana's labour problems" had usurped the space, 
but that they planned do do something at a later date. Nothing ever appeared 
in an edition of the Sunday Mirror, though later in September the Daily Mirror 
carried a small piece on the Report. On Monday 17th, the Guardian carried a 
large piece on page 2 which quoted Working Paper 18 along with a series of 
estimates made by Scott-Samuel of how many "unemployment-related deaths" 
had taken place in the year 1984 (Scott-Samuel 1984), and, last but not least, a 
report on the document "Unemployment, Health and Social Policy". In this case, 
at least, the strategy of information subsidy had been effective. 
The LS team seemed rather pleased with what they regarded as a most 
enthusiastic response by the media. I asked explicitly what role had been 
played by the Study Group's strategy of hitching their report to the latest 
findings of the LS. Would they have made a decision to go public with the 
Working Paper at this stage? One LS researcher felt 
It won't do us any harm. We had a discussion with Alex -- Alex 
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phoned us a couple of weeks ago. Then the Guardian came down 
and interviewed us last week ... They were told what had been 
said at the Institute of Statisticians meeting.. They were given a 
couple of papers, and they've based the article on these, in 
addition to what Alex had done [on "unemployment-related 
deaths"] and the UHSG report. 
In this researcher's opinion: 
Basically the reason the Guardian liked it is that there is just 
enough of a hint .... that this is some sort of leak of some 
""Official Report" 
They admitted that talking to the press before publication in a journal had 
brought them in for "a bit of criticism" and that BBC TV had decided not to 
cover the story until the "Official report" was published, because it was 
government data. In fact, only one of the other national daily newspapers 
carried the story, despite the enthusiasm of the radio stations. This was The 
Scotsman. 
Other reports of the Working Paper's findings were carried in the Morning 
Star ("Unemployment is Murder"), Labour Weekly ("Research confirms jobless 
die sooner"), and the Liverpool Echo ("Death on the Dole"). A BBC Radio London 
journalist for whom I did a brief interview (she was referred on to me by the 
UHSG) told me: 
Once you've got down to death and suicide, what more can you 
say about it? People only want to hear just so much about things 
like this 
which was a fairly common response of media-workers to the issue from this 
time onwards. 
One civil servant's view of these events was that 
I knew the balloon was going to go up again ... John Fox sent me 
a draft of his paper some time ago ... I don't think that in his 
sample he CAN be as definitive as a lot of people are interpreting 
it to be. All he can do is set out a strong case that there MAY be 
something. The first draft I saw was somewhat overstated. 
Importantly, it seemed to him (as it did to me) that 
There is much less hooha about this issue this time round 
However, this offial's impression of the LS team's reaction to being the subject 
of an information subsidy was quite different to what they had told me: 
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from what I could gather, John Fox was by no means pleased 
about the way it came out in The Guardian. I suspect he will 
write a letter or something [in protest] ... Andrew Veitch always 
takes this sort of line, whenever anything about unemployment 
and health turns up ... 
and indeed it was commonly said amongst researchers that Veitch was not 
"typical" of medical journalists and would often give space to less orthodox 
views when others would ignore them. The civil servant quoted above seems 
to have been quite correct, also, in predictng that the media and parliamentary 
"balloons" would not reach anything like the heights achieved by use of 
Brenner and Fagin's work in 1981. The discrepancy between the two accounts 
of the LS team's reaction is puzzling. On 5 Oct, a member of the UHSG told me 
of a conversation that she had had with some people at Social and Community 
Planning Research, who have close links with City University. The SCPR people 
had said that OPCS reacted strongly to the "leak", by reprimanding members of 
the Working Paper's author group, and "reminding some of them of their civil 
service status". The situation did not seem to justify a great deal of official 
concern, in view of what was, in comparison to that receieved by Brenner and 
Fagin, relatively low media interest. However, at a much later date, some LS 
researchers looked back with a certain degree of dismay at the aftermath of 
events in September 1984, feeling that the SSRU had "had no peace" since then 
from official suspicion and scrutiny. 
What may have motivated a certain amount of governmental disquiet over 
the possible effect of more bad news about the health of the unemployed was 
the revival of the more social-democratic or "wet" faction or the Conservative 
Party in late 1984. This revival had its major opportunity for expression at the 
annual party conference, which took place 8-12 October. But rumblings were 
apparent well before this date. 
On September 25, a week after the "leak" of the LS findings, Hugo Young 
wrote a feature in The Guardian entitled "A valediction on the death of 
consensus in British politics". This article touches on many of the themes 
which were to overtake and incorporate the unemployment and health debate, 
and describes the movements in opinion which were ironically to make the 
debate both more relevant to general political discussion and less noteworthy 
in itself. Young laments several major changes in what he sees as British 
political traditions. Firstly, the Civil Service: 
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Civil servants now find themselves abandoning their customary 
role of testing the practicality of the politicians' objectives to 
destruction, and serving up instead the advice they know 
ministers want to hear 
More generally, Young felt that: 
the rules of engagement in public life have been rewritten. In 
particular, the concepts of neutrality and objectivity, so dear to 
the civil service mind and so close ... to the very essence of 
British civilisation, have been abolished. 
He warns the Conservatives that if they so profoundly "politicise British 
society" as this, formerly quiescent public functionaries, such as Bishops, 
Judges and civil servants may be expected to start "fighting back". Echoing the 
sentiments of the government statisticians I talked to, a wider range of officials 
were beginning to formulate the idea of a duty to something beyond "the 
government", or as Young puts it, "the political imperatives of the moment" 
(Benjamin 1984, Boreham 1984, 1985, Orchard 1985, Hoinville and Smith 1985, 
Moser 1980). 
Early in October, the Archbishop of Canterbury raised the temperature of 
"social issues" by giving an outspoken interview to the Times, in which he 
criticised the government's handling of the miners' strike as well as its general 
economic policies. According to the Times: 
he denounced unprecedented levels of unemployment, despair 
and poverty in the community, inequitable sacrifices and those 
who "treat people as scum". 
The Conservative Party Conference provided an opportunity for a 
resurgence of these more liberal ideas, and for the party leadership to be seen 
to be responding. Shortly before the Conference, Mr David Young, former 
chairperson of the Manpower Services Commission was appointed as "the 
Cabinet's own job creation expert" (according to The Times 8 October), to be a 
Minister without Portfolio and head of a Special Entreprise Unit "designed to 
promote job opportunities." 
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7.4 ESRC Workshop October 1984 - Compromises between 
experts 
The miners' strike, revolt stirring amongst civil servants, protest from the 
Church of England and disquiet on the government's own left wing shaped the 
political context in which most of the leading academic protagonists of the 
debate on unemployment and physical health came together on 26 October, 
1984. The occasion was another of the ESRC Employment and Unemployment 
Workshops at the Department of Employment. Two papers were scheduled, one 
by Fox on "Unemployment and mortality from the OPCS Longitudinal Study", 
the other by Platt on "Parasuicide and unemployment in Edinburgh 1968-1982". 
The organisers, as before, were Adrian Sinfield, Michael Hill of the University of 
Bristol's School of Advanced Urban Studies, and Chris Trinder of NIESR. 
Attenders included departmental advisers on economic and social issues from 
both DHSS and DE. 
Fox began his presentation by giving some "historical background" to the LS 
work on unemployment, stressing that their early table showing the high 
mortality of the "unemployed" (i.e., men "seeking work" in the week before 
Census night 1971) had first appeared in a relatively obscure journal in 1979 
(Fox 1979), and only been "picked up" in 1980 by the Cohort Study team. Thus, 
the controversial table's next appearance, in the Employment Gazette of 
September 1981 (in Ramsden and Smee 1981), had not been the LS team's 
doing at all. "The Department of Employment and the DHSS approached US," he 
related, "to see if we were interested in doing research on unemployment and 
health. However, in the end, we went to the MRC and other bodies for our 
funding (see section 5.2.2). He also pointed out that: 
We did not return to this question of unemployment and health 
again until the beginning of this year -- and that was because I 
had been invited to a meeting in Australia ... Harvey Brenner was 
the invited speaker from the USA ... So I thought, I've got to find 
some new data, and I started looking at the unemployment data 
up to the 1981 Census. 
Here Fox, aware that his audience included civil servants and professional 
advisers from the DHSS and Department of Employment, was clearly locating 
the "natural history" of the present work within the ACADEMIC cycle of 
credibility, and distancing it from the political debate. His introduction was 
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totally different to that given by David Jones in his presentation of a very 
similar paper, based on the same data, to the Institute of Statisticians 
conference. This was in accordance with both the very different audiences, and 
with the fact that circumstances were now more highly charged since the 
September 17th information subsidy. 
In looking for his "new data" in the next five years' follow-up of the LS 
sample, it had been found that 
the overall figure [tor mortality amongst the unemployed] was 
surprisingly high 
In characteristic "LS style", Fox went on to enumerate, first of all the 
"weaknesses of the study" (small numbers of deaths amongst the unemployed, 
weak and cross-sectional measure of unemployment, only 1971 data on 
unemployment available). This was followed by its "strengths": that it is not 
"ecological", it includes data on others in the index individual's household, it is 
prospective. The rest of his talk was broadly similar to that given by David 
Jones in July. At the end, he made an appeal to the audience for ideas for 
future work which they would like to see. 
The discussion which followed will be reported in some detail because it 
represents a rare direct, public confrontation between the two "sides" of the 
debate, uninhibited by the conventions of academic publishing or a more 
formal conference setting. There seemed to be something of a 
"comprehension gap" between the LS team and its audience. (This may have 
been context-speCific, but this could not, unfortunately, be tested, as at the 
more professionally homogenous Institute of Statisticians meeting so little time 
was left for discussion.) However, the most heated part of the discussion was 
on the question of "health selection", and here difficulties of comprehension 
and disagreements of substance were more or less indissoluble. One 
Department of Employment adviser was speaking for many participants when 
he described "selection" as "the crucial issue". He went on 
Listening to the example you [Fox] gave, perhaps it is my fault, 
but I didn't understand it .... much of the excess death is from 
smoking-related diseases -- and smokers are more likely to be 
unreliable workers as well as more likely to get lung cancer. How 
have you dealt with this sort of problem? 
In his reply, Fox made the first publicly contested attempt which I witnessed to 
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explain the "unhealthy nonworker effect" and its "wearing off", as applied to the 
problem of unemployment and health: 
If you have a group of people with, shall we call it, a natural 
mortality level -- let's just assume for a moment that there is no 
social mobility. Then if, by your sample selection, you oversample 
people who are unhealthy at the start of follow-up, then 
mortality from this group should be high to begin with, but 
you'ld expect it to go down [as the very sick members of the 
group "die off", and the less sick recover]. On the other hand, if 
you take a group where you've selected OUT the sick people, 
you'ld expect THEIR initial mortality to be LOW [in relation to that 
of the whole population which contains BOTH sick AND healthy], 
and then to rise back towards the natural [population] level. 
Fox supplemented this explanation by some comments directly referring to 
his earlier work on the "healthy worker effect" (i.e., low mortality for all groups 
of "workers" at the beginning of cohort studies, which rises back to the "natural 
level" over time) as it had been used in studies of asbestos and other industrial 
hazards. 
In the LS, if I take people by economic position and look at 
trends in health, there is [amongst the unemployed] a RISE in the 
level of mortality over time. If you take the sick group, it goes in 
quite the opposite direction. The "seeking work" group is 
artificially biased the other way from what you are suggesting 
[Le. only the relatively healthy ARE seeking work as opposed to 
defining themselves as permanently sick] ... I'm not claiming this 
is conclusive. But the interpretation at this time is that our group 
is positively, not negatively, selected for health. 
The same line of argument was than taken up by another government 
economist. What if there was some variable, not measured in the LS, which 
caused BOTH unemployment AND, say, suicidal tendencies? 
the you will generate the kind of association you have found, 
even though it is not a causal relationship. We know that 
assortative mating is strong. Now, although I think the high 
mortality of the wives is one of the strongest aspects of your 
data, we cannot ignore the possibility that emotionally disturbed 
people, say, may marry each other. 
Fox replied to this that there was no correlation found between the death 
rates, or ages of death, of spouses in the LS. The economist persisted: 
We all know there is assortative mating by class, education, 
culture, etcetera. I don't know if that would be expected to lead 
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to similar levels of mortality. 
But Fox was not to be moved. If these people had some reason for higher 
mortality, then eventually they would have to "die out", and thus their 
contribution to the group's mortality rate would "wear off" over time. In the 
long term, the mortality rate of any group some of whose members were 
"selected for poor health" would, therefore HAVE to fall. 
If I've initially put in more of such people, some of them should 
die off in the first year, so next year there should be a smaller 
proportion of them in the whole group, and the next year even 
smaller, and so on ... 
An economist asked 
But what if the characteristic is one which isn't LIKE illness, but 
some trait which is likely to trigger mortality at more widely 
distributed times? 
In response, Fox argued that there was no "medical model" of illness in use 
which could make sense of such a pattern of deaths widely and randomly 
spaced in time, which were nevertheless "triggered" by the same sort of 
underlying "factor" that could be used to explain unemployment. 
Eventually, one of the economic advisers became more specific about what 
the "unmeasured factor" which could trigger mortality might be: 
We only have fragmentary evidence on this, but what there is 
tends to suggest that people who are unemployed smoke and 
drink more heavily on average than the people in employment, 
but this is while they are EMPLOYED. When they are actually 
unemployed, they smoke and drink less. Now, this is precisely the 
kind of factor that will predispose people to unemployment and 
also kill them off earlier. 
But Fox returned to the fact that the high death rate of the unemployed in 
the early period of follow up did not "wear off", which would be expected if a 
significant number of those found to be seeking work at one point in time were 
being killed off by something which predated their unemployment, no matter 
what this was. 
Here I must make it clear that, in common with most members of the 
Unemployment and Health Study Group, as well as a wide range of other 
participants in the debate, I did not fully understand this argument in late 1984. 
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The phrases in square brackets within the quotations from my field notes of 
Fox's talk have been added at the time of writing in order to make 
comprehension easier for the reader. Understanding the "wearing off" argument 
was something which happened to me (and others) almost in the manner of a 
"conversion experience" or paradigm-switch (in my case, during the autumn of 
1986). What now happened in this Workshop also seemed to me at the time to 
resemble a conversion experience on the part of one of the economists. But it 
did not take place on the basis of the arguments derived from occupational 
epidemiology. Rather, it was a product of the perceived strength of the 
argument that spouses of the unemployed were (despite "assortative mating") 
NOT very likely to be similarly "selected" for poor health. It was also based on 
the perception that the work embodied in the second paper (Steve Piatt's) was 
amenable to a different kind of research programme which might appropriately 
"domesticate" the academic debate. 
After the usual long tea-break, during which the participants tended to 
break up into "camps", statisticians on one side and economists and 
government advisers on the other, Steve Platt spoke on the findings which he 
and Norman Kreitman had just had published in the BMJ, four days previously 
(Platt and Kreitman 1984, see also Platt and Kreitman 1985, Platt 1986). As was 
stated in their second draft, submitted in August, Platt now repeated that these 
were "preliminary results" and that a fuller version would be published in 
Psychological Medicine in the following year. He summed up his talk: 
I must make it quite clear that we tend to conclude -- how can 
put this now? -- that our findings are not incompatible with a 
causal role for unemployment. That is the most conservative way 
of saying it that I can think of. But we pOint out that we are not 
putting forward a monocausal theory. We know that lots of 
these people have alcohol problems and criminal records and 
that kind of thing. We are aware that there are self-selection 
factors involved. 
After the talk, the second person to ask a question was a prominent 
member of the "other side" of the argument, one of the economists. He felt 
that 
The question is, what ought one to be doing about or in 
response to this balance of evidence? That's a very big agenda. I 
think the SAPU people find that, for young people, gOing in a 
YOP course has as good an effect as being in employment 
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The economist continued to enumerate a series of possible "alleviations": 
extension of the long-term rate of benefit to the unemployed, Community 
Programmes, wider availability of part-time work. If the "poverty effect" visible 
in ecological data were significant, then the first measure might be the most 
important, he suggested. 
After some more questions and discussion on the combined social effects 
of recession and inflation on people other than those actually unemployed, 
Platt stepped out of the specialist SOCial-psychologist role, as if to extend an 
appeal for dialogue to the economists present. 
I'd like to say something about inflation -- here I'm going to get 
sat on by an economist -- We use unemployment as an indicator 
of the state of the economy which is reasonably reliable. What 
worries me is the extent to which it gives one a true picture of 
the state of the economy at the present time. Whichever 
indicator you read: inflation, GNP, income per caput, etc., you get 
a different impression ... Is this very silly? 
To which one of the economists replied: 
It is very sensible. ( ... ) You've hit on something very important. 
There are clearly times when unemployment is high and real 
incomes are growing ( ... ) Unemployment rates are good 
indicators of the state of the unemployed, but not for the state 
of the employed. 
This exchange illustrates the beginnings of a promising "translation" -- a 
member of each group tentatively extending an offer of their respective 
definitions of the situation as a "resource" to the other side (see section 1.5). 
The rest of the discussion centered around the psychology of para suicide 
and reflected both the interests of a large section of the audience, and of the 
MRC Unit in which Platt worked. When the meeting ended, some participants 
"hung around", forming small groups. I asked the economist who had proposed 
"policy changes" (I shall call him "E") if I had heard him aright? Was he really 
proposing a change in the agenda, from academic argument to discussion of 
concrete measures to protect that health of the unemployed? He replied, firmly, 
that he was. The sort of research now needing to be done was exemplified by 
Jennie Popay's study of how health visitors and social workers dealt with the 
problem of having a growing proportion of unemployed in their caseloads. 
More research was also needed, however, on "precipitating/mediating effects 
and how to intervene". I asked if he thought there would now be a lobby within 
the DHSS for the extension of the long term rate of benefit to the unemployed. 
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But this, he felt, was crying for the moon, "It's a question of priorities". At this 
point we were joined by John Fox, who was clutching a note passed over to 
him by E during the discussion of Platt's paper. "Can we [the LS team] rely on 
you to say this sort of thing in the Department?" Fox asked. The economist 
replied, cautiously, "I'm convinced. It's just a question of whether I can be SEEN 
to be convinced." Fox urged him, "It's the sort of thing we need you to say". 
(The LS researchers were at this time negotiating with the OPCS for permission 
to carry on linking post-1981 vital event data to the 1971 sample). But the 
economist replied, "Come on, John, you and I know ... that the DHSS is very 
hard to move on this sort of thing." 
In this exchange, which exemplifies a "failed" attempt at "translation", there 
is a striking example of how research and policy objectives can become 
confused. Fox was asking E to "lobby" within the DHSS for the respectability 
and usefulness of his STUDY, in order to obtain further co-operation from 
opes. The claim "unemployment damages health" was not being put forward 
by Fox as a "moral claim" (for better benefits, or more training schemes etc) 
here, but as a "knowledge claim", and as a bid for resources to pursue the 
study38. However, E immediately interpreted it (quite correctly, from HIS point 
of view) as something that would involve a government department in possible 
expenditure commitments which "any civil servant knows" is a difficult thing to 
do. So that E's conversion, wholehearted on the intellectual level, could be 
"seen to be" only partial, although the sociologists present at the meeting were 
astonished that someone in his position had gone even that far. 
Both E and Fox agreed that research 
does not really influence the Treasury. If they decide to change 
policy -- say to extend the long-term rate to the unemployed, 
they'll do it for some other reason. Then, of course, they'll quote 
research on health effects [of unemployment] as a justification. 
But they'll never do it FOR that reason. 
Now, this seems to contradict some of my previous conversations with 
advisers to "spending departments", who said they had first taken an interest in 
Brenner's work because it might come in useful in their battles with the 
38 Although these objectives are not mutually exclusive. 
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Treasury. What seems to be being said here is that officials in government 
departments do not become either interested in or convinced by research 
merely because of its "quality". As Knorr-Cetina has pointed out (see section 
1.5), acceptance by peers is not a guarantee that a piece of work will advance 
a scientist's cycle of credibility, in the sense of facilitating claims to resources. 
Rather, attitudes towards research depend on the ways in which projects and 
their (actual or potential) findings fit into the wider strategies of, for example, 
funding bodies, or government departments, or of groups within these 
organisations. 
The status of research "findings" as "resources" must be negotiated, it is 
not self-evident and cannot be predicted from the reception of research by the 
academic community alone. Policy advisers in government departments select 
research findings STRATEGICALLY, rather as the writers of academic papers 
select the works to which they will refer (Law and Williams 1982). No longer 
was E sceptical of "the facts", but only of their "usefulness" to those involved 
in formulating and defending policies, and those wishing to ensure their own 
"organisational survival" as policy advisers, given the changed political climate 
since Brenner's first appearances in Britain. But, as Knorr-Cetina, once again, 
has pointed out, these decisions are also a part of what constitutes the 
"accepted state of knowledge" at a given time. For reasons he admitted were 
"tactical", E hesitated to volunteer to be "seen to be convinced". And at no 
future time did he write for publication any retraction of his previous widely 
quoted papers which had thrown such severe doubt on the idea that 
unemployment could "directly" affect health. So that his strategic orientation 
towards the knowledge-claims put forward by the LS researchers also had 
consequences for the debate on "the facts". 
He went on 
It would be mistaken to aim this stuff [the findings of the LS and 
of Platt and Kreitman's study] at the macro-economic debate ... If 
this government wouldn't make a U-turn in 1981, how much less 
can they afford to now? 
Rather, he felt that if research was to continue being seen as a useful adjunct 
in the debate on social policy relating to the unemployed, it must be removed 
from the discussion on ECONOMIC policy, and redirected towards problems of 
"intervention" and "alleviation". Useful research should therefore in future 
include: 
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1) improved estimates of the costs of labour market policies, 
including costs at the "macro" level, 
2) recommendations on how to carry out limited interventions 
directed at vulnerable groups 
In other words, to be "useful" at this stage, research must partake in the 
process of moral fragmentation described by Manning (1985). Potentially, 
Platt's work was more amenable to this kind of change in emphasis than that 
of Fox and colleagues. Although I did not hear their conversation, I noted at the 
time that E spent far longer talking to Platt than to anyone else, and it was 
Platt's paper, not Fox's which precipitated the "I'm convinced" note. 
"Moral fragmentation" was also in general accord with a strong strand in 
the research programme of the MRC Unit for Epidemiological Studies in 
Psychiatry, as shown by their Progress Reports to the MRC. For example, their 
work on depression amongst women showed that environmental factors and 
threatening life events produced depression only in those "already predisposed" 
(see Ingham et. al. 1986, 1987) Whatever they may have FELT about it, the LS 
team were constrained by their data to continue to study "structural factors"; 
that was all they had. The data available in the Decennial Supplements carried 
the mark of a much earlier SOcial-problem process (see Szreter 1986) 
concerning differential FERTILlTy39. As such, it simply did not contain items 
which could be adapted for work of "moral fragmentation". All that was open 
to the LS team at this point was an increasingly "technically fragmented" 
defence of their position, which became more and more difficult for EITHER 
side of the debate to integrate into their value claims. 
39 I was told that the Chief Medical Statistician, Dr Michael Alderson was lobbying for the 
inclusion of smoking, drinking and exercise measures in future Censuses. This would have 




STAGE FOUR - THE SOCIAL 
PROBLEM CLAIMS ARE ACCEPTED (OR ARE THEY?) 
8.1 Stage Four (A): Acceptance 
It would seem that those who had for long suspected, and sought to 
demonstrate, that unemployment damaged physical health, and wished to 
persuade policymakers of this were now taking the offensive. However, what 
we shall see in this chapter is the debate entering the fourth phase of Manning 
and Downs' model, which has been characterised by Downs as a "twilight zone" 
of declining interest. Added to this was the tendency, which became strongest 
at this point, for the debate on unemployment to regress towards the older 
one on health inequalities. This did not happen because of any scientific work 
"successfully" questioning the knowledge claims of the BRHS, the LS or the 
Edinburgh MRC Unit, but rather as part of the increasing tendency of this work 
to be interpreted differently according to the uses made of it by different 
groups, and not to be directly challenged. 
8.1.1 Research to policy: in the balance 
On 14 November 1984, the Unemployment and Health Study Group meeting 
noted with satisfaction that Kenneth Clarke, both in a letter to the Nuffield 
Centre for Health Services Studies who had published the UHSG's "Leeds 
Report", and in his speech to the MIND annual conference, had admitted that 
unemployment was damaging to health. But, the minutes note, "the change in 
government attitude had not resulted in any policy change". 
On 8 December, "Unemployment and mortality in the OPCS Longitudinal 
Study" by KA Moser, AJ Fox, and DR Jones was published in The Lancet. But 
by this time, there was not a great deal more to be said about the 1971-1981 
follow-up of the LS's "unemployed" men and their wives. The material in the 
published paper was essentially the same as in the working paper. One 
difference was that Peter Goldblatt'S name had disappeared from the list of 
authors, removed on advice from his colleagues at the OPCS, where he (unlike 
the other authors) was employed as a full-time civil servant. The "Introductory" 
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section had also been shortened and considerably changed. Most important, 
perhaps, was the limitation of the discussion on "inadequately described 
occupations" to a mere reference to the working paper. In the discussion of 
"selection", the published paper is rather more explicit than the working paper 
or David Jones' rendering of it. The "wearing off" to be expected in a group 
selected for poor health is, in the Lancet version, spelt out as due to 
the high initial mortality of those selected on the basis of 
ill-health [which would mean that] the proportion of sick men in 
this category would decline over time ... as has been observed in 
other areas of our work. 
Both in the Lancet paper and the working paper, a far more cautious 
attitude is taken towards extrapolation of the findings to the unemployed of the 
1980s, than that exhibited in the "leaked" Guardian report of September 1984. 
As unemployment has become a "more common experience", has its severity 
decreased, due to a reduction of stigma? On the other hand, average duration 
of unemployment has INCREASED. The Lancet paper promises that further 
analysis of the LS cohort will answer this question in due time (which is, of 
course, by way of being a claim for resources). 
There was little media response. The UHSG produced a deliberately 
co-ordinated onslaught on the letters page of The Lancet, with letters coming 
from Steve Watkins, Silvia Tilford (a member of the Leeds Report drafting 
group), Gill Westcott, and Scott-Samuel. The latter included in some detail 
(including two tables) the extrapolation of Moser et. al.'s findings to the 1980s 
unemployed population. Even taking the lowest and most conservative 
estimate, Scott-Samuel claimed, there had been an annual excess of deaths 
"due to unemployment" of 1034 (combining unemployed men and their wives). 
"For every 2000 men seeking work, 1.94 men and 0.98 wives will die each year 
as a result of unemployment" he concluded, offering a Brenneresque 
ready-reckoning method for any local planning department, or indeed, pressure 
group, to use. 
The Labour Party did take up the question, independently of the UHSG. 
Rather dramatically, Labour Front Bench health spokesperson Frank Dobson is 
quoted (in Labour Weekly, 4 January) as saying 
At first the government pretended that there was no link 
between unemployment and ill-health and deaths. Recently they 
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have had to begin owning up to those links ... That means that 
now, through their policies, they are knowingly killing people. 
On 10 January, New Scientist devoted a full page to a feature entitled 
"Death on the Dole", reporting that the LS results 
will be taken up by Opposition MPs in the coming weeks as 
further evidence of the inhumanity of the government's economic 
policies 
As one might expect, the "wearing off" argument makes its first "popular" 
media appearance here, in a popular-scientific journal. Unfortunately, it is not 
phrased in a way which seems well calculated to clarify the idea, even to the 
scientifically trained uninitiated. 
At the Unemployment and Health Study Group's first meeting of 1985, on 
16 January, it was felt that: 
... we were not 'over the top' yet as regards government attitudes, 
research findings, and the Unemployment Health and Social 
Policy report [the "Leeds Report"]. The acknowledgement by 
Kenneth Clarke of the health-damaging effects of unemployment 
needed to be translated into action; the steadily more conclusive 
findings of research needed wider dissemination. 
Against this background of debate, the last face-to-face confrontation 
between members of the "core group" took place on 1 February 1985. 
8.1.2 A Needle and A Haystack 
This workshop comprised a small invited audience at the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research in London on 1 February 1985. An eminent group of 
speakers had been invited from various parts of Europe, their expenses paid by 
the DHSS, as part of its ongoing support for the Centre's programme of 
research on "Human Resources". The organiser of the "workshop" was Prof 
Roderick Floud of Birkbeck College, an economic historian, who also chaired. It 
took place in a cheerful and lively atmosphere. By now, most of the researchers 
in the "core group" knew both each other and the representatives of 
"Manifesto" Community Medicine who had been most involved, Watkins and 
Scott-Samuel. It was a welcome opportunity for widely dispersed members of 
the network to meet. A considerable number of notes were passed back and 
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forth during the more formal sessions, and breaks were busily occupied, both 
by friendly chat and by what was described as "horse-trading" between 
academics and civil servants (three were present from DHSS and one from the 
Department of Employment). 
The first paper was Derek Cook's, another version of the Institute of 
Statisticians' paper. Once again, he made heavy use of the dietary study of 
Doyle and Crawford, somewhat strangely in view of the fact that this study 
does not specify whether ANY of the breadwinners of the Hackney of 
Hampstead samples were actually unemployed. On this occasion, he also 
criticised the suggestion in Gravelle, Hutchinson and Stern's 1981 paper that a 
"robust effect" could be isolated in time-series work by "better statistical 
techniques". Cook felt this was a "pious hope", and that "superior statistical 
technique will not be the answer". 
Cook's discussant was Jon Stern, who felt it had been a "very good 
exposition of the problems as I see them". He agreed that more time-series 
analysis was pointless, despite what had been said in the paper of which he 
was co-author ("I didn't write THAT sentence") and felt that 
The fundamental methodological problem is what is known as 
selection bias. 
By placing the problem of "selection" back at the centre of debate in this 
context, Stern was adopting the strategy consistently used by the economists, 
that of "moral fragmentation". In this context, the question "Does 
unemployment cause ill heath" is fragmented into questions concerning "Who 
are the unemployed and are they at risk of ill health for other reasons?" (the 
"ceteris paribus problem"). This strategy had been clearly visible in the 
discussion at the October ESRC workshop. It was also extensively deployed in 
another related debate on the "Black report" and the causes of social class 
differences in health40. It was not just a question of whether unemployed 
people were physiologically "diseased". The meaning of "selection" shifts 
according to the argument in which it is used, and the people who use it, but 
here it meant both "diseased" and also "unfit" in the eugenic sense (which 
40 see discussion in section 621. also Stern (19831. Himsworth (1984). 
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comes close to the economists' concept of "low in human capital"). Stern now 
felt, however, that 
we do now have three large scale good studies. It would be 
stupid to deny that there is some effect of unemployment on 
physical health and mortality. The effect is probably small rather 
than large ... But we have found the needle in the haystack. 
Policy advisers had, it seems, adopted the studies which have been mostly 
extensively discussed in Chapter 5 of the present study as the basis for what 
now seemed to be an emerging consensus. Stern went on to ask where "we 
should go from here". He was in favour of "small scale studies" and "action 
research" to investigate "mediating effects", that is, the pathways by which the 
now admitted "ceteris paribus effect" of unemployment on health operated. 
One of the officials present then took up a theme of the discussion 
following the October ESRC workshop: 
What do we mean by "policy"? As a DHSS official, policy in this 
area means affecting the kind of policy variables that are under 
the control of the DHSS. One problem is that the health effects 
have been used as a weapon in the war about macro-economic 
policy. Fine, terrific. But THOSE kinds of policies are under the 
control of the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Further interesting information and discussion was forthcoming from papers 
that followed, by Charles Webster, Irvine Loudon, Urban Janlert, Jurgen John, 
and Noel Whiteside41 But from the point of view of the present account, the 
other important discussion took place between Platt and Gravelle, the 
"discussant" to his paper, chosen by Floud. 
Platt's paper was scheduled as the first after tea. During the break, the 
"discussant" to the paper, Hugh Gravelle foreswore the social mixing, took his 
tea back into the seminar room, and proceeded to write a series of equations 
on the blackboard, which he left there. The paper once again presented the 
Edinburgh Regional Poisoning Treatment Centre study, with both the 
"ecological" and the time-series "individual" data (see Platt and Kreitman 1985). 
Offering a "translation" of the work as a resource to the range of workshop 
41 Much of which has been written up elsewhere: see CEPR Bulletin March 1985. Whiteside 
(1987). 
193 
participants, Platt began by remarking 
The origin of the project was in the growing interest in 
unemployment and health and the thought that I could exploit a 
unique data set 
The main points of the paper that are relevant for the discussion which 
then took place were as follows: 
1. Unemployment and parasuicide were highly correlated over time, at least 
until 1983, 
2. As unemployment rose, the proportion of parasuicide cases who were 
unemployed also rose 
3. Over time, the relative risk of parasuicide amongst the unemployed 
(compared to that among the employed) began at a very high level, then 
fell, and then stabilized at around 11 to 1 
4. Cross-sectional data showed that areas of high unemployment tended to 
be areas with high rates of parasuicide, but this correlation was reduced 
to statistical insignificance when a measure of "poverty" was introduced 
as a control variable. 
In reply, Gravelle re-emphasised the economists' distinctive approach: 
... you have to start with basic models. Firstly a production 
function an aetiological model that summarizes your 
hypotheses about the relationship between unemployment rates 
and parasuicide rates ... Secondly, you need a model of 
behaviour. 
He went on to give the fullest and most explicit account to date of "the 
economists' approach" to the problem of the relationship between 
unemployment and health, which most clearly demonstrates the technical 
accomplishment of moral fragmentation. 
Gravelle's first two criticisms of Steve Platt's paper were purely technical. 
He pointed out that the proportion of parasuicides who are unemployed is 
bound to increase as the unemployment rate rises (just as the proportion of, 
say, red-headed people who are unemployed would increase as the rate of 
unemployment rises). Similarly, the amount of parasuicide in the population as 
a whole which can be ATIRIBUTED to unemployment (the "attributable risk") 
must rise as unemployment rises. Next, as in his critique of Brenner, Gravelle 
proposed that if Platt and Kreitman's time-series was broken into two, the 
correlations would disappear for each separate period. Turning to the 
"ecological" data, Gravelle picked up the point that when "poverty" was 
controlled, the cross-sectional correlation between unemployment rates and 
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parasuicide rates in Edinburgh enumeration districts disappeared. That 
suggested to him 
severe problems of multicollinearity. That means that all the 
results which do not include poverty as a measure must be 
biased. 
There was an anomaly, he thought, between the time-series and the 
cross-sectional data. This was that across areas with different rates of 
unemployment, parasuicide rates rose steadily: the higher the unemployment 
rates, the higher the parasuicide rate. But across TIMES with different rates of 
unemployment, the RELATIVE risk of parasuicide behaved less consistently. As 
the unemployment rate rose, the RELATIVE risk of parasuicide first fell, and then 
stabilised. He proposed that this anomaly in fact offered the key to explaining 
the "true" link between unemployment and parasuicide. Namely, at the 
beginning of the period of the Edinburgh study, the high rates of parasuicide 
amongst the unemployed were entirely due to "personal characteristics" (as 
Platt himself had argued in 1982). The finding that parasuicide was highest 
amongst HIGHER social class individuals who were unemployed could also be 
explained in this way -- they were the ones with the most "personal problems" 
(Le. they were unemployed despite a relatively favourable labour market 
position). People with "personal problems" were also concentrated in poor 
areas. As unemployment rose, the second of the two possible determinants of 
the "propensity to unemployment" (i.e. the demand for labour) took over from 
the first ("personal characteristics"), hence one would expect the "new" 
unemployed to have better mental health and a lower rate of parasuicide. This 
alternative explanation had always been latent in Platt and Kreitman's analysis, 
as were other kinds of moral fragmentation of other kinds of social problems 
(depression, alcoholism) in the work of the MRC unit. 
This was an impressive presentation, the effect of which was heightened by 
the presence of complicated-looking equations on the blackboard. The 
intensity of the confrontation between Platt and Gravelle meant that the closing 
discussion of "policy", introduced by Jennie Popay, was conducted in a 
somewhat muted atmosphere. Popay felt that 
You're asking for more research in this area than ever gets asked 
for to justify policy change in other areas. The only similar case I 
can think of is with inequalities in health. You ask for so much 
rigour, that you end up with rigor mortis. 
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Floud then turned to "our colleagues from the DHSS", and asked their 
opinions. One research administrator felt, like Stern, that 
The approaches we can adopt have to relate to services. Some 
measures to help improve the level of living of people who are 
unemployed is the direction we'd prefer. 
In contrast to the research manager, an administrator thought 
There are some policy implications we can take on board and 
some we cannot. The implications of raising benefit, if that was 
what the research implied, are such that the present government 
would be unlikely to envisage, let's face it. 
Gravelle himself was more cautious about "intervention" , 
Unless you have got some model, just going in and intervening 
might not tell you much. 
he warned. 
Although the technicalities in the economists' account were just as elusive 
and opaque to a non-specialist audience as those of the statisticians (the 
"wearing off of selection effects"), there was a crucial difference. The 
economists' symbols and equations were relatively fluently translated into a 
moral language which the lay person (and policy-makers) could understand 
(basically, the unemployed have a set of "personal characteristics" of an 
ambiguously moral/natural kind which unfits them for normal life in society and 
accounts for both physical and economic vulnerability). This translatability, in 
Latour's terms, rather than JUST the way in which their model individualizes 
social problems (as discussed by Manning, and which I have termed "moral 
fragementation"), seems at least partly to account for the success of the 
economists as policy advisers. Their approach was not LESS technical than the 
approach of the statisticians, as Gravelle had demonstrated. But it attracted 
allies both because of what it could be translated into, and the active way in 
which this was done by the economists ("selling their wares"). 
The statisticians' strategy had different effects. It concentrated on repelling 
assailants by means of its technical complexity and its authors' intimate 
understanding of the large and complex data set involved. There was, of 
course, a potential moral translation of the statisticians' analysis. But this 
translation would have a tendency to attract allies of a more problematic kind 
(as discussed in section 3.5 and 4.3.3. above). Inherent in the very nature of 
the data available to the LS team was a tendency to highlight "structural" 
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explanations of health inequalities. The data set simply did not include 
information on such lifestyle or behavioral factors as smoking, drinking and 
exercise. The resulting "structural" analysis had at times attracted such 
powerful allies as the Royal College of Physicians, particularly its Faculty of 
Community Medicine. When this happened, the "structural" approach was useful 
to the scientists, in their pursuit of tactical, "trans-scientific" objectives. But 
there was a fine line which divided the usefulness of the LS to the social 
problem claims-making activities of powerful and prestigious groups in 
medicine, from a more dangerous exploitability of the results by "ginger" 
factions within the medical subspecialties and other professionalising groups 
such as health education. Insofar as these latter "customers" tended to 
emphasise a more overtly "political" interpretation of the LS results, the 
scientists pursued relationships with these allies in a more hesitant fashion. 
They might, after all, subject the scientists' findings to just as much "distortion" 
as any other group (for example, health service managers or officials). The 
different modes of "fragmentation" employed by the different disciplines can 
therefore be understood as partly the outcome of the ways in which these two 
subdisciplines related to different "customers" or clients. 
The evening after the meeting, considerable disquiet was expressed by 
some participants at the outcome of the day's proceedings. As one put it: 
I don't think what Hugh did was on. Steve has always played it 
straight, always played the game according to the rules. If Hugh 
was going to attack him like that, at least he should have warned 
him. 
Plans were made to liaise with Platt over "how to get round" the "problem" 
pointed out by Gravelle. One statistician's opinion was that Gravelle's 
presentation had been "rubbish", implying that it was not really worth bothering 
about. Between this day and the end of my period of observation of the debate, 
Gravelle's rebuttal of Platt and Kreitman's work was never published in a 
refereed journal, and Platt was therefore under no obligation (according to "the 
rules") to reply to it. He sent a copy of the equations to Cook, who found the 
notation confusing, and both researchers were too busy to devote the 
necessary time to clarification. The links proposed that evening between Platt, 
Stern and Cook were never re-activated. 
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8.1.3 Stalemate 
An account of the CEPR workshop was written up and published in the next 
edition of the "CEPR Bulletin" in March. It came into the hands of the 
Unemployment and Health Study Group in a roundabout way. A copy WAS 
sent to Michael Meacher in his capacity as Shadow Secretary of State for 
Health and Social Security, and his research assistant forwarded it to 
Scott-Samuel, whom she knew as a member of the Front Bench advisory group 
with this special interest. 
The comment on Platt's paper was that 
his methodology was heavily criticised in the discussion which 
followed [his paper]. Without further research, these conclusions 
will not gain widespread acceptance. 
and the report of the workshop concluded 
It is necessary to ascertain what aspects of health are affected 
by unemployment and what remedial measures can be taken to 
protect the health of unemployed people. 
The outcome, at least in the CEPR Bulletin's account, was a striking reversal 
of that of the ESRC workshop of October 1984. One of the major pieces of 
research in the debate was now redefined as something which "would not gain 
widespread acceptance". However, contrary to this concluSion, Steve Platt 
continued to be invited to address important academic and professional 
meetings (such as the Royal College of Psychiatrists' annual conference in July 
1985) throughout the rest of my period of observing the debate, and he was 
also invited to write an editorial on the topic for the British Journal of 
Psychiatry, which appeared in the late summer of 1986 (Platt 1986b). The notion 
that unemployment increased the risk of suicidal behaviour continued to be 
widely accepted in subsequent literature as one of the "firmest" findings of the 
entire corpus of research on unemployment and health. 
It seemed as though the academic debate had now reached a point where 
the two "sides" were relatively polarized, in terms, at least, of the client or 
"customer" groups which formed salient parts of their "trans-scientific fields". 
To some extent, this gave the impression that the two "sides" were also taking 
on the aspect of opposed social groupings, and it is true that some social 
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contact between members of each "camp" though not a very great deal, did 
persist beyond the more intense phase of the debate. Those who believed that 
the balance of evidence pointed to a "direct effect" of unemployment on health 
were sociologists, medical statisticians, and community physicians oriented 
towards "social medicine", They made use of an "incremental" criterion of truth, 
looking at the accumulated "balance" of the studies that existed. The ultimate 
technical justification of this position resided in the notion of an "wearing-off 
of an unhealthy nonworker effect" which should be present if "selection bias" is 
the "real" explanation of patterns of mortality differences between groups. This 
argument, however, was not really understood by most of those in the wider 
issue community who favoured a "direct effect", at least, certainly not by the 
spring of 1985, and no-one outside Fox's Social Statistics Research Unit ever 
used this argument in their own future work. 
The argument against the reality of a "direct" effect of unemployment on 
health was put forward by economists, who worked by techniques of 
"modelling", using an explicit theory about "selection by personal 
characteristics". The strongest evidence AGAINST the selection hypothesis was 
that the death rate from accidents, violent deaths and suicide, the major causes 
of excess deaths amongst the younger "unemployed" in the LS sample (who 
had higher relative, though lower absolute mortality rates than older men) 
showed no sign of "wearing off" with time. Men "unemployed" in 1971 had just 
as great an excess of mortality in 1981 as in 1976, when these causes were 
considered. The argument was that if a proportion of these men had been 
selected into unemployment by some "propensity" towards violent death, then 
those WITH the propensity should have been "killed off" by it as time went on, 
causing the death rate for the "unemployed" as a whole to fall back towards 
the average in the later stages of follow-up. If the higher death rate of the 
"unemployed", that is, could be accounted for by the deaths of those men with 
such a "propensity", then the deaths of these men should leave a group purged 
of their influence. This could not be tested in Platt and Kreitman's data set. Nor 
was it ever tackled head-on by the economists. In theory, data from the 
Regional Heart Study might have thrown some light on the question, but 
events during 1984 had meant that the priorities of the BRHS and of Cook in 
particular, had changed. 
In the autumn of 1984, the Regional Heart Study application for a further 
five-year programme grant from the MRC (its third) was unsuccessful. As a 
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consequence, Derek Cook had to abandon his work for a Ph D using the 
follow-up data on unemployment and mortality experience of the 7735 men. 
His new topic was to be an investigation of lung function in relation to social 
class, town of residence, and smoking. Cook's decision to re-direct his efforts 
was taken quite abruptly. The Lancet of December 8 1984 had published an 
optimistic letter in which he spelt out the promise of the study in relation to 
the question of the relationship between unemployment and health: 
The suggestion arising from this study is that those men who 
have early evidence of disease may become unemployed more 
readily and remain unemployed for longer than men who are 
healthy. This possibility cannot be confirmed from the preliminary 
cross-sectional analysis, a more dynamic view of the 
unemployment/health relationship is needed. 
To obtain this "dynamic view", the BRHS researchers were using information 
from a postal questionnaire to all men at five years after entry into the study. 
The questionnaire had received a very high response rate (98%), and, in 
conjunction with the measurements made at initial examination, it was hoped, 
would enable them to 
examine the extent to which men have been selectively forced 
out or kept out of the workforce because of ill-health ... The 
Regional Heart Study should be able to provide detailed 
information on the dynamics of the unemployment and health 
interrelationship and to quantify this 'selection of the fittest'. 
However, the loss of its MRC grant now made it uncertain whether there would 
be resources even to finish sending out and analysing the follow-up 
questionnaires which were to have provided the data for Cook's Ph D. 
In the event, the Regional Heart Study did receive generous funding from 
other bodies, such as the British Heart Foundation. However, the need to 
change the emphasis of the work and to be more willing to prepare papers for 
publicly visible occasions produced a new set of priorities for Cook. He firmly 
believed, by late 1986, that smoking amongst the unemployed could be shown 
to account for both a raised risk of unemployment and for the "randomly 
triggered" higher mortality, evenly spaced out over time, found amongst those 
men in the LS who had been unemployed at the time of the 1971 Census. The 
spacing of the "excess deaths", he felt, could be explained by the fact that 
people had taken up smoking at different ages, and so reached the end of the 
"latency period" for lung cancer (the cause of death most in excess of average 
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amongst the middle aged and older "unemployed" men in the LS) at different 
times. As the BRHS only dealt with older men, Cook made no claims about 
ways in which smoking could account for accidental and violent deaths, which 
were the most in excess amongst younger "unemployed" LS sample members. 
For the time being, then, the sociologists and statisticians had reached a 
position of stalemate in relation to the economists. There was no pressing 
reason for effort to be put into breaking this, as for one thing, the academics 
amongst them inhabited rather different social worlds -- they attended 
different conferences (on the whole), published in different journals, and, on up 
to now, had been applying for funding to different organisations. Potentially, 
Cook's theory could have formed a bridge across which medical statisticians 
and economists could at least have argued with each other, over the 
importance of "personal characteristics". In substance, Cook agreed with 
Gravelle, yet he spoke the methodological language of the LS team and the 
Edinburgh MRC unit. The important difference seems to be that, as a medical 
statistician, Cook's "natural" client group was community medicine, and he was 
therefore in a sense "tied" to one side of the debate, not by any cognitive 
factor, but by virtue of where his discipline stood in relation to the professional 
boundary-dispute42. 
8.1.4 "Unemployment and health in general practice" 
One new study did appear in the debate in 1985. This was the "Caine 
study", a longitudinal case-control study in which the cases were all patients of 
a single general practice. In 1982, Harris Meats, the major employer in the 
country town of Caine, Wilts, made their entire workforce redundant. The first 
reported findings of the study were that redundant workers and their spouses 
were significantly more likely to consult the GP, but not AFTER being 
dismissed. The rise in consultations took place during the extended 
"anticipation" period during which workers were aware that the factory was 
likely to be closed. Redundant patients were, furthermore, more likely than 
42 . d h . " ff t" f The one medical statistician who eventually publlshe a paper s oWing no e ec 0 
unemployment rates on mortality rates in different geographical areas (Charlton 1987) was, at the 
time of publication, working for the DHSS. There is no intention here to suggest that the debate 
inevitably took place between disciplines rather than within them, rather to describe the ways in 
which debate was socially organised. 
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controls to be seen as sufficiently ill to warrant referral to hospital out-patients 
departments for specialist advice. 
In March of 1986, a fascinating account written by Beale about the process 
by which this research came to be done, was published in the BMJ (Beale 
1986). It is a classic "discovery account", in that the "idea" is depicted as 
"abruptly" occurring to him in the spring of 1983 while he was "giving the lawn 
its first haircut". 
Like several other researchers (such as Fox) in their "public" discovery 
accounts, Beale distanced himself from any possible "political" motives. 
However, he was aware that the imminent closure of the major employer in his 
area might "be affecting our practice workload." This accomplishment of motive 
is followed by a gesture towards "science": 
In Cambridge I had been allowed the ultimate privilege of a 
British science education. The master of my college had won a 
Nobel prize for work on DNA ... I remembered with pleasure the 
research project I had done for a year after Second MB; I had 
learned to ... define aims, to shuffle index cards, to tabulate 
results ... I was familiar with the infrastructure of science at least 
His account of his own "Pilgrims progress" through the project is 
disarmingly honest about mistakes, confusion and "cheating". Yet it does 
portray the process as cumulative, as a progress through error towards the 
discovery of truth "out there". 
Beale described his mood in various emotional terms: 
I was hooked ... Creativity is close to madness it is said. I could 
not have survived the next year without a demonic mania that 
had developed. I now had an obsession. 
After the tedious work of looking through company files and medical 
records to identify his cases and controls, and trace their medical histories: 
I began to be naughty. I craved for results and repeatedly 
compiled data from incomplete samples. 
To his horror, even the completed work showed no change in illness 
following redundancy: "months of work and nothing to show for it". However, 
the fact that the practice's own cleaner had previously been made redundant 
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during an earlier rationalisation at Harris Meats caused a "flash of insight": 
I suddenly understood the importance of something I had known 
for four years: there had been ... earlier redundancies from the 
factory ... Did morbidity change with the threat of job loss two 
years before the factory closure? Yes, it did. But could I prove it? 
At this point, by "good fortune", he met socially, a medical statistician who 
was looking for part time work (Susan Nethercott) and 'With enormous reliet I 
handed her the numbers to crunch". Next, Beale discovered the Joint Working 
Party on Unemployment and Health of the Royal College of General 
Practitioners and sought advice from Ian Russell, their statistical adviser. 
Russell queried the statistical technique that had been used. Now, using some 
money from the Science Foundation Board of the Royal College of GPs, 
Nethercott set about re-aggregating the data. This took up the month of 
October 1984.The paper was eventually submitted to the Journal of the Royal 
College of General Practitioners. 
The first journalist to pick the study up was Andrew Veitch of The Guardian, 
who had also been the only one to write about the Regional Heart Study in 
1982. Like Cook and his colleagues, Beale had made no effort to "subsidy" his 
work, and Veitch commented that full-time medical correspondents (in 
distinction to the experience of Dinwoodie and Christie of the Scotsman) on 
papers which could afford such things, did regularly scan journals, although the 
Journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners was one which he only 
looked at when he had "nothing else to read". Unlike the Regional Heart Study, 
however, and perhaps because the memory of the papers by Smee and 
Ramsden and Gravelle et. al. had faded by late 1985,the Caine study's impact 
expanded from coverage in the Guardian. 
Beale described the media response and his own reaction to it: "countless 
interviews", his home full of film technicians, the telephone ringing incessantly. 
The culmination of all this was a summons from the BBC itself, and then yet 
more findings: 
After the weekend, "Auntie" came, but, more important, Susan 
had found more significant results, the hub of another paper. To 
the addict, the fix is everything. 
The next paper from the Caine study to receive media attention was 
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published on 22 December 1986 (Beale and Nethercott 1986d). It resulted once 
again in requests to appear on radio and TV. Andrew Veitch's fairly small piece 
in The Guardian was headlined "Redundancy 'affects health for years'''. The 
new finding was that workers most affected by the period of "anticipation" 
were those with previous experience of unemployment. Those with previously 
stable work histories, however, suffered more AFTER redundancy. Veitch still 
feels that even so 
ministers have been reluctant to accept that the stress of 
unemployment has had a significant effect on the nation's health. 
This account of the last major programme of research in the unemployment 
and health debate between 1975 and 1987 provides a vivid example of the 
presentation of "scientific discovery" as described by Latour (1987) and Woolgar 
(1982). Beale and Nethercott's findings were quoted and used in policy debate 
as widely as those of the LS, despite the fact that "referral" is a "softer" 
measure of effect than death. But from the point of view of the popular media 
the absence of dramatic endpoints such as heart attacks or suicides meant that 
rather less interest was shown. Beale and Nethercott's work was used more by 
writers of health manifestos for pressure groups or political parties. Neither did 
Beale and Nethercott ever become part of the "core group" in any informal 
sense -- there was no social contact between them and the members of the 
UHSG, or the LS team for example. For a general practitioner, to demonstrate 
that acceptable research could be done using existing records was of great 
importance, but within a rather different subprofessional entrepreneurial 
process, that of increasing the academic potential and therefore the status of 
general practice itself. 
8.2 Stage Four (8): Metamorphosis 
8.2.1 "Occupationless Health" 
Because its author played something of a "midwife" role in the emergence 
of the new interests and alliances which now superseded the unemployment 
and health debate, it is appropriate to include in this section a discussion of 
Richard Smith's series in the BMJ on "Occupationless Health". This series of 
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articles ran between October 1985 and February 198643. It is difficult to 
classify the series as part of the "academic" or "public" debates on 
unemployment and health. This difficulty is not accidental, but reflects the way 
in which the public debate was increasingly conducted without reference to the 
academic debate, and illustrates an important stage in the process by which 
knowledge and policy interact. 
The series may be viewed as something which Smith did as part of the 
"cycle of credibility" followed by serious medical journalists. He had previously 
written series on alcohol and prison medicine, and followed "Occupationless 
Health" with one on research funding. The title of the series implies a "public" 
aim, and in content the articles were in the form of a series of reviews of both 
research and policy responses. The view of the Unemployment and Health 
Study Group was that having such a comprehensive review readily available, 
and the fact that it had appeared in such a "respectable" journal would add 
solidity to their case in policy debates. 
Richard Smith was an Edinburgh graduate who had completed his "house 
jobs" and then worked and travelled in the Far East for some time. On returning 
to Britain, he had not gone back into clinical medicine but "fallen on his feet" 
into an assistant editorial post at the BMJ, which he made his career. He felt 
strongly on the question of unemployment, and, like other sympathetic 
journalists such as Bryan Christie and Robbie Dinwoodie, was disappointed at 
the lack of response to his work. The content of the articles will not be dealt 
with in detail here, as the research has been discussed in other chapters. 
While planning the series, Smith approached Scott-Samuel, Cook and 
myself with a request that we read over each article before it was published to 
"check factual details". The group he chose as his "experts" might, therefore, be 
regarded as somewhat weighted towards the "Manifesto" end of the spectrum, 
but in the first paper, "Bitterness, Shame, Emptiness, Waste: An introduction to 
unemployment and health", he states: 
the evidence linking unemployment with poor psychological 
health is much stronger than that linking it with poor physical 
health 
43 The papers were eventually published in book form, Smith (1987b) 
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and 
Studies on how unemployment affects physical health cannot 
match the sophistication of the psychological studies 
What was "new" in this paper was Smith's summing-up not of the outcome 
of research, but of the way research had been conducted: 
Sadly, although unemployment began to increase dramatically in 
Britain more than five years ago, no study was ever set up to 
study specifically the effects of unemployment on mortality -- or 
indeed any other measure of health. Instead, clever use had to be 
made of data from studies set up for other purposes ... Some 
people to whom I spoke thought that the government had 
deliberately discouraged research on unemployment and health, 
because it did not want any data produced that might make 
continuing with present economic policies more difficult 
Smith had "heard of at least two ... cases from England where applications 
had been rejected more on political than scientific grounds." But, he goes on 
others I spoke to subscribed less to this conspiracy theory and 
more to the idea that doctors' leaders had been slow to wake up 
to the importance of unemployment to health (Smith 1985). 
He also mentions the confusion of responsibilities between the Departments 
of Health and Employment, the attitude that there was no need to add "health" 
to all the other reasons for lobbying against unemployment, and the fact that 
"information is scattered through a variety of disciplines." He thereby presents 
his account as a "balanced" appraisal of the mixture of reasons why, by 
October 1985, it was considered that "we knew little" of the effects of 
unemployment on physical health. The risk of being identifiable as his 
informants so alarmed Smith's "expert group", however, that they asked not to 
be acknowledged publicly for their role. Encouraged by the contact between 
himself and Smith occasioned by the series, in late November 1985, 
Scott-Samuel wrote to him to 
suggest that it would be timely for the BMJ to publish an 
editorial on inequalities in health. 
The justifications for this move were several. Firstly, the British government 
had, as a member of the World Health Authority, signed a document "Targets 
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for Health for All by the Year 2000", which committed it to reduce health 
inequalities (amongst many other objectives). Secondly, the BMA itself was now 
taking up the question of health inequalities in a number of ways, having 
established a working party to "look again at the Black Report". Thirdly, there 
had been recent advances in the technical sophistication of the available 
measures of inequality in life expectancy. The outcome of this was a paper by 
Scott-Samuel, entitled "Health Inequality -- back on the agenda?". Ironically, the 
editorial board of the BMJ turned it down. It was eventually published in the 
Lancet on May 10 1986 (Scott-Samuel 1986a). 
8.2.2 Health Inequalities: back on the agenda 
The rest of the academic debate on unemployment and health in 
1985-March 1987 was low key, and demonstrated a process of metamorphosis. 
As some had anticipated, the unemployment and health debate now began to 
be re-integrated into the older debate over the Black Report and health 
inequalities. 
By early 1985, many academics knew the broad outline of the content of 
the forthcoming Decennial Supplement on Occupational Mortality to the 1981 
Census (OPCS 1986). Many expected that what were seen as "increasing social 
divisions" would be accompanied by increased differences in the health of the 
various social classes. And this was what the Decennial Supplement seemed 
about to show. As early as March 1985, the BMA News Review carried a paper 
by Nicky Hart (the researcher on the original Black Report) documenting 
differences in life expectancy between the social classes, and urging GPs, in 
particular, to "play a vital role in pulling together the evidence of social and 
economic ills and thereby help put them on the health policymaking agenda" . 
By 1 May of 1986, a table was circulating in "samizdat" fashion which showed 
the following changes in mortality rates by social class: 
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Class Differentials in Mortality 1970-1983 
Standardised Mortality Ratios 
Class DS 1970-72 LS 1976-81 DS 1979-83 LS 1981-83 
I 77 66 66 63 
II 81 77 74 84 
IIIn 99 105 93 89 
111m 106 96 103 94 
IV 114 109 114 103 
V 137 124 159 131 
DS= Registrar Generalis Decennial Supplements on Occupational 
Mortality 1970-72 and 1979-83 
LS= Longitudinal Study mortality ratios for 1% sample of the 
1971 census who died in the years 1976-81, and 1979-83 
Here it can be seen that the Decennial Supplements seem to be showing a 
quite striking increase in the "mortality gap" between the social classes, from 
77/137 in 1970-72 to 66/159 in 1979-83. The LS figures show a smaller 
increase (Fox and Goldblatt 1986, Goldblatt 1986). The Decennial Supplement 
on Occupational Mortality for the period around the 1981 census44. was finally 
published on 29 July 1986. 
At the same time, members of the LS team were also working on a 
"commission" from the DHSS to examine patterns of social mobility amongst 
members of their one percent sample of the 1971 census. The monograph was 
completed by August of 1986, though still unpublished by March of 1987, and 
must have influenced their thinking. 
As repeatedly stated by the Registrar-General in the various information 
subsidies surrounding the publication of the Decennial Supplement to the 1981 
Census, the LS had confirmed that 
Marked changes in the shape and structure of the labour force 
took place between the 1971 and 1981 censuses 
These changes did not affect the outcome that 
44 for an explanation of the relationship between DS and LS see section 5.2.2. 
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Socio-economic disadvantage in 1971 would appear to be 
predictive of unemployment and ill-health in 1981 (Fox 1986). 
Most of those unemployed in 1971, apart from those in the older age 
groups, were once again in employment ten years later. But those unemployed 
in 1971 had tended to be downwardly socially mobile. They were also more 
likely to have experienced marriage breakdown and movement from owner 
occupation to local authority housing. Furthermore, the children of those 
unemployed in 1971 were "disadvantaged" in terms of their risk of 
unemployment, the type of occupations they did obtain, and the type of 
housing they ended up in, regardless of the social class of their fathers. Fox 
expressed a fear that economic change was giving rise to an "underclass" of 
multiply disadvantaged families. 
8.2.3 The economists' contributions 
In these later phases of the unemployment and health debate and the 
process by which it metamorphosed, economists made two important 
contributions. Only one of these was by an established participant in the 
original debate, but the tone and content of both contributions was entirely 
consistent with the position taken by economists throughout. The first of these 
to appear in public was "An investigation into the incidence and dynamic 
structure of sickness and unemployment in Britain 1965-75" by Wiji 
Narendranathan, Steve Nickell and David Metcalf of the Centre for Labour 
Economics at the LSE (where Jon Stern had been working when he wrote his 
own contribution to the debate). It was published in the Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, (Series A), which appeared in early October of 1985). The 
content of this paper had been available as a working paper since 1982 
(Narendranathan et. al 1982), and discussed by Jon Stern in his 1983 paper in 
Population Studies, (see section 6.2.1). 
Like Stern in all his work prior to the "unemployment and health debate", 
these authors give prominence to the social concentration of BOTH 
unemployment AND sickness in the lower social classes and in certain regions 
and ethnic groups. Despite its potential importance in re-introducing the 
notion of the social concentration of both unemployment and ill-health into the 
debate, this paper received no media attention (not surprising in view of the 
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journal in which it appeared and the difficulty of the methods used) and was 
not commented on by activists, even for purposes of criticism. 
In November of 1986, a paper entitled "Unemployment and health: some 
pitfalls for the unwary" was published in Health Trends, a lesser-known journal 
devoted mainly to health service issues, but refereed and regarded as 
"respectable". It was by an economist, Adam Wagstaff, who had recently 
completed a Ph 0 under the supervision of Prof Alan Williams at the Centre for 
Health Economics at York. He threw down a challenge at the beginning of his 
paper: 
Contrary to what is often asserted ... the evidence regarding the 
impact of unemployment on health is far from clear-cut 
(Wagstaff 1986c). 
He emphasizes the "complex methodological problems" involved and the fact 
that because of these complexities "it is frequently difficult for the 
non-specialist to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of research reports 
about unemployment and health." He criticizes Moser et. al for not controlling 
for past health in their analysis and claims that 
unemployment status at April 1971 will tend to act as a proxy ... 
for health status at April 1971 
thus completely ignoring the argument that the effects of such selection on 
mortality should "wear off" over time. Like Narendranathan et. al.'s paper, 
Wagstaff's was noted by the Unemployment and Health Study Group, but had 
no media or political impact, at least not in the "public domain". 
These examples of research findings and reports show the way in which the 
debate on unemployment and health turned towards a debate on class 
inequalities and the persistence therein of a "cultural-behavioral" versus 
"structural" dichotomy of approaches to these questions. Up to this point, the 
group involved with the Longitudinal Study had relied on the technicQl tJU wer of 
their argument for defence against those who were critical of "structural" 
explanations. In the next section, however, the strategy of the LS team began 
to change, and to shift in the direction of "enrolling" new allies from the 
transepistemic field in which the debate took place. 
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8.2.4 Technical re-constitution: changing perspectives of the LS team 
In early January 1987, the next major paper from the OPCS Longitudinal 
Study was published in the BMJ. At least one of its author group felt that the 
message of their paper was ambiguous. It seemed, on one reading, to be a 
report of LOWER mortality amongst men seeking work in the week preceding 
the 1981 census (the 1981 "unemployed") during the period 1981-3 than had 
been found in the period 1971-73 for those "unemployed" in 1971. 
The argument of the paper was that when comparing the effect of 
unemployment on mortality in the years following the 1971 Census with that in 
the 'Iears after 1981, three factors had to be taken into account. 
1. unemployment had risen greatly, perhaps tending to make the 
unemployed a less "deviant" or "selected" group 
2. the numbers of men "permanently sick" and "early retired" had also risen 
greatly, so that those still in the labour market even if unemployed might 
be more highly selected for GOOD health 
3. the length of the average spell of unemployment was now much longer 
than in the early 1970s. 
On the last point, a paper in the Employment Gazette for September 1986 
(Hughes and Hutchinson 1986) had shown that the average number of weeks 
spent in unemployment in 1971 had been 8.4, in 1981 it was 20.5. These three 
factors might give rise to two opposing trends. The first two would tend to 
weaken any association of unemployment with mortality. The third might tend 
to strengthen the association. The results of the analysis duly demonstrated all 
three tendencies. The LS researchers adopted the strategy of comparing death 
rates for the years 1981-3 (all that was available at this time) with those for 
1971-3. In 1971-73, the SMR for men of working age at death who were 
seeking work in Census week 1971 was 121 (adjusted for social class). In 
1981-83 the equivalent figure was 112. Neither of these SMRs is significantly 
different from 100. 
Broken down by age and by year of death, however, a different 
interpretation becomes possible, and this is the one adopted in the paper. For 
younger men (15-44 at death in 1971-3, 16-44 at death in 1981-3) the SMR is 
162 in the earlier period and 160 in the later. These figures, because of the 
small number of deaths in the younger groups, are still not significantly greater 
than 100. But for older (aged 45-64) men, taking deaths in 1983, the SMR is 
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145, significantly above 1 DO, and much higher than the SMR of 123 for men 
"seeking work" in 1971 who died aged 45-64 in 1973. The effect of selection by 
GOOD health into unemployment rather than permanent sickness is also more 
visible in the 1981-3 period. The SMRs for the older men being below 100 for 
the Single years 1981 and 1982, but jumping to 145 in 1983, a classical "healthy 
worker effect" pattern, as the text points out. The authors conclude: 
It therefore seems that for men at older working ages, the data 
for 1983 provide the most appropriate estimate we have of 
mortality among those who were seeking work in 1981. 
Adding the 145 of older men in 1983 to the rate for younger men gave an 
overall SMR for this year of 147. Moser et. al. comment: 
the standardized mortality ratio of 147 at ages 16-64 in 1983 is 
the best measure we have of overall mortality among men who 
were seeking work in our sample. 
Thus, they nail their colours firmly to the mast of the "wearing off of 
selection effect". Without this argument, the figures could be interpreted as 
having demonstrated even less of a cause for concern in the 1980s than in the 
early 1970s. One co-author of the paper felt, therefore, that readers and 
potential publishers of the paper might well react "So what?" 
Any claim to have demonstrated a cause for concern is based on the 
adoption of the 1983 figure the "true" effect, the one visible after the effects of 
health-selection into the "seeking work" category (as opposed to long-term 
sickness or early retirement) had "worn off". The paper also makes reference to 
Fox's unpublished work on social mobility and possible "residualisation" in the 
families of those men who had been unemployed in 1971 (see section 8.2.2.). 
In a letter to the 8MJ, Dr 8 S Smith writing from a Midlands district general 
hospital (8 S Smith 1987), accused the LS team of having done no more than 
shown that "men who are at higher risk of ill health are more likely to be 
unemployed and more likely to die." Smoking, he argues, echoing Cook and 
the economic advisers (with whom he had no contact) could produce both the 
observed high rates of lung cancer and be indicative of 
personal or personality problems which lead to alcohol abuse, 
drug dependence, and broken marriages ... Smokers are more 
likely to have road accidents, to have psychiatric problems, and 
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to have been in prison ... Because they continue to smoke, 
smokers would seem in general to possess less motivation .. 
In their replies (Moser et. al 1987b & c), Moser and colleagues did NOT use 
the argument from selection effects wearing off, rather surprisingly. They argue 
that their men "seeking work" were selected for good health at the beginning 
of the study, that the great majority of the 1981 unemployed were in steady 
jobs in 1971 (according to Fox's unpublished monograph on social mObility), so 
that the 1981 unemployed can hardly be seen as some sort of deviant group. If 
the mortality of the larger, more SOCially heterogeneous unemployed group in 
1981 so closely resembles that of the 1971 unemployed, how can both effects 
be due to predisposing factors? They conclude: 
Reduction in cigarette smoking and changes in other aspects of 
lifestyle with adverse health effects are, of course, desirable. 
However, it would seem from available evidence that they are 
unlikely to be successful in removing health inequalities unless 
other problems associated with unemployment and poverty are 
also tackled. (letter by KA Moser, PO Goldblatt, AJ Fox, DR Jones, 
BMJ 21 Feb 1987, p. 509) 
This letter is far less technical than any of this group's previous work on 
unemployment and health. It replies to Smith's claims about the moral 
characteristics of smokers and the unemployed in (at least partly) similarly 
"moral" terms. There seems to be nothing in the data they have presented on 
January 10th or elsewhere which would act as clear evidence AGAINST some 
kind of hypothesis to the effect that over the long term, "smokers" could be 
the ones worst affected by recession. The one possible technical argument, 
that the effect of smoking on a cohort, like that of chronic illness (or indeed 
"suicidal tendencies"), might be expected to "wear off" over time as smokers 
died, and that mortality in a group "selected for smoking" would therefore not 
exhibit the "healthy worker" pattern of persistently raised mortality levels, is 
not made here. Rather, these two letters make opposing claims of a more 
directly "political" kind -- should health inequalities be tackled by policies 
directed at the behaviour of individuals or by macro-economic policies bearing 
on poverty and unemployment? 
The tone of this letter seems to indicate the beginning of a renewed effort 
by the LS team to "enrol" allies, perhaps of a new kind. Which made it all the 
more frustrating for them that the media response they expected to their 
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January 10 paper did not materialize . Only a single article appeared, in The 
Times of January 9 (Prentice 1987). There were no calls to City University 
requesting television or even radio interviews and no other coverage in 
national or local daily papers or weekly journals. More galling still, the Times 
piece was the result, not of the appearance of the paper in the BMJ, but of a 
feature-writer's search for "background" material for an article on a factory 
closure. 
Other issues now preoccupied the science and health correspondents. And 
there was no "information subsidy" to tempt them. It must be remembered 
that the LS researchers "played the game according to the rules" and did not 
indulge in "soap box" exercises, a strategy which enhanced the credibility of 
their work in the eyes of colleagues. The appearance of the 1984 paper in the 
media had been due to an information subsidy organised by the UHSG. When I 
asked the member of the group who had co-ordinated the 1984 subsidy for his 
reaction to the media silence he remarked: 
I would have told Andy Veitch that the excess mortality was 22% 
last time [that is, for 1971-73] and 45% this time, so he could 
say that unemployment had twice as much effect on mortality in 
1981-83. By the way, that 145 was social class standardised, 
wasn't it.. [MB: I don't know] Oh well, but they [Moser et. al] do 
SAY that adjustment for class made little difference, so you 
COULD use it. 
The question to be asked, therefore, by the researcher into the social 
problem process (as opposed to that asked by the dismayed participants) is 
why, on this occasion, unlike in 1984, the interest-groups who had once 
provided the information subsidy that carried Moser and colleagues' earlier 
paper into at least some degree of limelight did not behave the same way in 
1987. The next chapter will explain why this was. 
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CHAPTER 9 
UNEMPLOYMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
SOCIAL POLICY MARCH 1985 - MARCH 1987 
In chapters 7 and 8 it has been shown that one aspect of the development 
of the unemployment and health debate was a process of confrontation in 
which the arguments on both sides, but particularly on the side which held that 
there "was an effect" of unemployment on physical health, became more 
elaborate in both technical and substantive terms. In order to explain the fate 
of these developing knowledge-claims, this chapter will trace some of the 
processes which unfolded in the "trans-scientific field" in which the scientists 
were embedded. The "field" will be divided into four parts: (a) the pressure 
group and the Labour Party (b) the sub-profession (c) the media (d) the 
relationship between the government and the scientific community. 
9.1 The Unemployment and Health Study Group: New Directions 
At its first meeting in 1985 (on 16 January), an agenda item was 'Whither 
UHSG?". It was felt that despite Kenneth Clarke's statement at the MIND 
conference 
We [are] not "over the top" yet as regards government attitudes, 
research findings and the Unemployment Health and Social Policy 
Report [the Leeds Report] ... the steadily more conclusive findings 
of research needed wider dissemination ... The facts about the 
quality of life on the dole ... and the effects of relative poverty of 
the long-term unemployed (e.g. on nutrition ... ) needed wider 
dissemination. 
And at the next Study Group meeting, on 19 February, Watkins and 
Scott-Samuel reported back on the CEPR Workshop 
DHSS participants had acknowledged the causal implications but 
had stopped short of any firm commitment to action on the 
policy front 
They felt that Gravelle's discussion of Platt's paper had been conducted "in 
incomprehensible econometric jargon -- an English translation was needed 
before any assessment was possible". 
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The group's April meeting was in one way the end of an era, in that it was 
the last which was devoted mainly to the discussion of research into 
unemployment and health. There was bitter commentary on the CEPR meeting, 
and the write-up in the CEPR Bulletin. Several workshop participants had 
discussed the CEPR Bulletin's version and told Study Group members that they 
were 
generally agreed that the report had been written in a 
tendentious way in order to convey the fake impression that 
there had been general agreement that more research was 
needed before any action could be taken on the health damage 
caused by unemployment. This would permit DHSS and 
government to claims that "something had been done", while 
continuing their inactivity over policy responses. 
The new direction for the Study Group was signalled by a short paragraph 
in the April minutes about work by Gill Westcott on "The cost to the economy 
of maintaining unemployed workers". In June, she began a correspondence 
with Neil Fraser and Adrian Sinfield of Edinburgh University, whose paper 'The 
Real Cost of Unemployment" had been published in March. The paper was 
circulated to all Study Group members in July 1985 for discussion at the 
August meeting. The Study Group began to take more interest in matters such 
as "job creation" from this point in time. 
In June and August, the main topic at meetings was once again "Whither 
UHSG?". They felt that they had been successful in wringing TWO ministerial 
admissions that unemployment "affected health". The second was in the form 
of a letter (dated 1 July 1985) from Secretary of State for Health and Social 
Security Norman Fowler to Michael Meacher (who had, at the suggestion of 
UHSG members, sent Fowler a copy of the Leeds Report). In the letter, Fowler 
stated that he 
would not question that unemployment may well have negative 
effects on health in many cases 
and that the DHSS 
continues to monitor research evidence on the relationship 
between unemployment and health, to take it into account in the 
formulation of policy, and bring it to the attention of other 
government departments as appropriate. 
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At the UHSG meeting of 8 August, when this letter was discussed, Westcott 
suggested that this was the moment for the group to "broaden its focus from 
unemployment to unhealthy aspects of economic growth and the social costs 
of recession." Having offered this "new" perspective (though see section 4.3.3), 
and the skills necessary to pursue it, Westcott then announced her resignation 
from the group for personal reasons. Another meeting did not take place until 
November. By this time, a new health economist (Catriona Waddington) had 
been recruited. The continuing question 'Whither UHSG?" still appeared on the 
agenda for meetings. As part of these explorations, Jennie Po pay was invited 
to address the group in February of 1986, on her research on how social 
workers, health visitors and health educators dealt with unemployed clients. 
This new direction, in the direction of "alleviation of the effects of 
unemployment on health" (as advocated by the government economist in 
section 7.4), seemed to mark an upturn in interest in the Study Group. The 
meeting of 21 February 1986 was attended by 13 people. It seems that at this 
pOint some participants from the beginning of the debate, who had stood back 
from the intensely technical developments of 1982-84, now re-entered it, and 
aided to complete the shift from "research dissemination" to "service" and 
"policy" issues. 
On 2 May, 1986, came the first public indication that the Labour party 
intended to take up the health consequences of unemployment as one reason 
for its own economic strategy. A House of Commons press release by Meacher 
stated: 
Over 17000 people have died as a result of unemployment since 
1979, Michael Meacher, Labour's chief spokesman on Health and 
Social Services, reveals today at a North-Western TUC Health 
Committee 
Using Scott-Samuel's by now well-publicised extrapolation of the 1984 LS 
paper, Meacher claimed that "Just over 3000 people will die this year because 
of unemployment". The press release continued, also using the results of Beale 
and Nethercott's study: 
The list is endless. The impact on the quality of life for the 
unemployed and their families is devastating, The cost of treating 
unemployment related disorders is astronomical, and soaring, 
while health budgets are standing still at best, and are often cut. 
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This links the unemployment-health issue to the question of "health service 
expenditure", on which Labour spokespersons had been scoring regular 
victories in Parliament and the media ever since the Radical Statistics Group's 
"Unsafe in The Hands" pamphlet of Easter 1985 (see Section 9.2 below). 
The inexorable rise in unemployment engineered by this 
Government clearly indicates the need for a massive increase in 
health spending and yet health service budgets in the 1980s have 
at best stood still... 
The press release also uses Fraser and Sinfield's work on the costs of 
unemployment. 
On 17 May, the BMJ's regular "Letter from Westminster" column was headed 
"Unemployment Kills, claims Labour's Michael Meacher", validating Meacher's 
figure of "3000 deaths" in 1986 as "a statistic based on data provided by the 
OPCS Longitudinal Study survey of the effects of unemployment." The 
Westminster columnist, Philip Johnston, comments 
Statistical experts and medical researchers may be able to find 
major flaws in Mr Meacher's analysis. But to the layman --
namely the ordinary voter -- it is a chilling catalogue. The claims 
appear to be outlandish, but even if only half true they can hardly 
be ignored 
At the end of June, the Labour Party launched the first of a series of 
regional campaigns in Newcastle upon Tyne, "The Battle for Jobs and Welfare", 
stressing the health and social costs of unemployment. David Hencke, 
Westminster correspondent of the Guardian, found that the "attempt" to use 
OPCS LS figures "to claim that 1294 people have died in the North as a direct 
result of unemployment since 1979" was "the most controversial part of the 
campaign". The headline to his piece was "Labour seeks to blame deaths on 
unemployment". Here again, the unemployment and the NHS funding issues are 
explicitly linked. 
By the UHSG's July meeting, the Labour party had also produced "Health for 
All a charter for preventive health", which was welcomed by 
"Manifesto"-oriented doctors. The Study Group was now set on a path which 
combined macro-economic discussion with "service issues". In September, the 
Leeds Report itself was re-issued, having been reprinted by the Manchester 
University Department of Community Medicine Centre for Professional 
Development. 
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In October, a research and pressure group which had been set up in April 
1985, the Employment Institute ventured briefly onto the territory of the 
unemployment and health debate in its "Charter for Jobs - Economic Report 
vol 2 no 1 ". Joanna Munro and Alan Shipman (both young economists) had 
produced a report entitled "The human costs of unemployment" which drew on 
discussions which Munro and Shipman had held with members of the UHSG. 
They had by no means swallowed the line of the Study group, however: 
Statistical association on its own [they wrote] is no proof that 
unemployment is a cause of ill health. For it may be due to the 
fact that people in poor health are more likely to become 
unemployed and have greater difficulty in finding work again 
once they have lost their jobs. 
This quote shows just how far Moser and her colleagues' concept of the 
"unhealthy nonworker effect" was from penetrating the policy debate, even 
TWO YEARS after the publication of their first paper in the Lancet. Munro and 
Shipman go on to discuss possible "mechanisms" by which unemployment may 
affect physical health, such as the physical demands of the sort of work done 
by people more at risk of unemployment, and the effect of poverty on nutrition, 
heating and access to medical care. As in the rest of the debate, the effect of 
unemployment on mental health (short of suicidal behaviour) is not questioned. 
On suicide and parasuicide they write: 
The form of the association between unemployment, suicide, and 
parasuicide, is not incontrovertible. (Munro and Shipman 1986) 
though they quote Steve Platt, as well as an "informal account" from Social 
Work Today of the suicide of a young man in Shotton in support of the 
possible "causal" effect of unemployment on suicidal behaviour. 
A member of the LS team attended a conference on unemployment and 
health arranged jointly by the UHSG and the liverpool-based Social Research in 
Health group, at Manchester Town Hall in November 1986. This was the only 
time that any member of the group of researchers at the SSRU working on the 
LS data ever attended a meeting organised by the Study Group. He was greatly 
intrigued by the Study Group members he met, but considered the tenor of the 
conference "unworldly", "utopian" and not seriously connected with the 
epidemiological work on unemployment and mortality in which he was 
involved. But these "utopian" topics were working very well for the Study 
Group, which went into 1987 with unprecedented support. Members continued 
219 
to be invited to speak at meetings allover Britain, to advise on research 
programmes (including the ESRC's "16-19 Initiative") and talk to journalists (but 
now to feature writers more than "news" reporters). This had been achieved 
without members gaining an understanding of "health selection effects", or 
making any specific use of the more technically sophisticated arguments 
developed by either the medical statisticians or the economists. 
9.2 The political agenda and the IINew Public Health" 
Two things are illustrated by the above account of the activities of the 
Unemployment and Health Study Group. One is that by mid-1986 it was no 
longer felt to be necessary for members of the group, or for any other 
activists, to use "health" considerations in order to get unemployment onto the 
Labour Party's agenda or to use "unemployment" to raise the profile of health 
issues. The other is what happens when a pressure group seems to have gone 
as far as it can in one direction (extracting confessions from Ministers), and 
sets out in another. The saliency of "research" to the group was greatly 
reduced as it took up a new set of issues around the "alleviation" of 
unemployment and of its effects, and attracted interest from health educators 
and other paraprofessionals. Another process which unfolded during the year 
1985-86 was to reduce the importance of the research on unemployment and 
health to "Manifesto" community medicine. In this process, "Social Medicine" 
and "Public Health" became more prominent items on the agenda of 
Community Medicine, and even of the wider profession, carried there by a 
number of different issues. Unemployment and health was itself beginning to 
become redundant. 
In May 1985, the Labour party took up a lively offensive on NHS expenditure 
after the government had circulated a free pamphlet entitled "The Health 
Service in England" claiming unprecedented rises in expenditure on, and 
provision of, health care during the lifetime of the Thatcher administration. 
This offensive was greatly helped by a counter-information subsidy produced 
by the Radical Statistics Health Group called "Unsafe in Their Hands". The 
author group included Derek Cook. It was published and press-released on 8 
April, accusing the government of presenting "misleading and dishonest 
figures" ... which did not allow for the rate of inflation specific to NHS costs, 
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the rising number of elderly people, and the expense of new medical 
techniques. "Unsafe in Their Hands" was much quoted over the following two 
years, for example, in the Opposition Day debate on the NHS of 2 July 1985 
(Hansard cols 203-241). Michael Meacher renamed the government leaflet 
"Fowler's howlers", and pointed out that treating a larger number of patients, as 
the leaflet claimed the NHS was now doing, was not necessarily a positive 
indicator of the nation's health. On the contrary, it 
may merely reflect the fact that more people are ill under this 
government ... the trebling of unemployment, the halving of 
housing investment, the doubling of poverty, the weakening of 
controls over health and safety at work ... one does not have to 
be a statistician [!] to know that things are going badly in the 
NHS (col 204) 
During the debate, Labour health spokesperson Frank Dobson was not 
contradicted when he declared 
For a long time the government denied that unemployment leads 
to ill health. They cannot deny it any longer. Reputable surveys 
show that general practitioners face higher demands for primary 
health care from people who are out of work ... death rates 
among unemployed men can be over 20 per cent [sic], that 
para-suicide is nine times more likely among the unemployed. 
Neither the medical profession as a whole nor any of its subgroups took up 
the potential threats to health of the proposals for the reform of social 
security, which were being discussed in the Cabinet during the spring and 
summer of 1985, and were issued as a Green Paper on July 3.However, the 
unease which was aroused by some of the proposed changes fed into a 
revived medical and public health debate on "growing inequalities". 
In February 1986, Frank Dobson addressed a meeting of the Progressive 
Strategies for Health group in Sheffield, and told the audience of 150 that NHS 
funding was a "trivial" issue in comparison to poverty and unemployment, thus 
bringing Labour Party expressed views into line with the professional ideology 
of "Manifesto" community medicine. Even so, Dobson came under fire for 
failure to commit his party to more specific health policy measures. 
Scott-Samuel asked him why Labour did not: 
sit down and decide what is feasible and commit itself to making 
people live longer by 'x' number of years 
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Others called for a salaried dental service, for health authority members to 
be elected, for more redistribution of resources to under-funded regions. 
Dobson insisted that he and Meacher had been attempting to "force the debate 
on the government's handling of the NHS into one about the nation's health 
rather than whether or not NHS resources had increased by 0.05 percent" 
(Feinmann 1986). Peter Draper called for the Labour party to "adopt a new 
approach to public health" and 
get across ... that it is the present rampant, free market ideology 
that is the health hazard. 
On 26 March the H&SSJ published an article written jointly by Draper and 
Scott-Samuel on 'Whatever happened to Public Health?" (Draper and 
Scott-Samuel 1986). The social problem claims made in this article range from 
"crumbling sewers and death from hospital acquired food poisoning" to the 
arms race. It sets out an agenda for a new "public health militancy". Following 
a serious outbreak of salmonella poisoning at Stanley Royd hospital in 
Wakefield, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Services, Norman 
Fowler, had ordered an inquiry into the role of "public health doctors and 
community medicine", announced in the Commons on 20th January (Hencke 
1986). Draper and Scott-Samuel used this opportunity to gain publicity for the 
ideas of "Manifesto" community medicine. They called for a greater 
understanding of 
the health significance of public policy more generally, for 
instance, in agriculture or housing, in order to develop health 
enhancing rather than health damaging public policy 
Also, echoing Frank Dobson, they claimed that 
we [now] have the widespread dissemination of an economic 
philosophy that is intrinsically in conflict with a public health 
perspective ... The conflict between free market ideology and 
public health is one of the reasons why a public health approach 
is intrinsically "political" 45 
Copies of the H&SSJ article were circulated to a group of people who were 
then invited to begin discussions aimed at setting up a "Public Health Alliance". 
~------
45 It should perhaps be noted here, however, that in the winter of 1987, the Public Health Alliance 
which emerged from these efforts declared itself firmly "non-political" and "non-aligned". 
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Meanwhile, the inquiry into public health (christened the Acheson inquiry, 
after its chair, Dr Donald Acheson, the Chief Medical Officer at the DHSS) was 
calling for evidence from various organisations and individuals. Its terms of 
reference included 
determining the health needs of whole populations, evaluations 
of the outcome of services, medical advice and support to local 
authorities (letter circulated to all members of the Society for 
Social Medicine, 18 April 1986) 
On 19 April, the Lancet's "Commentary from Westminster" column claimed 
that the state of the NHS was the issue which "most disturbs" the world 
outside of Westminster. The by-election campaigns in Brecon and Radnor and 
in Fulham had, the columnist David McKie feels, demonstrated this clearly. 
Opinion polls of various sorts had shown that the public were worried about 
the state of the health service and disapproving of the Conservatives' handling 
of it (McKie 1986a). 
In early June, the BMA's Board of Science and Education began to circulate 
interested groups and individuals (including Radical Community Medicine and 
the Radical Statistics Health Group) asking for written evidence to its ''Working 
Group on Deprivation and III-Health,,46. On July 1 st, not to be outdone the 
Faculty of Community Medicine published a "Charter for Action on Health for 
All by the Year 2000". This document called for the government to declare that 
the health of its people is one of the most important products of 
a civilised community [and to] consider the health 
consequences of legislation and policies in all government 
departments ... pursue policies designed to eliminate absolute 
and relative poverty ... [and] to reduce inequality 
Alwyn Smith, retiring as President of the Faculty of Community Medicine, 
told the Guardian: 
Britain was the leader in public health a generation ago. It has 
now lost that position ... and the result is that we are falling 
behind our neighbours in those areas -- child health and 
immunisation, health promotion and prevention -- when we 
should be in front. 
46 For the eventual fate of this exercise see British Medical Journal 1987. 
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Here he explicitly links the management of infectious disease 
("immunisation") with "prevention and health promotion", indicating an 
enrolment strategy now possibly opening to the subprofession and its Faculty 
in a period when AIDS and health inequalities were prominent items on the 
agenda of public debate. David McKie's "Commentary from Westminster" 
column pointed out the good use to which the Labour party put this document. 
To them, he felt, it was 
No surprise ... but a clear political bonus. It allows them [Labour] 
to relaunch their standard allegations quoting such a 
distinguished and impartial umpire as the President of the 
Faculty, Prof Alwyn Smith, ... (McKie 1986b) 
The production and dissemination of this document may be taken as a sign 
of the strengthening of the position of the "Manifesto" position within "the 
Community Medicine establishment". By the spring of 1987, for example, "rising 
young stars" on the more "managerial" side of the subprofession were telling 
me they "took it for granted" that questions of inequality were just as central 
to "health policy" as medical audit and performance indicators. 
On 29 July 1986 the Registrar General's Decennial Supplement on 
Occupational Mortality was published, to be followed by a series of articles in 
the "quality" media on social and health inequality. In September, the 
appearance of a monograph by Peter Townsend and colleagues on "Health 
Inequality in the North-East" kept the issue in the public eye. In response to 
this, a relatively new junior Health Minister, Mrs Edwina Currie, claimed in a 
widely reported speech that, in the words of one article: 
Poor health among people in the North was due more to 
ignorance than poverty or unemployment 
This speech, and various replies to it, penetrated the popular press, with 
headlines such as Eat Your Words, Mrs Currie, and Bananas! MPs Blast 
Edwina (Daily Mirror, September 25). Badges and stickers were quickly 
produced with a Currie and Chips logo, to be distributed by groups such as 
the London Food Commission (some of these found their way into Departments 
of Community Medicine). This ministerial initiative was widely regarded as an 
example of an ambitious "new girl" taking it upon herself to counter the 
beginnings of a consensus amongst a variety of professional and pressure 
groups that aspects of social and economic policy could have implications for 
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health. That is, it was seen by observers as a move in the "cycle of credibility" 
of a junior Minister, entailing the necessity to balance the costs of 
"sensationalism" against those of anonymity. The ensuing debate on the diet of 
Northerners was, however, only sporadic. 
9.3 The state and the media: the "problem of suppression of 
information" 
The media attitude to the delay in publication of the Registrar General's 
Decennial Supplement on Occupational Mortality is consistent with what had 
been the media response to "unemployment and health" throughout 1986. This, 
in turn, reflected the growing fertility for journalists of the disillusion in the 
civil service with government attitudes towards "social engineering", and 
towards the legal position of civil servants in relation to the Official Secrets 
Act. The whole of this story cannot be traced here, although the use of 
"information subsidy" by disgruntled users of "official data" has been a 
recurring theme in the present study. But throughout 1986, whenever 
"unemployment and health" appeared in newspapers and weekly journals, it 
tended to be linked to the "problem" of "government suppression of 
information". 
Early in 1986, Bryan Christie gave me one journalist's point of view on why 
"suppression of information" was now a more interesting topic than "Death on 
the dole". He commented: 
I wouldn't write anything more about unemployment and health 
now. It's quite clear that unemployment does harm health. The 
real story now is how civil servants are sitting on information. 
His generalisation of "civil servants" is somewhat too broad, as the reason 
why journalists BECAME aware of "suppression" was that SOME civil servants 
(especially but not only professional advisers such as planners and research 
managers) were occasionally producing "leaked" information. The frustration of 
health planning advisers in Scotland, for example, is expressed in a feature on 
the Scottish Health Services Planning Council which Bryan Christie wrote for 
the Scotsman in October 1985. The SHPC's Secretary was Mr T. Drummond 
Hunter. Hunter told Christie that the "career" civil servants: 
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regarded strategic planners with ill-concealed disdain ... Why turn 
over stones that did not need to be turned over? Why open cans 
of worms that did not actually need to be opened 
Interestingly, here Hunter speaks of the struggle by policy planners for 
"occupational survival" as outlined by Prince in exactly the same words (see 
section 3.3). He felt that as a Quango, the Planning Council (set up in 1974) had 
fallen into disrepute during the Conservative administration. It was instructed to 
confine itself to devising economy measures. The fate of the Council, as told 
here, sounds remarkably similar to the problems facing the Central policy 
Review Staff as related by Heclo and Wildavsky. 
The issue of "government advisers being ignored" was also taken up in 
relation to the review of social security. On 11 November 1985, Michael 
Meacher in the Commons debate on the Queen's Speech, accused (as Hunter 
had done) ministers of a "bunker mentality". He claimed that "advice was now 
tailored to what ministers wanted to hear" (Travis 1985), and that even "top 
civil servants who do not share ministers' political prejudices had been 
sidelined .... objective and independent advice no longer reached ministers". 
In the same vein, on 28 February 1986 Jeremy Laurence wrote for New 
Society on "How Ministers fiddle figures" (Laurence 1986a), enumerating the 
"distortions of statistics on public spending, the unemployment rate, NHS 
spending, tax relief to home owners, hypothermia deaths and the health of the 
unemployed". The Central Statistical Office, he wrote 
continually finds itself in the position of having to defend its 
integrity ... Statistics are the bedrock of government. They supply 
the facts against which its policies are justified and the measure 
by which their success (or failure) is assessed. 
Thus Laurence delineates one of the new "social problem processes" in 
which government statisticians had, especially since the 1980 Rayner Review, 
found themselves participating (see section 3.1). It was this process, and the 
claims and information subsidies which arose from it, which gave some of their 
shape to the alliances which now began to form around questions of public 
health in 1985 and 1986. A "conspiracy theory", Laurence felt, was, in this case, 
not mere fantasy. Statisticians fight regular battles with civil 
servants and ministers over the presentation of figures. 
Sir John Boreham, who had retired as head of the Central Statistical Office in 
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1985, told Laurence: 
Governments are composed of human beings. They don't like 
publishing statistics that show their policies aren't working --
yet. That's when it gets interesting. 
According to Laurence, the statisticians felt that they "nearly always won". 
An exception had been the removal of a table on the health of the unemployed 
from the 1986 edition of Social Trends. Boreham himself had "got as far as 
drafting his resignation letter once" and was aware that "technical questions 
such as the recognition of hypothermia as a cause of death ... get fogged up 
with political questions." Overall, however, Boreham considered that 
"The government is pretty clean in this country -- BECAUSE WE 
HAVE A BLOODY POWERFUL SCIENTIFIC ESTABLISHMENT (my 
emphasis, p.362) 
Here can be seen the very obverse of the complaints voiced by 
administrators who spoke to me that "statisticians would not do 
quick-and-dirties" and "stood on their professional pride". Seen from the 
statisticians' point of view, their obduracy was part of what kept government in 
Britain "clean" (that is, "keeping government honest" was being offered to the 
media as a "social problem" to which professional statisticians' skills and ethos 
was offered as "the answer"). 
On 2 June 1986, however, the government began a "major review" of the 
work of the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, to be carried out by 
the Machinery of Government division of the Cabinet Office. No warning of this 
review was given to top officials at the OPCS before the public announcement. 
The assistant secretary of the First Division Association, the trade union to 
which many civil servants working for OPCS belong, told Richard Norton-Taylor 
of the Guardian that this had 
"major implications for the integrity of government statistics ... " 
The response of "some officials" was that the proposal to devolve statistical 
work to the appropriate government departments would produce a temptation 
to "doctor statistics". Another proposal was that interviewing surveys such as 
the General Household Survey should be carried out by private research 
organisations. Norton-Taylor reminds Guardian readers that 
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The government has been reducing the supply of official 
statistics and the money spent on collecting them since a Rayner 
review carried out in 1981. It stopped work by the Central 
Statistical Office on the distribution of wealth and reduced the 
number of official estimates on income distribution. 
9.4 The future of the debate? 
On 21 March, Laurence wrote a two-page feature on unemployment and 
health . He cites Warr and colleagues' research as having "proved" that mental 
health was damaged by unemployment, but 
For politicans ... a mental patient is less persuasive than a 
corpse. 
and goes on to quote the LS (referring in a short phrase to the "unhealthy 
nonworker effect") and Steve Platt's and Norman Kreitman's research on 
parasuicide. The latter, he feels, shows that ''The link between suicide and 
unemployment is one of the strongest so far established" despite Gravelle's 
criticisms, which had still not been published at this time. Laurence calls for 
more and better research ... to keep up pressure on the 
government ... [which is] clearly embarrassed by the research. 
However, this account of the unemployment and health debate has 
indicated that it is not the mere existence of research findings, or even the 
opinion of the academic community as to their "quality" which ensures the 
entry of knowledge claims into the public sphere and policy debate. In order to 
become either "true" or "policy-relevant", knowledge claims need to be "points 
of passage". That is, they must attract the assent of a number of groups, a 
network which will pick up and pass on the claims intact to a wider audience. 
What has been described in this chapter is the dispersal of the actor-network 
that carried claims about the health of the unemployed. The network had, in 
any case, never been strong enough nor sufficiently well connected to the 
groups of researchers, to ensure a very wide or consistent acceptance of the 
link between unemployment and ill health as a "fact". But it did not disperse 
solely because of its weaknesses or because of the strength of its opponents 
(in government or in "rival" groups). An important factor in the final detachment 
of the network from the producers of new knowledge claims was the success 
of constituent groups in attaining their objectives in other ways, and through 
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other alliances which did not include the researchers. 
By mid-1986, the unemployment-health link was sufficiently well 
established amongst non-expert opinion for new initiatives to have been 
undertaken whereby local authorities and health authorities in some areas set 
up programmes of job-creation, aiming their programmes especially at groups 
hardest hit by recession (see Harris and Smith 1987). There was a new task for 
health education and health promotion professionals, at least as much as this 
relatively small group could deal with at the time, in providing special 
measures to protect the health of the unemployed (Laughlin and Black 1985). 
"Unemployment and health" was accepted as a topic for consideration by the 
new and expanding ""Healthy Cities" initiative, the most conspicuous aspect of 
the WHO Health for All by the Year 2000 programme, at least in Britain. There 
was also sufficient residual academic interest for researchers to find space in 
journals for occasional papers on the subject, including many participants in 
the earliest stages of the debate getting some "return" on that investment 
(Westcott 1987, Brenner 1987a, 1987b, Forbes and Macgregor 1987 Charlton et. 
al 1987). These groups (health educators and "promoters", community 
development workers, academics) could continue as if "the health of the 
unemployed" had been accepted as a legitimate problem requiring the use of 
their skills. Just as the health educators and community development workers 
could ignore the doubts and complexities of the academic debate, so could 
researchers write as if the "wearing off of selection" argument had never been 
proposed. For example, Forbes and McGregor (who also must be regarded as 
politically relatively sympathetic to the aims of those who promoted Brenner's 
work) wrote in 1987: 
Interpretation [of the LS results] is difficult because the 
researchers cannot control for the role of ill-health in generating 
some of the unemployment experienced by their sample 
and Charlton (a statistician, by this time working for the DHSS and in terms of 
political background and allegiance far less sympathetic to Brenner's early 
sympathisers): 
... [LS] findings ... do not rule out the possibility of a selection 
effect ... 
Other groups now discovered new paths towards their goals and new 
markets for their expertise. A wish to change the Labour party's policies 
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towards unemployment had been one aim of early participants in the debate 
(see Chapter 4.). This now seemed so out of date as to be almost bizarre. 
Events between the General Elections of 1979 and 1987 had nearly wiped out 
the memory of Dennis Healey's deflationary economic policies, and of the 
overriding concern with inflation rather than unemployment, which had meant 
that special effort was seen as necessary by some Labour Party activists in the 
late 1970s to place unemployment higher on the party's agenda. Those who 
wished to increase Labour's concern with health had a similar experience. 
"Health" was second only to "unemployment" in Labour's stated priorities in the 
1987 election, although the two issues were seldom explicitly linked. 
Meanwhile, "Manifesto" community medicine and its allies in academic 
departments found other social problems to tackle: health inequality, 
democracy in the NHS, equity in resource allocation, the need for more public 
health education at a time when the threat of AIDS seemed to loom over 
Britain's sexually active population. All these concerns could be combined, 
conceptually and organisationally, under the banner of the need for a New 
Public Health, raised initially by Peter Draper, supported by Scott-Samuel, 
Player, the editorial group of Radical Community Medicine, and even sections of 
the BMA, as illustrated by two editorials in the BMJ, both written by Richard 
Smith (Smith 1986a and b)47 Other enterprising professional groups could also 
"get mileage out of" the new SOCial-problem processes which succeeded 
"unemployment and health": the first Chair of the newly formed Public Health 
Alliance was the Secretary of the Health Visitors' Association, Shirley Goodwin, 
and the first major organisation to affiliate was the Royal College of Nursing. 
On the subject of new directions for community medicine, the editorial 
group of Radical Community Medicine, in the Autumn edition of 1986 (vol 27) 
could see that: "public health" was "beginning to be fashionable again ... the 
Black Report is probably more relevant here than the Acheson inquiry [on the 
organisation of Community Medicine] looks likely to be." Here the "Manifesto" 
group more or less explicitly pose the social problem of "health inequality" as a 
47 Smith's participation in the debate is a good example of "entrepreneunalism" in its later 
stages, and the heterogeneous nature of "network-building" in the translation of "science" into 
public and policy debate. His series on "Occupationless Health" and the resulting book was not 
an original piece of research. It took pains to be "fair" but did not avoid controversy. It made no 
contribution to the "scientific debate" directly, and yet was as influential as any other piece of 
work in maintaining "interest". It also played a role in Smith becoming a favoured candidate for 
editorship of the Journal. 
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likely saviour of their mainstream subprofession from the threat of being 
re-organised out of existence. The editorial group now set about planning a 
whole issue on "Health Inequalities" for 1987. 
During the summer of 1986, the vehemence of both the claims being made 
by the new studies of health inequality and the government's attempts to 
counteract them was very similar to the mood of the unemployment and health 
debate in 1981. John Fox, as director of the Social Statistics Research Unit at 
City University, within which the LS team were located, had been centrally 
involved in both the unemployment and health debate and the debate on health 
inequalities. The reason why so much of the work on the LS looked (to me, 
and to other participants from "Manifesto" community medicine and the "New 
Public Health") so "good" and "relevant" was that at one point it almost did 
provide an "obligatory point of passage" for two major debates: on the health 
consequences of unemployment, and those of other social inequalities. The 
concept of the wearing-off of selection effects was explicitly presented by 
SSRU staff in various papers as an answer to problems in both these areas of 
inquiry. It seemed to hold the potential to close the circuit and finally bring 
into contact the concerns expressed, for example: at the Stirling "consultation" 
of 1982; in the work of some economic advisers since 1979; and in the Black 
report, with those of campaigners on the "single issue" of unemployment and 
health. 
Some participants in and observers of the debate had suggested that the 
"excessive" nature and "showy" presentation of Brenner's early papers had 
actually damaged the cause of those who wished to carry out a "serious" 
investigation of whether or not unemployment affected health. If the debate 
had been conducted from the beginning in a lower key, if claims had been put 
forward "according to the rules" of academic scepticism, then the attention of 
hostile forces would not have been attracted to intellectually fragile work. 
There may be some substance in this argument, which only further studies of 
other similar debates would clarify. However, workers in the "strong 
programme" of SSK (for example, Shapin 1982) have suggested that in some 
cases it IS the politically sensitive nature of debates which produces a more 
and more intricate and technical form in knowledge-claims, as a response to 
the strenuousness of the challenges coming from opponents. This is the 
process which I have called "technical fragmentation". Shapin has suggested 
that 
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the social interests of groups of scientists should not be seen as 
sources of error and distortion 
but, on the contrary, 
the action of conflicting social interests ... may be seen as an 
important element in the development of bodies of knowledge 
valued as 'interest-free' ... (p. 143) 
One way of looking at the outcome of Fox and his colleagues' necessarily 
careful(partly because of Brenner's "errors" and partly, perhaps because of the 
very hostility of government which many bemoaned) defence of their position 
is to see it, as many participants did (and not only those who "agreed" with the 
basic proposition that unemployment damaged health) as a major piece of 
intellectual virtuosity. The superiority of Moser et. al,'s work over that of 
Brenner was never questioned. There is, therefore, no explanation to be found 
here for its lack of persistent impact on policy debate. 
It is here that the work of the "strong programme" of the sociology of 
scientific knowledge, and its development in the direction of a "translation 
theory" seems a useful aid to understanding the progress of this debate. 
Technically and ethically (in that they, too, "played the game according to the 
rules") the work of the LS team was not seriously faulted. But their alliances 
were, in Latour's terms, just not strong enough. It was as a consequence and 
not a cause of the weakness of the "lash-up", the institutional nexus between 
researchers, pressure groups, professional subgroups and the Health 
Departments that the question "does unemployment cause ill-health?" remained 
"scientifically" an open one at the end of my period of observation. The 
social-problem processes in which the non-academic participant groups 
invested their energies, and from which they hoped to gain increased prestige 
and command over resources, could now simply move on, without anyone 
having to be concerned with this question. Finding themselves thus stranded, 
the academics, too, had to "move on", according to their own unwritten rules 
of reasonable and competent performance (see Chapter 1). Specifically, during 
1986 and 1987, the field of contestation between health economics and 
community medicine shifted from unemployment and health to health 
inequalities, where a sharp public controversy (Ilisley and Ie Grand 1986, Ilisley 
1987, Wilkinson 1986, Scott-Samuel 1986b) was followed by a move towards 
reconciliation and mutual enrolment (Ie Grand 1987) between different groups 
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of experts, in the face of continued government pressure being exerted on ALL 
forms of "social engineering" (see section 6.2.1.), including "economic advice". 
We have seen that when a major paper from the LS team on the health of 
men seeking work in the week of the 1981 Census was published in January of 
1987, it received no publicity at all (section 8.2.3). Three weeks later, the 
Medical Research Council told Fox that his request for a new programme grant 
of 5 years had been cut to two. Shortly afterwards, the team were told that 
due to the large pay rise granted academic staff, it was doubtful whether even 
two more years work could be funded by the MRC. (In the event, they did 
receive two years' funding). It is tempting here (and was even more tempting 
to me at the end of my period of observation, still closely tied-up with my own 
fieldwork identity of "apprentice") to regret that the debate went no further, 
that there was no confrontation between the "behaviorist" interpretations of 
Gravelle and Cook and the "structuralist" ones of Moser, Fox and their 
colleagues. The purpose of this account has not been to make 
recommendations about future research programmes on unemployment and 
other forms of inequality on health, although the description of those alliances 
which did not become consolidated, such as those between health and poverty 
researchers, may appear suggestive. But perhaps it should not surprise us that 
when an account of scientific controversy is written so as to make explicit, 
rather than, (as normally happens), to hide the relationships, accidents, and 
decisions which socially organise the debate, alternative directions seem to 
appear which, to some, could prove rather "interesting". 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION: THE SOCIAL-PROBLEM PROCESS 
AND THE ABANDONMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 
This account of the unemployment and health debate between 1975 and 
1987 has tried to show the ways in which entrepreneurial activities by 
professional and disciplinary subgroups produced knowledge claims and 
attempted to establish these claims as resources ("obligatory points of 
passage", see section 2.1) to other significant groups in their "trans-scientific 
fields". It has traced the formulation of the claims, and the controversy to 
which they gave rise, by treating the debate as a social problem process, and 
(for the latter part of the period) following it "in hot blood". The aim has not 
been to make judgement on the "correctness" or "incorrectness" of the claims, 
but to trace the ways in which groups in the scientific and trans-scientific 
environment of the researchers adopted or opposed knowledge claims, or took 
up a "wait and see" position, all as part of their own occupational and 
micro-political strategies. 
10.1 A twilight world 
At the beginning of the process, the scientific groups involved were: 
- statisticians working on "public health" issues, influenced or trained in the 
traditions of the General Register Office who regarded vital statistics as a 
form of social monitoring, and feared the decline of this role after the 
Rayner reviews 
- economists involved in work on either health or labour market issues, with 
links to a government advisory role which had been less threatened than 
that of the statisticians by the political and administrative changes which 
took place during the period under study 
- medical sociologists engaged in the more "quantitative" types of study, but 
much further removed from any advisory role to departments of state. 
All three of these groups sought a more prominent role in the health 
planning process, at a time when health planning questions were high on 
government agendas. Their participation in the unemployment and health 
debate can be understood by setting it against the kinds of claims they made 
about "public health" and health "service" issues, within the economic, political 
and administrative context of the period at which the debate took place. Those 
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disciplines whose members claimed that unemployment did affect health were 
the more threatened ones (medical sociology, "social/medical" statistics) and 
the professional group with whom they allied was similarly threatened, in its 
turn, not by Rayner reviews or other cuts in government funding provided for 
research, but by successive rounds of NHS reorganisation. Economists, in 
contrast, had relatively well established alliances with policy-makers In 
government departments. Some were also quietly pursuing a a long-term 
strategy of "inter-esting" factions within the medical profession (see Mulkay et. 
al. 1987 a and b). Others offered interpretations of the relationship between 
unemployment and physical health as "resources" to client groups within 
government with the skill for which they were respected -- the ability to tell 
whether the customer wanted "the Black Magic or the Dairy Box". In 1979 this 
involved questions about "whether the RAWP formula should be changed to 
include measures of unemployment". In 1981 it included a critique of Brenner's 
methods. In 1984 it was a matter of "recommending measures of alleviation" 
within an accepted context of high rates of long-term unemployment In 
particular. Economists made no efforts to gain media attention or to engage in 
pressure-group activity, and were indeed acutely embarrassed on the rare 
occasions on which the media did feature their work (a headline claiming "No 
Jobs Link with III Health" was dismissed by one economist as 'What I am 
SUPPOSED to have said", see Black 1981). The statisticians, in contrast, and 
also true to their "form" as seen by civil servants, pursued "the truth" (which, 
as one remarked bitterly in late 1987, "you are only allowed to tell this 
government once in a career"). Thus did different occupational cultures affect 
the ways in which members of the two disciplines reacted to changes in 
macro-economic and political climate. 
The claim "unemployment causes ill-health/mortality" was brought to public 
and political debate by the activity of an "intermediate body" (in Hall et. al.'s 
sense) whose role was to promote informed discussion of health policy issues, 
and two quasi-pressure groups (one terming itself a "study group", the other a 
"forum") which provided "subsidized" information, not only to the media, but to 
other entrepreneurial professionalising groups (health visitors, health educators, 
community workers). Yet we must remember that the membership of the Unit 
for the Study of Health Policy, the Unemployment and Health Study Group, and 
the Social Costs of Unemployment Forum was also largely COMPOSED of 
members of the major subdisciplines and subprofessions (sociology, community 
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medicine, health education, community health development, etc}. Participation in 
the pressure groups was one strategy by which the researchers stimulated 
demand for their expertise, and the professionals for their authority. 
Nor was it the WHOLE subprofession of community medicine (any more 
than it was all health economists, or medical statisticians) who saw one or 
other "side" of the unemployment and health debate as a suitable testing 
ground for their claims. Within community medicine, the majority were probably 
of a more "managerial" than "public-health" orientation. In any case, they could 
rest assured that the posts of District and Regional Medical Officers and of 
"specialist" in community medicine could only be filled by medically qualified 
persons. Establishing (or re-establishing) a public-health role for the 
subprofession was therefore not seen as an essential activity by the majority. 
However, by late 1987, the Acheson Report on the future of community 
medicine and the public health function was awaited with some anxiety, and 
the feeling was spreading that previous attitudes may have been too 
complacent, and that the Acheson Report could "wipe out" community medicine 
in its present form. 
By early 1987, the sociologists and "manifesto" community physicians had 
found other issues through which to pursue their aims (some of these around 
a revived debate on the causes of and remedies for class inequalities in health). 
They more or less withdrew from the debate, leaving the social statisticians of 
the LS team with their painstakingly established "structural" theory of the 
effects of unemployment on health which was now, for the time being at least, 
not a necessary resource either to pressure groups, political parties, 
professionalising groups, officials, or the decision-makers within research 
funding bodies. As a result, the knowledge claim that "the absence of 
'wearing-off of the unhealthy nonworker effect' supports a structural rather 
than an individual interpretation of health inequalities" remained a fragile 
object, little understood, and hardly used in public debate (see Hansard 23 
October 1987, col 1046 for the first, rather vague, appearance of the argument 
in Parliament). It is argued here that the fragility of this argument is the 
CONSEQUENCE of the strategiC re-grouping of those involved in the 
unemployment and health debate. Certainly there is no evidence to support the 
opposite case (that the claim was "dropped" by the rest of the policy 
community because "conclusive" evidence against it had been accumulating). 
The idea was not "discredited". It was merely abandoned, left in the twilight 
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world or "limbo" phase of Downs' model of the social-problem process. 
McCarthy (1986), in his study of the Child Poverty Action Group (see section 
1.2), has made illuminating use of Downs' "stages". He suggests three reasons 
why social-problem processes enter the "fourth stage" of a "twilight world of 
lesser attention and spasmodic recurrences of interest." 
1. The fact that "some people think the issue is to big to solve" 
2. The social problem comes to be seen as confined to the "rough" section 
of the working class, partly because of media treatment of the issue, and 
is therefore abandoned by labour organisations 
3. The "dilettantism" of "those who simply become bored and disenchanted 
by the issue and passively await the arrival of a new... issue". Here 
"those" include Ministers, civil servants, academics and journalists, as well 
as "middle class do-gooders" who "flippantly desert" issues, leaving them 
"largely unresolved" (pp. 100-104) 
By mid-1987, all three of these things seemed to have happened to the 
unemployment and health debate. Civil servants had long regarded the 
"problem" as "too big", either inherently ("what could the DHSS do about it?"), 
or because it crossed departmental boundaries (see section 3.3), or because of 
government policy ("You know and I know this government is not going to 
make a U-turn ... ", see section 7.4). Seaton (1986, p. 19) found that as 
unemployment increased during the 1980s, its news value tended to fall. Her 
study of coverage in The Times showed an "inverse relationship between the 
percentage of the population out of work and the front page attention given to 
the subject ... " One journalist, commenting on the failure of the Labour Party to 
take up Steve Platt's research in 1983, remarked that unemployment and 
suicidal behaviour was "too big" for a political party as well. Opposition 
politicians, Bryan Christie felt, look for issues over which they can quickly 
demonstrate the superiority of their own policies. The spirit in which the 
likelihood of the existence of "the unemployment effect" was admitted by a 
policy adviser in late 1984 had been almost one of breathlessness at the 
enormity of what it entailed (see section 7.4). This was also reflected in a 
Lancet leading article of November 1984, which, perhaps unintentionally, 
highlighted the contrast between the (relatively) minute sums that could be 
spent on even the most expensive research, and what would be necessary to 
tackle the underlying problem of mass unemployment. Those who dealt with 
this larger problem in terms of practical economics had never joined in the 
debate on "health" (see section 4.3.3). 
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The second cause to which McCarthy attributes the languishing of a social 
problem process, that is, of the better-off and poorer sections of the working 
class being turned against each other, amounts to what I have termed "moral 
fragmentation". In McCarthy's case study, the problem is that of poverty rather 
than "the health of the unemployed", but the same analysis can be applied. For 
McCarthy, the media play a decisive role in individualising social problems. 
Seaton (1986, p. 28) disagrees, and holds that the media "have not been an 
overriding independent influence on attitudes towards unemployment" but 
rather acted as a "catalyst" of new attitudes which emerged, as she sees it, 
mysteriously. In the present case study also, other factors seem to have been 
at work. The media occasionally picked up statements made by those who 
opposed the idea that unemployment affected health ("Dole is like a holiday, 
says economist"). But "Death on the dole" headlines were the vast majority. 
We need to look elsewhere for the source of individualisation, and this study 
has argued that it was the entrepreneurial activities of some economists, and 
the established alliances and new enrolments which they sought, which 
produced an account of the poor health of the unemployed as a product of 
individual characteristics. Changes in public awareness and perception of the 
phenomenon of unemployment in Britain may well have played a role in the 
easy acceptance of these experts' views, however. By 1983-4, the pattern of 
unemployment was one of increasing inequality of distribution: that is, the risk 
of unemployment was, if anything, more concentrated within social classes IV 
and V than it had been in the mid-1970s (Sinfield 1987). There were grounds 
for thinking that the tendency described by Stern for the 1970s (Stern 1979) 
had become even stronger as unemployment rose and then stabilised at new 
heights. As more of the total amount of unemployment was experienced by the 
same people, either as long-term spells without work or as a life "in and out of 
work", those in steady jobs had every reason to feel less personally 
preoccupied by what unemployment might do to them if it struck (see section 
6.1.2). As these trends became clearer, it was less and less likely that labour 
organisations would ever be "enrolled" in a debate on the health of the 
unemployed (although they began to take up the question of the pay and 
conditions of workers in the "secondary labour market") At the same time, 
sociologists were showing that there was a growth in the proportion of the 
labour force employed in low-paid, part-time, and/or intermittent forms of work 
(Fevre 1986, Walker, Noble and Westergaard 1985, Harris, Lee and Morris 1985, 
Martin 1987) Unions organising unskilled and service sector worker, as well as 
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certain industrial sociologists, could have been "enrolled" by those researchers 
who believed there were important health consequences to recession, and who 
wrote of "residualisation" as did Fox (1986 unpublished), Moser et. al.( 1987}, and 
Platt (1986)48. 
This unfulfilled possibility is the reason why McCarthy's third point, on 
"dilettantism", needs to be considered rather more carefully as it applies to the 
present case study. Firstly, the considerations of "time", priorities, and funding 
which have been discussed in section 1. 4., indicate that we can perhaps go 
beyond a concept of "dilettantism" in explaining why expert groups abandon 
social problems. Academics, for example, must enrol resource holders if they 
wish to acquire the means to do research of any kind. Secondly, although 
necessary discretion of both academics funded by government departments 
and of civil servants created considerable problems in interpreting the interview 
and field material in the present study, questions about the degree of 
"pressure" applied to unruly experts have to be addressed. Only a fine line 
divides the ability to "see which way the political wind is blowing" from 
"government suppression of research", and some field material did indicate that 
certain researchers felt under considerable pressure to abandon work on the 
effects of social inequality and unemployment on health. The spirit of routinely 
"moving on to the next thing" was certainly present49 in some researchers. 
Others, however, by 1987, did seem discouraged even to the extent of feeling a 
sense of "depression" and futility, which, they feared, had affected their 
academic "productivity". 
There were some, certainly, who felt that academics (in medical and other 
disciplines) who became involved in the debate had been engaged on an 
imperialistic exercise, and who might therefore regard their loss of interest as a 
form of opportunism (such as that attributed to medical sociologists by Strong, 
1979) or "dilettantism". This would, however, be rather a simplified picture of 
the way in which entrepreneurial sub-professions dealt with unemployment and 
health. "Manifesto" community physicians such as Peter Draper had always 
------~---~-~-
48 But the difficulties involved in sustammg any form of "enrolment" between reforming groups 
and the "unskilled" working class, the unemployed. or other "consumers" of social welfare services 
has been commented upon. for example. by Hall et. al (1978. p. 91). and Ditch (1986). 
49 though it should be asked why the history of science contains so many instances of problems 
being abandoned for no immediately obvious reason (see for example Collins and Pinch 1979. p. 
239). this questions cannot be addressed here and "moving on" is taken to be a routine practice 
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made it clear that the topic was not central to them but only one issue which 
could be used as a vehicle to promote wider objectives (section 4.1.1). Civil 
servants (including professional advisers) and journalists, as has been 
discussed, have a "cycle of credibility" which involves "having a bright idea and 
fighting for it", and then "re-investing" the career capital thus obtained. If there 
is dillettantism or opportunism, it must be regarded as institutional in nature. 
The decline of interest amongst subprofessional factions, for example within 
medicine, social work, nursing, and health education did, however, have an 
important effect on the academic debate. This interest had reached its peak in 
1981-2, and been reflected in the rush of conferences on unemployment and 
health which had encouraged groups such as the UHSG and SCUF, and 
produced a high demand for their expertise. Since that time, however, other 
events had intervened to increase the confidence with which these 
professionalising groups could enter new territories. During 1981-2, to judge 
from the content of their Annual Conferences, health visitors, and even 
librarians, for example, were adopting the welfare of the unemployed as a 
legitimate area for the exercise of their skills. But by 1986 it was no longer 
necessary for these groups to enter into debates over the KNOWLEDGE-claim 
that unemployment damaged health. The knowledge claim was either 
sufficiently accepted by decision-makers within the professions and their 
organisational contexts, or far less important as they found new reasons to 
claim a portion in the wider social problem of unemployment. As the 
subprofessional groups stopped raising the issue, journalists were no longer 
receiving "information subsidy" on the subject. And it was the disappearance of 
this phenomenon -- sub-professional activism combined with information 
subsidy -- which lowered the political temperature of the academic debate. No 
longer a "political hot potato", unemployment and health no longer attracted 
resources on the "customer-contractor" or "concordat" (see Ch. 3) principles by 
which government Departments could persuade scientifically respectable 
groups to devote resources to "fuzzy" topics. 
1 0.2 Implications for theory and method 
In attempting to understand the progress of a policy-related academic 
controversy, and thereby to better understand the shifting status of the factual 
claims which it may produce, the concepts and methods of the "strong 
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programme" in the sociology of scientific knowledge have proved valuable. By 
giving equal weight to all knowledge claims, devoting equal attention to those 
regarded as "true" and "false", and seeking the social and organisational 
patterns which give rise to both "rational" and "irrational" beliefs this method 
allows a common perspective to be applied to studying the actions of 
"researchers" and "policy actors" ("Authorities and Partisans" in the words of 
Hall et. al.). An established "fact" in a policy-related inquiry is just one possible 
outcome of a social problem process. "Facts" occur when statements become 
an "obligatory points of passage" that bind together a variety of those groups 
which have entered the process seeking their own different objectives. Recent 
studies of policy communities (for example, McMahon et. al. 1983) and their 
interaction with researchers offer a very similar analysis to those of the 
sociologists of science whose work has been used as a guide in this study. 
For example, speaking of social research in government, Walker (1987) feels 
that 
.. .it would be wrong to underestimate the individual motives and 
sub-departmental interests that underpin some government 
research. In the same way that researchers may initiate research 
to further their own individual and collective interest, so do 
policy makers .... As a result, policies tend to evolve -- in part at 
least -- through a process of conflict and changing alliances 
between policy divisions in which research is one of the many 
'weapons' that are deployed 
Describing the wider context of such Whitehall dealings, Moon and Richardson 
point out that: 
Virtually all political issues carry with them a constellation of 
groups, jockeying to influence policy-makers .,. and trying to 
influence the definition of the issue to their own advantage. 
Groups are engaged in pursuing a wide variety of objectives, and 
"knowledge-claims" are a currency (amongst others) in this process. A 
knowledge claim which proves useful to the all relevant groups becomes an 
"obligatory point of passage" and is accepted as "fact". Scientific debates will 
persist when unadjudicated claims create "bottle-necks" which hinder either the 
accomplishment of professional or political objectives (which, as we have seen, 
are often closely inter-related). But debates do not only end in "closure" by 
the establishment of "facts". They can also end when the participants simply 
disengage, when other means of reaching groups' objectives become available. 
Under these circumstances potential points of passage become mere diversions 
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or dead ends, and knowledge claims no longer attract even enough attention to 
sustain controversy. 
We may think of other examples of (at least temporarily) abandoned 
knowledge claims, such as the outcomes of debate on race or class and 
intelligence (Harwood 1979, 1982), and of the investigation of environmental 
hazards such as lead or radiation. What is the current epistemological status of 
the factual claims made in the course of these debates? Sociologically, the 
question is not whether some are true and others false, but rather what were 
the organisational and political circumstances which gave rise to these claims 
and what changes in these circumstances led to the ending of controversy? 
This may result from the judicial decision at the end of an inquiry, for example, 
or a re-organisation of the school system brought about following a change of 
government. Such questions are pertinent (according to the "rule of symmetry" 
discussed in section 2.1) whether or not one aspect of this "closure" of debate 
was an acceptance of the truth of specific knowledge-claims. 
At the outset of the present study there were two aims: 
1. To follow a policy-related academic debate "in hot blood", to see whether 
what some onlookers and participants (including myself) saw at the time 
(late 1982) as academically superior research would have a greater impact 
on policy discussion and decision-making than the "discredited" work of 
M H Brenner. 
2. To attempt to apply theoretical approaches drawn from sociology and 
social policy (the "social problems perspective") and from the sociology of 
scientific knowledge, and specifically the "translation model", to the 
understanding of the debate as it progressed. 
The present account has been structured by the attempt to apply a 
social-problems perspective elaborated according to the "translation" model 01 
the construction of scientific knowledge. Material has been selected by a 
series of decisions taken on the basis of the theoretical approaches adopted. 
These approaches, however, were not adopted at the beginning of the study 
and carried throughout. I have included, in chapters 1. and 2., some discussion 
of the ways in which theoretical ideas were tentatively applied and, in many 
cases, had to be rejected, sometimes after a lengthy process involving the 
collection of much material, which ended up as one or two sentences. For 
example, I felt that the prediction that media interest in the health aspects of 
unemployment would be aroused by spates of factory closure stories, marches 
of the unemployed, or other similar "macro-social" events could be regarded as 
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discredited only after some two years of collecting newspaper cuttings, 
pressure-group minutes, and notes from Hansard. This finding increased my 
confidence in the idea that the social-problem process in this case was created 
by entrepreneurial activities amongst subprofessional and subdisciplinary 
groups. But to see it as a "positive" finding IN SUPPORT of my analysis is to 
ignore my earlier "hunches" about the role played by "the media reacting to 
social movements and macro-economic change" as a force in the 
social-problem process. The reluctance of the media to follow up plant 
closures with "health" stories appeared, at first, as something as puzzling as 
the insistence of a high proportion of my scientists that they were totally 
uninterested in the health effects of unemployment full stop, and even moreso 
in whatever "political" meaning the debate might be seen as having. 
Nor did I set out with a conviction that the two approaches I adopted 
would converge into a common perspective (although began to hope so in a 
very vague way quite early on).At first, the two approaches (the social 
problems perspective and the "translation" model drawn from sociology of 
scientific knowledge) appeared to apply to quite separate aspects of the 
debate. Interview and field material relevant to the scientific controversy was 
addressed with the aid of concepts drawn from the "translation" model as 
described in Chapter 1. The social-problem "stages" model was used to make 
sense of the policy debate and the material derived from interviews with 
officials, activists, and media-workers. As both the history of the debate and 
the progress of my interviewing continued, however, there were two 
developments. 
Firstly, it began to be clear that there were more similarities than I had 
expected between the ways in which members of the different groups involved 
in the debate spoke about their own actions. Secondly, a new literature began 
to emerge in the sociology of scientific knowledge, which seemed to point to a 
convergence between ways of understanding "pure" scientists, and ways of 
understanding "technologists", administrators, and even "politicians". 
Sociologists of scientific knowledge (this is the point of not calling the 
perspective "sociology of science') had long insisted that the cognitive closure 
of scientific debates could only be accounted for in terms of the social 
relationships within which science is located. My own struggles with the data 
in the present study, which stubbornly refused to display social or political 
"interests" as characteristics differentiating the antagonists in the debate, led 
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me to concentrate on the professional rather than the political allegiance of 
participants, and on the micro-politics of what seemed to be the relevant 
"technology", namely, "social engineering", the technologies of welfare. 
In conclusion, to return to the set of questions of theory and method posed 
at the beginning of this account, can approaches derived from the sociology of 
scientific knowledge and a "social problem" perspective help to organise the 
material produced in a case study such as the present one in such a way as to 
aid in understanding its progress? 
A "stages model", and Spector and Kitsuse's method of "following the 
problem wherever it goes" both guides the researcher through the debate and 
helps to order the material which results. However, as Manning has pointed 
out, the "stages model" requires to be adapted and elaborated by a more 
detailed understanding of the different groups which become involved in social 
problem processes. In the present study this has involved drawing concepts 
from other work, such as Gandy's on the media, Richardson and Jordan, Heclo 
and Wildavsky, and Lindblom on the operation of "issue communities", and 
sociologists of scientific knowledge on science as a socially organised activity. 
In the process, it has emerged that scientists, journalists, professionals and 
officials can all be regarded as following the "cycles of credibility" appropriate 
to their occupational cultures. In order to understand WHO becomes involved in 
policy-related academic debates, these aspects of occupational culture need to 
be addressed. In order to understand what those who become involve do, it is 
necessary to trace out the objectives of the groups involved, and the ways in 
which individuals and groups pursue these objectives by "inter-esting" and 
forming alliances with each other. In this sense, it does seem that "interests" 
play an important role in the framing, contestation, and acceptance of 
knowledge claims as "fact". However, in the present study, neither social 
background nor political allegiance seemed to account fully for participants' 
actions. In addition, it was necessary to understand the "interest-work" carried 
out by individuals as members of entrepreneurial sub-professional or 
sub-disciplinary groups, and the relationships of these groups to each other 
and to other, often similarly "entrepreneurial" clientgroups. 
The social problem perspective not only provided a useful guide to the 
overall progress of the debate (the "stages"), but also clarified aspects of the 
scientific process WITHIN the debate. In fact, the "translation" approach itself 
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can usefully be regarded as a type of social-problem perspective. 
The "translation" approach was found to be a satisfactory guide, not only to 
understanding the actions of scientists, but also of officials and professionals, 
both in the "more" and "less academic" phases of the debate. This might have 
been expected, given that the chosen debate was one with a high "scientific" 
content. However, as outlined above, the translation approach does benefit 
from insights drawn from the social-problems perspective, and needs to be 
further developed by other case studies involving more detailed consideration 
of the dynamics at work in the "trans-scientific field" of government 
departments, funding bodies, professions and wider social movements. 
How well did concepts taken from these two perspectives "fit" the unfolding 
events in the debate? 
1. "Moral and technical fragmentation", as described by Manning, did seem 
to take place. However, once again events seemed to call for a rather 
more complex application of the concepts than proposed 
a. 'Technical fragmentation" was seen to be a response to strong 
contestation of a political and/or academic type (or, more accurately, 
the to the type of powerful academic counter-argument which could 
be produced given the policy-decision to "interest" academics in 
investing time and effort in such an argument.) Rather differently to 
what is proposed by Habermas (197', and see also discussion of this 
by Scott 1988) and some of his followers, the present study did not 
find that technical fragmentation operated as a form of social control 
exerted by or through scientists. On the contrary, the more 
technically fragmented an argument became, the more lik.ely it was 
that all sides of a policy debate would eventually lose interest in it. 
b. "Moral fragmentation" could tak.e place at higher or lower levels of 
technical sophistication and was independent of this. Moral 
fragmentation comes closer to the concepts used both by Habermas 
and by Manning, that is, the "reduction" of a collective problem to 
one concerned with the characteristics of individuals. 
2. The role of the media and the concept of "information subsidy": The role 
of the media was not at all what had been expected at the outset of the 
study. Rather than any consistent tendency of journalists to 
"independently" distort or sensationalise research results and other forms 
of expert pronouncement, it appeared that experts' attempts to "interest" 
client groups and to claim a role in the social problem process played a 
major role, through the mechanism of information subsidy, in producing 
media "stories" which attracted public attention. 
3. The role of 'pressure groups~ in its turn, appeared far more similar to 
that of entrepreneurial "ginger groups" within professions and disciplines 
than had been expected. The first hint of this was the difficulty I had 
when coding my interviews, deciding who to code as "P" (professional) 
and who as "A" ("activist"). The initial distinction between "authorities" and 
"partisans" (Hall, Land, Webb and Parker) was far too simple to be 
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maintained throughout the case study. For one thing, the most energetic 
members of pressure groups were also enterprising professionals or 
academics, and NOT (as may be the case in other social-problem 
processes) members of wider social movements. 
Concepts and rules of method derived from recent work in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge have guided the analysis of the activities of individual 
members of the debate's "core group" and of the professional and disciplinary 
factions to which they belonged. 
1. The two principles of "beginning with controversy" and "following the 
course of action wherever it leads" are common to both Latour and 
Calion's translation perspective and Spector and Kitsuse's method for the 
investigation of social problem processes. Adherence to these rules of 
method was more or less inevitable given the starting point of the 
present study. 
2. The "principle of symmetry" helped to avoid attempts to "fix" the state of 
knowledge in the debate at any given point in time as having established 
what was "really the case", which would have been a fruitless exercise 
and might have cut off the investigation arbitrarily. 
3. "Explanation by association and situation" has helped to concentrate the 
analysis on the shifting balance of alliances between scientists, 
professionals and officials which gave the debate its shape. 
We have seen in this account the varying degrees to which subdisciplines 
concentrated on "translating" their theories, methods and findings into forms 
which would attract allies from their trans-scientific fields, and the outcome of 
these efforts in terms of research coming to be seen as more or less 
"policy-relevant", "fundable" and "yielding firm results". One aspect of the 
enrolment process made more visible in the present case-study than it may 
have been in some others (for example, Calion 1986, Coutouzis and Latour 
1985) is the effect of science policies formulated at governmental level and 
acting via decisions made in the "independent" research councils. The effect of 
the Rothschild reforms in encouraging research councils to look favourably 
upon "pOlicy-relevant" work was to raise the priority of "unemployment and 
health" in the eyes of MRC-funded research teams. As well as making it 
"controversial", the political salience of the debate also made it 
"policy-relevant". This had consequences for scientists' opportunities to 
advance their own individual "cycles of credibility" and those of the research 
groups they belonged to (see section 7.2). 
As Collins (1985) has warned, however, attracting more attention is a 
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double-edged weapon to a research team. New allies (as Latour 1987 also 
points out) can be unreliable, and new opponents may also be attracted into 
the field. However, as Shapin (1982) has argued, conflict also intensifies 
scientists' efforts to construct their claims as "objective" and "value-free". The 
knowledge-claim "the effect of unemployment on mortality cannot be due to 
selection" was based on an intricate argument. This argument expressed a 
tentative "lash-up" of several professional and disciplinary subgroups: 
public-health oriented epidemiologists and community physiCians, occupational 
medicine, vital statisticians concerned with "social indicators,,50. Whether this 
statement would become a "fact" depended (and continued to depend at the 
end of the study period) on the strength of the associations and alliances 
around the researchers. Between September 1986 and late 1987 these alliances 
appeared to become "untied", and the "wearing off of selection" began to fade 
towards uncertainty. But it does not by any means follow that the statement 
will not, at some future time, regain a degree of "solidity", if it once again 
provides a potential "point of passage" through which a sufficient number of 
interest-groups must pass in pursuit of their aims, and if these aims are met 
with "success" in policy terms. In the unlikely event, for example, of a marked 
equalisation of living and working conditions in British society being followed 
by a reduction in class inequalities in mortality, the ideas developed at the 
Social Statistics Research Unit might well come to be regarded as 
unquestioningly as those of John Snow on cholera (Jones and Cameron 1983) 
or Pasteur on anthrax (Latour 1984b). It is, however, as pointed out by the 
economist in section 7.4, most unlikely that such policy change would come 
about BECAUSE the arguments of any particular group of researchers were 
"accepted,,51. 
This argument returns us to the question of the relationship between the 
"quality" of research (as judged by the "scientific community") and its impact 
on policy debate. Bulmer (1986) points out that in Cohen and Garet's (1975) 
study of the effect of applied social research on educational policy-making: 
50 Another group which might have been expected to be included was the "poverty lobby", bu~ by 
late 1987 this enrolment had not yet been seriously attempted from either Side (researchers or 
"activists"') perhaps for the sorts of reasons discussed in the context of the Stirling conference of 
June 1982 (see section 4.3.3). 
51 Although an important and rather unexpected postscript to thiS account occurred in February 
of 1988, when John Fox was appointed Chief Medical Statistician at the OPCS. 
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There was no clear connection between relevance, 
methodological sophistication and authoritativeness [partly 
because] methodologically superior knowledge was more 
complex, arcane and hard to interpret (Bulmer 1986) 
In the course of the debate described by Cohen and Garet, as in the present 
case study 
the knowledge produced improved by any scientific standard, but 
was not more authoritative by any political standard, and often 
more mystifying by any public standard (Bulmer 1986, p. 26-27). 
However, it cannot be concluded from this study of the unemployment and 
health debate that there is necessarily a trade-off between "quality=complexity" 
on the one hand and "clarity=over-simplification" on the other. Brenner's work 
was regarded as the most "arcane" by participants, though not as the "best". 
Nor can the failure of the LS team's work to become widely accepted be 
attributed to its complexity alone. Highly technical work, in this debate, was 
sometimes seen to be relatively easily translatable, and less technical work 
more difficult to communicate to participants in the policy process. 
The perspectives used in this study should perhaps lead to are-formulation 
of questions such as 
- ''What is the influence of research on policy?", or 
- "Is the lack of influence of social research on policy due to the poor quality 
of the research?" 
It might be more fruitful to inquire into the ways in which "social problem 
processes" produce opportunities for claims to expertise to be made, and 
thereby shape both "debated" and "accepted" knowledge itself. Such a 
reformulation has been suggested by Rein, who sees the relationship as an 
"interplay" (Rein 1980) and holds that 
intervention pushes research rather than the other way around ... 
The challenge is not linking research to policy, but uncovering 
the latent policies that organize the empirical research carried 
out by social science (Rein 1983, p. 228, 245). 
Such a reformulation would bring us closer to the ways in which 
participants in policy-related academic debates themselves see the relationship 
-- as constructed within an iterative process in which individuals and groups 
make claims about the "truth" and "pOlicy-relevance" of some aspect of their 
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work as a form of strategic advance into a new field or market-place which 
has opened up as a result of conflict and change in the policy making arena. 
Claims-making is therefore adapted to the different perceived characteristics of 
the field, such as the nature and strength of the opposition, and the "interests" 
of potential allies. Knowledge claims weave their way in and out of policy 
debates, often by means of such "vectors" as researchers' tactical use of 
information subsidy, and participation in pressure groups. Other tactics (less 
visible to an outside investigator and therefore not discussed at length here) 
include informal contact with decision-makers, as evidenced by officials' 
nervousness about "stirring-up" members of the academic community who are 
seen as able to mobilise either the media or "powerful acquaintances" with the 
ability to influence funding decisions. Future case studies may examine the fate 
of other knowledge-claims in relation to their articulation with policy objectives 
in this more "symmetrical" fashion. 
Outcomes of the interactions between the parties to a debate could also be 
seen in terms of quite transparently "political" objectives: "Ministers didn't want 
to know". However, both the present case study, and much existing literature 
on British policy-making shows that (unlike many of the participants in the 
debate), the sociological analyst should not simply assume that a 
social-democratic government is sympathetic to research and a conservative 
one less so. McCarthy (1986) argues that the "right-wing research institutes" 
had a strong influence on Conservative economic and social policy, by virtue of 
persistent and painstaking lobbying for certain ideas over a long period of time. 
As we have seen, knowledge claims are produced and elaborated by individuals 
and groups with their OWN aims and objectives, not reactive in any simple 
sense to "political pressures". Understanding political allegiances seems to be 
less helpful than understanding the ways in which expert groups enter policy 
debates with a history of participation in previous social-problem processes, 
which has established their methods and the data available to them as 
"resources". At the time of the debate, work within government departments 
provided a major market for the skills of both economists and statisticians. 
However, the work of the economists may be regarded as including a form of 
"management of an economy". That of statisticians, in contrast, was more in 
the nature of "management of a population. The different technologies 
involved in these two different kinds of management both influenced and 
constrained what could or would be adopted and offered to client groups as 
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either a "problem" or a "solution". Put somewhat crudely, there was a 
knowledge-claim: 
- "Inequality" (social or medical) is a result of the "unfitness" of a small 
section of the population. This unfitness is either inherited or acquired in 
early childhood (due to poor parental skills). Therefore, differences in health 
or life expectancy between groups with different experiences of adult life 
should not be attributed to those experiences (work, income, 
unemployment). 
which had been proposed by various researchers over a very long period of 
time (for an account see Jones 1986). It was reflected, for example, in IIlsley's 
much-respected work on perinatal mortality carried out in the 1950s. Jon 
Stern's work on health inequality described in chapter 6 could be seen (as it 
was by Fox, for example) as located in the old Eugenic tradition discussed by 
Mackenzie. This knowledge-claim came to be seen as a potential resource by 
policy-makers who took a counter-Keynesian stance. A good early example of 
this was Sir Keith Joseph's notion of "transmitted deprivation". An opportunity 
for "enrolment" was therefore presented to economists working with ideas of a 
"human capital production function". Although many economists would not 
regard it this way, there is a possible translation of "human capital theory", 
espoused at least transitorily by several economists prominent in both the 
unemployment and health and the health inequality debates (Stern, Gravelle, 
see also the references given above to the work of Julian Ie Grand and Illsley 
himself on health inequality), which allows the theory to attribute misfortune to 
individual characteristics and "free choices" (for example, to invest in education, 
exercise or a healthy diet). Individual economists may later have abandoned 
this interpretation, but during the most politically heated period of the 
unemployment and health debate, much of the evidence presented here (for 
example, sections 6.2.1, 7.4) seems to indicate its importance. 
,Whether or not the enrolment between certain economists and 
policy-makers would hold remained to be seen by the end of this case study. 
The work of the LS team presented a potential challenge to such an alliance 
because they were attempting to establish the concept of the "wearing off of 
selection" as a method of distinguishing between group-specific patterns of 
mortality which could be attributed to selection (pre-existing "unfitness") and 
those which could not. But knowledge claims about the effects of 
unemployment and class inequality on health did not DETERMINE the outcome 
of these attempts. On the contrary, the truth-status of the various "findings" 
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and "models" was a RESULT of the varying success of the groups that made 
them in enrolling allies and maintaining their alliances. An impression was 
growing by the end of field work that the threat to the size of the market for 
the economists' skills posed by successive waves of government 
re-organisations was making the enrolment between economists and 
policy-makers (in this and in other issue communities) increasingly tenuous. 
Booth (1982), for example, has observed that: 
Social planning is in the doldrums ... After all, who needs to 
bother with planning if the market, released from the distortions 
and burdens of state intervention, official regulation and 
bureaucratic red tape, will by itself maximize national wellbeing? 
And Michael Heseltine, when Secretary of State for the environment, was 
reputed (by disconsolate government statisticians) to have said, "Research on 
housing? We don't need research, we take decisions on housing and we 
implement them, that's all there is to it". Such trends in government thinking 
were more likely to encourage an alliance between the expert groups 
themselves. 
One criterion by which to judge the usefulness of the present study would 
be whether it could equip other researchers better to address questions about 
other teams of experts, such as the "right-wing" Institutes (Adam Smith, 
Economic Affairs) and the "non-aligned" ones (Brookings, PSI), and their 
relationships to political parties and to Whitehall, Westminster, or Capitol Hi1l 52 . 
The origins of the unemployment and health debate can be seen, on one level, 
as residing in the much grander conflict in which counter-Keynesian economic 
thinkers sought to mobilise behind their technical claims (in the form of 
"scrounger debates" for example), a growing social movement, that is, the 
growing discontent with the failures of mixed economy "welfarism,,53. The 
outcome of the present study would suggest that future research on the 
question of the relationship between research and policy might consider more 
carefully the positions of professional and disciplinary sub-groups as 
"entrepreneurial" claimants to areas of expertise, and of both political parties 
52 A most interesting example is recently provided by Anna Pollert's analysis of the concept of 
the "flexible firm" as a product of the mediating role between government and mdustry played by 
an "intermediate body", the Institute of Manpower Studies, see Pollert 1987. 
53 This would account for the attractiveness to some on BOTH sides of the debate of the ide~s of 
M H Brenner, which bore the mark of his early training as an economist in the KeyneSian tradition. 
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and government officials as "brokers" of social-problem areas. 
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